

INTEGRATED  
ASSESSMENT  
AND  
PLANNING  
**HANDBOOK**

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## Introduction

The United Nations Secretary-General's endorsement of the *Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning*<sup>1</sup> reaffirms the Organization's commitment to integration as a way of maximizing the individual and collective impact of the United Nations in conflict and post-conflict situations. Now more than ever, when the sources of instability and conflict are increasingly multidimensional and the environment is one of significant resource constraints, the United Nations family must maintain unity of purpose and work together to do "better with less", if it is to be effective in meeting the needs of war-torn societies. The diversity of mandates and the need to respect agreed principles across the range of political, security, humanitarian, human rights and development responses is not a barrier to integration. In fact, this diversity is an asset, which can be harnessed by the Organization in a manner that enhances, rather than undermines, each response.

The mandatory minimum requirements established by the IAP Policy have been designed – and subsequently agreed by the leadership of the United Nations – to ensure that the purposes of integration can be achieved. The IAP Policy does not, however, over-prescribe how to meet each requirement, which must be adapted to the specific characteristics of each situation by those directly involved in the response in the field and at Headquarters.

It is in the same spirit that the following Handbook on the implementation of the IAP Policy has been developed. The Handbook captures – and celebrates – the creativity and breadth of innovation already on display in contexts as varied as Lebanon, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti, and across all levels and areas of United Nations support. Under the framework of the IAP Policy, the ability of United Nations staff, from missions, the UN country team (UNCT) and Headquarters, to apply the requirements in a manner that makes the United Nations system as a whole more coherent, more effective and more efficient, remains our greatest asset.

The Handbook provides guidance on methodologies, tools and approaches that may be used to meet the IAP Policy's mandatory requirements and minimum standards. It combines elements from various sources, including previous guidelines,<sup>2</sup> with updates as necessary. Some sections of the policy have also required the development of new guidance by relevant parts of the United Nations system, in consultation with a number of United Nations mission and UNCT strategic planners, who also contributed specific sections or experiences. Such inputs have been instrumental in recognizing the diversity of contexts and conditions under which the United Nations is called to undertake integrated assessment and planning processes, and the Hand-

<sup>1</sup> IAP, *Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning* (2013).

<sup>2</sup> For example, *IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field* (2009) and *Role of Headquarters* (2010).

book has therefore been developed on the basis of accumulated experiences and past practices, and offers flexible tools and critical questions to be asked rather than fixed templates.

As such, we see this Handbook as a source of guidance, but also as an on-going process of knowledge sharing where good practices, as well as less successful ideas, can be recorded and disseminated. We encourage regular feedback on the implementation of the IAP Policy, on the usefulness of the examples and tools provided, and on all other examples of integrated approaches that do or do not work.

For ease of reference and application, the structure of the Handbook closely mirrors that of the IAP Policy. However, while each section contains references to other sections, the Handbook can be used in a modular manner. Different sections can be read as stand-alone guidance according to need, including for contexts that do not include integrated presences. The Handbook should be read in conjunction with the IAP Policy as well as other recently adopted policies and handbooks, including the *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal*<sup>3</sup> and the *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach*,<sup>4</sup> which present guidance and practices across a range of themes including programmes, operations, funding and communication that are highly relevant to integrated assessment and planning.

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<sup>3</sup> *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal* (2013).

<sup>4</sup> UNDG High Level Group, *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach* (2013).

## List of Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces, Uganda
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (renamed BNUB January 2011)
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CAF	Country Assistance Framework
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People, DRC
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DDRRR	disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement
DFS	Department of Field Support
DOCO	Development Operations Coordination Office
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPET	Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, DPKO
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ERSG	Executive Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR	Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
FRPI	Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri, DRC
GNC	General National Congress, Libya
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	humanitarian country team
HLC	High-Level Committee
IAP	Integrated Assessment and Planning
IDP	internally displaced person

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISPT	Integrated Strategy and Planning Team
ITF	Integrated Task Force
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JSJP	Justice and Security Joint Programme
JTP	Joint Transition Plan
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MLT	Mission Leadership Team
MOB	mobile operating base
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (renamed MONUSCO in July 2010)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NJP	National Justice Programme
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
PAD	Political Affairs Division
PARECO	Patriotes Résistants Congolais
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PNDDR	National Programme of DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBB	Results-Based Budgeting
RC	Resident Coordinator

RCO	Resident Coordinator Office
SA	Strategic Assessment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPG	Strategic Policy Group
SPM	Special Political Mission
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	security sector reform
SSSS	Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
TAM	technical assessment mission
TOR	terms of reference
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEST	United Nations Electoral Support Team
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNMAS	Mine Action Service, DPKO
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (ended July 2011)
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
VTC	video teleconferencing
WHO	World Health Organization

# SECTION I

## Integrated Assessments

This section presents guidance on the conduct of integrated assessments in line with the requirements articulated in the IAP Policy. Under the IAP framework, this guidance applies to any type of assessment of a strategic, programmatic or technical nature, when it must be carried out in an integrated manner because its scope and operational implications extend beyond one entity.

As such, this section covers strategic assessments, which, as UN system-wide assessments, must be integrated. It also addresses technical assessments that may require an integrated approach, if their outcome is expected to affect multiple UN entities.

The guidance is supplemented by a toolbox at the end of the section, containing information on various analytical tools that may be used in the conduct of integrated assessments.

Kids take part in a cross country race in Bonoua, Côte d'Ivoire, organized by the UN mission, UNOCI, as part of its "sports and peace" activities with local communities.  
20 April 2012  
Bonoua, Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 1: Overview of Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences

## I.1 The Definition of Integrated Assessments

### What the IAP Policy says:

16. An integrated assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities. The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake integrated assessment at the UN system-wide level for the purpose defined in paragraph 28 of this policy. Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical assessment missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secretariat departments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system.

28. The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Ahead of Mission start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences, the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consideration of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Council.

29. The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by:

- a. The Secretary-General; or
- b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security; or
- c. An Integrated Task Force at Director level or above

30. Strategic Assessments can be proposed by a number of UN entities including:

- a. A member of the Policy Committee
- b. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security
- c. A member of the Integrated Task Force
- d. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission
- e. The RC and/or HC, representing the UNCT

31. Strategic Assessments should complement, and draw on, any other analytical processes that components of the UN system may have undertaken on the ground.

32. Relevant interlocutors should be consulted including, to the extent possible, national authorities, civil society and other local representatives, as well as rel-



evant regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and key member states.

33. Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is being considered.

34. Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is undertaken by a Headquarters-based Integrated Task Force, which may already exist or may need to be established. The Strategic Assessment is then undertaken in consultation with the UNCT.

35. Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments should be carried out following a significant change in the situation or prior to a substantial change in a Mission's mandate. In these settings, Strategic Assessments can be initiated at field or HQ level.

36. Strategic Assessments result in a report and, where required, a recommendation to the Secretary-General through the Policy Committee. Strategic Assessments do not necessarily result in a recommendation to initiate planning for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission or changes to existing arrangements. In all cases, the chair of the Integrated Task Force has the obligation to reflect any disagreements over findings and/or proposed options when finalizing the report and recommendations to the Secretary-General and/or the Policy Committee.

The IAP Policy makes three critical points in particular:

**1. All assessments, regardless of title, level of focus and institutional leadership (mission or United Nations agency, fund or programme) must be conducted in an integrated manner if they have operational implications for multiple entities.**

While this is straightforward for system-wide assessments at the strategic level, the policy applies as well at the technical level. For example, if an agency is carrying out a technical assessment of its rule of law portfolio in a post-conflict country where a mission and/or other agencies also manage rule of law programmes, this agency should engage with United Nations partners involved in rule of law activities for the conduct of the assessment process. Similarly, if a peacekeeping mission conducts a review of its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) operations in a country where United Nations agencies also run DDR projects, then the assessment must include these agencies.

The details of the integrated approach (how many entities and which to include, etc.) will vary depending on the context.

**2. The requirement applies throughout the life-cycle of the integrated United Nations presence.**

Until recently, much of the focus, at the policy level and in practice, had been on mission start-up. While integrated assessments obviously have great significance and value at that time, there are also valid reasons to conduct integrated assessments at subsequent stages.

**3. Risk analysis constitutes an essential dimension of all integrated assessments.**

In crisis and post-conflict settings, it is important that a careful consideration of risks (to a specific entity, to the United Nations as a whole, to populations affected by the crisis, to national and external actors, including civil society organizations) be included in Strategic Assessments and most technical assessments (some exercise of a highly technical nature may not always need such considerations). For the type of assessments considered by the IAP Policy, a comprehensive approach to risk analysis (nature, probability, mitigation measures, etc.) makes it therefore necessary for such assessments to be "integrated".

## I.2 The Joint Conduct of Strategic Assessments

The Strategic Assessment is a form of integrated assessment with the specific aim of identifying key challenges, strategies and options for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation priorities, as well as proposals for United Nations (re)configuration in a given context.

Strategic Assessments should be undertaken whenever there is a need to formulate (or reformulate) the UN's strategy for engagement on peace consolidation priorities in a particular country. They may be triggered by several factors, including a dramatic change in the conflict or post-conflict crisis situation, and/or significant progress towards peacebuilding objectives. Strategic Assessments may also be undertaken as part of a broader United Nations transition triggered by a surge, drawdown or withdrawal of a Security Council mandated presence, in order to determine the most appropriate configuration for a follow-on United Nations presence.

To this end, the Strategic Assessment is designed to:

- (a) Present a shared analysis of the conflict situation including its key factors and dynamics;
- (b) Identify the main priority objectives to address those key factors;
- (c) Identify the strategic options for the United Nations in order to respond to the situation on the ground (and potentially revisit the United Nations configuration).

### I.2.1 Overview of the Strategic Assessment Process

The following diagram summarizes the Strategic Assessment process, the range of settings in which it may be conducted, and the documents it will generate.




Figure 2: United Nations Strategic Assessment

## I.2.2 The Strategic Assessment Process

### Convening the ITF

The Strategic Assessment is undertaken by an Integrated Task Force (ITF) in close consultation with existing in-country United Nations management, combining field-level and Headquarters expertise. Depending on the country situation to be assessed, an ITF may already exist or one may need to be established. The establishment of an ITF for the purpose of a Strategic Assessment does not presume the deployment of an integrated United Nations presence on the ground, or whether such a presence, if it is to be deployed, should be structurally integrated. The ITF is chaired, on behalf of the United Nations system, by the lead department for the relevant country in the United Nations Secretariat (DPA or DPKO),<sup>5</sup> Various agencies, funds and programmes (based on the “2+4” formula<sup>6</sup>), and United Nations field presences (i.e. the UNCT and United Nations peace operation if one is present in the country) should be members of the ITF and therefore heavily involved in the shaping, conduct and endorsement of the Strategic Assessment.

### Strategic Assessment Terms of Reference and Workplan

The Strategic Assessment terms of reference (TOR) articulate the objectives for the Strategic Assessment, as well as how and when it is to be carried out. The objective/aim in the TOR should include:

- A brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents for a potential change in the United Nations strategy;
- The identification of specific areas of concern;
- Consideration of prior engagements/actions in the country as well as current United Nations presence, plans and mandates;
- The specific output(s) of the Strategic Assessment.

The ITF should develop a Strategic Assessment workplan as soon as possible. This should be a working document, with a matrix of activities, timeline and division of labour. Updated versions should be distributed regularly to ITF members including field counterparts.

### Organization and Roles and Responsibilities

An ITF conducting a Strategic Assessment should ensure senior participation at Headquarters and field levels for decision-making. ITF members should be empow-

<sup>5</sup> DPA: Department of Political Affairs; DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

<sup>6</sup> Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN agencies, funds and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question, their ability to participate and the relevance of their mandate. Entities not based at United Nations Headquarters (e.g. Geneva or Rome) are encouraged to participate by video teleconferencing or through other means.

ered to represent their respective departments and agencies in the assessment. They should possess the requisite analytical skills and have an expert understanding of the assessment and planning modalities of their department or agency, as well as a thorough understanding of the principles of integration.

The ITF could also consider consultant expert advisers in areas where United Nations capacity is deemed insufficient and/or to provide an external perspective, and/or one or two dedicated lead drafters. The ITF could also consider bringing in specific thematic expertise from non-resident and specialized agencies not represented in the ITF, when a particular thematic issue is salient for the country situation.

The ITF may decide to create a subgroup or task team to develop an initial draft, using the full ITF for consultations, revisions and sign-off on a final draft.

### **Duration**

There is no strict guideline on the duration of a Strategic Assessment and each case will be determined based on its merits. At the same time, the ITF should normally ensure the substantive nature of the Strategic Assessment by dedicating about 2–3 months from inception to conclusion. If required, Strategic Assessments can also be conducted on an accelerated basis, sometimes within a few weeks. The ITF also needs to bear in mind any external deadlines, such as requests from the Security Council for recommendations/reports. The ITF should liaise with the Policy Committee Secretariat to align the timing of the Strategic Assessment with the scheduled meetings of the Policy Committee.

### **Desk Review**

The Strategic Assessment, to the extent possible, should draw upon existing United Nations analyses and country strategies. The following is an indicative list of the possible existing analyses:

- Secretary-General reports and Security Council resolutions ([Security Council online](#))
- United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and Common Country Assessments (CCAs) ([UNDG<sup>7</sup> online](#))
- Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) ([IMF<sup>8</sup>](#) and [World Bank online](#))
- Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) ([UNDG online](#))
- Peacebuilding Commission reports and Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks ([PBSO](#) and [PBC<sup>9</sup> online](#))
- Peacebuilding Fund documents, including Peacebuilding Priority Plans ([PBF<sup>10</sup> online](#))

7 UNDG: United Nations Development Group.

8 IMF: International Monetary Fund.

9 PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office; PBC: Peacebuilding Commission.

10 PBF: Peacebuilding Fund.

- Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs) and Humanitarian Situation Reports ([OCHA online](#))
- Previous Strategic Assessments (contact relevant desk officer)
- Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISFs)
- Transition plans
- United Nations human rights reports ([OHCHR<sup>11</sup> online](#)), reports by special mechanisms of the Human Rights Council (online) and concluding observations by treaty bodies
- New Deal Fragility Assessments (where available/relevant)

In addition, the Strategic Assessment should draw upon relevant non-UN analyses, including those providing fragility assessments. This should include analyses provided by important players on the ground, including Member States, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in order to ensure coherence with their action. An indicative list of documents and reports to be considered includes those produced by:

- Governments, including national plans and related documents
- Think tanks, academic institutions, research organizations
- Human rights organizations
- Civil society organizations
- Member States

As part of the desk review, a stakeholder mapping exercise should be undertaken (see methodologies in the toolbox at the end of this section). This would ideally be conducted by the field presences and would map the various actors (national/sub-national government, donors, United Nations, international and national civil society groups, women's groups, youth groups, regional actors, etc.) and their activities as they relate to peace consolidation in the country.

### **Field Visit(s)**

A Strategic Assessment may involve a field visit by the ITF or by the subgroup developing the initial draft. The field visits should be of sufficient duration to ensure proper consultations as well as time for drafting/redrafting of the Strategic Assessment report.

In some cases a field trip may not be possible, for example when time is short or where the security situation on the ground does not permit a visit. When a field trip is not possible special measures should be taken to fully capture field-based assessments from all appropriate national, regional and international actors. In all cases, and even if a field mission does not take place, country-based United Nations leadership should be involved in the establishment of United Nations priorities and strategic options.

11 OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

### **Consultations with External Stakeholders**

While the Strategic Assessment is an internal United Nations process, consultations with external stakeholders and other actors are essential for a number of reasons:

- To ensure that the Strategic Assessment is developed on the basis of the best available expertise and information;
- To ensure that the recommended options for United Nations engagement are properly coordinated with national, regional and international initiatives, and assess the level of support from key actors for these options;
- To secure close involvement of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank<sup>12</sup> and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional development banks as appropriate, as well as bilateral donors, in order to link options for United Nations engagement with funding and resource mobilization discussions, and access relevant analysis and expertise from these institutions;
- To ensure that government, local civil society leaders, including women, as well as private sector associations are engaged. In situations where the Strategic Assessment is undertaken alongside broader consultations between the national and international community on post-conflict priorities (including, for instance, joint or technical assessments by humanitarian actors, and with the Protection Cluster in particular, the PCNA process, fragility assessments and other New Deal related plans, or discussions within the Peacebuilding Commission), it is critical to make all efforts to ensure that these different processes are linked and coordinated, in order to avoid lack of coherence and fragmentation of efforts.

### **The Strategic Assessment Report**

Following the field visit(s), the ITF (or subgroup) finalizes the draft Strategic Assessment report. The report should be structured along the following lines (a template outline is provided in the toolbox at the end of this section):

- Executive Summary
- Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment
- Key conflict factors
- Analysis of priority objectives
- Existing capacities and an analysis of risks and opportunities
- Strategic options for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation priorities, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on broad (re)configuration of United Nations presence (if any), with associated risks and opportunities, including the risks of strategic options for the United Nations as well as for affected populations.

<sup>12</sup> The World Bank is given a standing invitation to join a Strategic Assessment. The ITF lead entity should formally contact the World Bank when the Strategic Assessment is being developed.

### **Internal Consultations and Endorsement of Report**

Following the development of the draft Strategic Assessment report, the ITF should review the document and make any necessary changes. The draft should then be circulated for comments within each ITF member entity, keeping in mind the requirement that members keep their respective entities informed throughout the process, with input consolidated by the relevant ITF representative. These internal consultations on the draft facilitate institutional buy-in to the conclusions of the Strategic Assessment exercise. These consultations shall also be mindful of the need to consolidate views between the field and Headquarters, which is the responsibility of each entity in the ITF.

The Strategic Assessment is a collective product of the ITF. Therefore, the ITF has a shared responsibility to ensure that consultations are undertaken with sufficient time and care to promote substantive improvements in and institutional commitment to the Strategic Assessment. Following these consultations, the ITF prepares a revised draft, which is then endorsed by the ITF at the Director level. On the basis of the report, the ITF develops the Policy Committee submission paper.

### **Administration, Logistics and Budget**

Each participating entity shall cover the cost of its representative for the Strategic Assessment, including field visits. The hiring of consultants should be undertaken by the lead department.

### **Factors Contributing to Successful Strategic Assessments**

Based on experience to date, there are a number of factors that contribute to the successful conduct of Strategic Assessments. Conversely, the absence of these conditions may result in processes and outcomes that do not meet the basic purpose of a Strategic Assessment, resulting in a significant waste of human and financial resources and, in some cases, loss of trust among United Nations entities participating in the process. It is therefore critically important that these factors are taken into account in the planning and conduct of a Strategic Assessment. They include:

- A strong focus on substantive and strategic priorities for the United Nations in the relevant country, based on the country's needs. The analysis should be needs-driven rather than supply-driven. Any discussions about how the United Nations presence on the ground should be organized (or reorganized) should be driven by this analysis (form has to follow function) and should not be the primary focus of a Strategic Assessment.
- Very close collaboration between Headquarters and the field throughout the process, as well as between the members of the ITF and the senior leadership of their respective departments and agencies.
- A clear understanding on the part of the lead department and all its relevant staff that the Strategic Assessment process is intended to be inclusive, trans-

parent and conducted in a manner that fully takes into account the views expressed by all participants.

- A clear understanding by all participants that, while the Strategic Assessment is a joint product, the process is not necessarily intended to generate a consensus or a product that incorporates everybody's inputs in verbatim form. While the lead department is responsible for producing and presenting the final Strategic Assessment report, it also has to ensure a strong sense of joint ownership and participation, including by reflecting any substantive disagreements on the analysis or recommendations of the report.
- A concerted effort by all participants to ensure that the best possible expertise is available to the Strategic Assessment process, including among the personnel participating in the ITF and at the country level, as well as in the external resources to be consulted, particularly by the lead department. Efforts should be made to systematically include expertise on human rights and gender.
- The leadership of a senior staff member to chair the ITF and lead the field visit. The leader should have extensive and successful experience with running inter-departmental/agency processes and be highly regarded by the main entities involved. The leader should also be well versed in the principles of integration and its supporting guidance. If the lead department cannot make a suitable senior staff member available, it should request other ITF members to propose candidates for this role.
- A clear understanding by all participants that the Strategic Assessment process involves a critical and honest analysis of the main on-going United Nations activities. This analysis should include consultations with non-UN stakeholders such as the government of the relevant country, civil society, including women's groups, donors and international NGOs with a significant presence in the country.

### 1.2.3 Methodology of the Strategic Assessment

The following is a **recommended** methodology and process for drafting the Strategic Assessment report. The Strategic Assessment TOR will specify the methodology, but the end product of a Strategic Assessment must include:

- (a) *A conflict analysis* centred on the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios;
- (b) *The analysis of priority objectives* for peace consolidation;
- (c) *The articulation of United Nations strategic options* to address the situation in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for United Nations reconfiguration);

- (d) *A risk assessment* for each strategic option, with references to challenges and potential risks to affected populations and United Nations partners.

Ideally, a maximum of two to three strategic options should be presented at the end of the Strategic Assessment report. Of these, one strategic option for a United Nations approach to peace consolidation in the country may be recommended based on the analysis of possible scenarios and timelines for future developments (if there is agreement on the recommendation). It should be kept in mind that the status quo could be one of the strategic options presented.

The following diagram gives an overview of the analysis process.




Figure 3: Analysis Process Flowchart

Each of the components and tools is described in detail below:

#### Conflict Analysis

The development of a shared understanding of the causes, dynamics and consequences of a given conflict provides an important basis for determining the appropriate content and form of United Nations support. As such, the conflict analysis constitutes the starting point and the foundation for integrated assessment and planning.

There are a number of conflict analysis methodologies that have been developed by various actors, including United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, donors, NGOs, think tanks and academic centres. The toolbox at the end of this section provides a non-exhaustive list of such tools, including the Power Analysis, the Country at Risk of Instability approach, the Strategic Conflict Assessment, the Stability Assessment Framework, the Country Analysis Framework, etc.

While each methodology or tool may have its own institutional origin and its specific features, it is important to note that (i) they all more or less share a number of central attributes (see next paragraph); and (ii) one may choose, as many actors do, to combine tools in order to have the most comprehensive analysis possible.

Regardless of the specific methodology used, the conflict analysis should at a minimum include the following elements:

- (a) A situation, context or profile analysis (i.e. a snapshot of the conflict context, including historical, political, economic, security, sociocultural and environmental context). The analysis should focus in particular on the nature of the political settlement, its legitimacy (is it disputed? if so, by whom, and why?) as a key starting point.
- (b) A causal analysis of conflict factors, which identifies and distinguishes between root/structural causes, intermediate/proximate causes, and immediate causes/triggers. The causal analysis should attempt to establish causal patterns between various causes of conflict (a problem tree may be used – see toolbox). The following is an example list of conflict factors: unequal access to resources, poor governance, inter-ethnic tensions or strife, separatist ambitions, rising food insecurity, lack of national strategies, incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants, displacement, human rights abuses and a culture of impunity, land conflicts, nationality questions, inconclusive elections, gender inequalities in accessing resources, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence including that perpetrated as a warfare tactic.
- (c) A stakeholder or actor analysis (i.e. analysis of those engaged in or being affected by conflict, including their interests, positions, capacities and relationships). In particular, the stakeholder analysis needs to map patterns of influence among the various actors, and identify the resources required for each actor to realize his or her agenda.
- (d) A conflict dynamics analysis, which synthesizes the resulting interaction between the conflict profile, the causes and the actors, including potential scenarios and drivers of change.

Recent practice also indicates the need to build the following considerations into the analysis:

- Define contextually, and agree on the definitions for, the terms used in the analysis (conflict, fragility, etc.) and the scope of the analysis (national, regional, local, and/or all);
- List all potential shocks (political, economic, social, etc., including regional where relevant) and explore how each one may alter the causal patterns and the conflict dynamics;
- Identify capacities for peace, and spoilers, within the stakeholder mapping, as well as mechanisms for conflict resolution, remembering that it is often not an either/or situation, and that capacities for peace can turn to spoilers, and vice versa depending on incentives and other factors, and that the presence of spoilers can also indicate deep flaws in the political settlement.

The analysis of capacities should also include an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the capacity and accountability of national institutions. Questions to consider include:

- In national institutions, what are the main strengths and weaknesses in terms of (i) capacity and (ii) accountability? (Start with those often related to a relapse into conflict or crisis: safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality and economic revitalization.)
- Which factors have been conflict factors or are closely linked to the causes of conflict? (For example, un-accountable judicial system, corrupt police force, overly-centralized government, laws discriminating against minorities, etc.)

There may not always be enough time or resources for a full capacity assessment. If so, there should be a brief, targeted assessment based on desk reviews and information-sharing with other actors, focusing on the two or three key areas (derived from the conflict analysis) where it is most important to understand national capacities, before conducting an in-depth assessment at the later planning stage.

Some conflict analyses also contain a mapping of peacebuilding activities and impact (or lack thereof), along with an analysis of international engagement (history, effectiveness, negative and positive impact, perceptions).

Finally, when conducting a conflict analysis, the assessment team(s) should bear in mind a number of constraints and challenges, namely (i) time, (ii) capacities, (iii) accuracy and (iv) acceptance (internally and by other actors). These factors at times conspire to turn the conflict analysis into a disputed process. As such, it is a required, necessary and indispensable step in the integrated assessment and planning process, but one that requires significant investment and careful stewardship.

### ***Priority Objectives for the Country***

From the conflict analysis, the Strategic Assessment should then identify the key factors that need to be addressed as priorities in the near term.

What is important here is to focus the analysis and the discussions on the elements that are required to achieve peace consolidation in the country, and/or prevent a relapse into conflict, **regardless** of the United Nations presence and capacities. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the priority objectives should not be limited to the scope/mandate of United Nations entities.

The following table shows an example of how conflict factors can be translated into priority objectives:

Conflict factor	Priority objective
Unequal participation in political representation or access to power	Support an inclusive form of government as a key component of a negotiated settlement
Militarization of politics perpetuates violent conflict and impedes peaceful resolution of disputes	Establish a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of armed groups following a ceasefire, including community work and social cohesion activities to ensure social reintegration
High level of impunity for sexual violence used as a tactic of warfare or as a means of destabilizing communities	Develop security and justice sector strategies to prevent and respond to sexual violence, as well as to contribute to behaviour change (personal, institutional)
Political and social inequality in access to economic and social rights fuels grievances and conflict	Establish an inclusive system of government; provide population with equal access to services and entitlements
Massive population displacement preventing economic recovery and creating new causes of conflict	(Re)integration in secure and durably stable areas of return and/or relocation
Weak civil society leading to lack of progress in local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts	Support the strengthening of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts
Unaccountable judicial system perpetuates discrimination against minorities and fuels conflict	Support reform of judicial system to ensure equal access to justice and contributions to national reconciliation processes
Police corruption fuels grievances and conflict	Address police corruption as part of security and justice sector reform

It is then useful to map out the priority objectives and explore how they are linked to determine priority interventions (sequencing) and understand who is best placed to do what and when in the peace consolidation process.




Figure 4: Priority Objectives

**Development of United Nations Priorities and Strategic Options**

From the mapping of country priorities, the Strategic Assessment derives the formulation of United Nations priorities, or priority objectives, for an integrated effort by the United Nations system, keeping in mind that the United Nations should not and cannot address all peace consolidation challenges.

The Strategic Assessment should then develop up to three possible strategic options for United Nations engagement to address the identified priority objectives for peace consolidation. In doing so, rather than focusing on the activities of individual United Nations actors, the Strategic Assessment should review clusters of priority actions within priority objectives. It should also take into account the likelihood of scenarios and focus on the needs of the country as well as the comparative advantage and capacity of the United Nations.

The different strategic options can be based on different scenarios or timelines or on differences in the interpretation of the analysis of opportunities and threats for the United Nations. Each strategic option should frame the broad strategic orientation of United Nations engagement, with the understanding that subsequent planning processes will provide further details on how the selected strategic option will be operationalized, including respective roles for different parts of the United Nations system.

Each strategic option should include the following elements:

- (a) *Overall approach and expected impact of the United Nations in helping to achieve the priority objectives:* This is the main part of the strategic option. It provides the “function” part of the “form follows function” principle. The overall approach should be developed on the basis of a realistic appraisal of existing United Nations capacities and expertise, as well as those which can be deployed in short order. It should also take into account the role of other actors

(national, regional and international) undertaking related peace consolidation efforts. Finally, the approach should include consideration of key assumptions and risks related to the strategic option and adequately reflect the existing obligations of the State, including human rights obligations.

- (b) *Implications for alignment and coordination of the various elements of the United Nations response:* The effectiveness of United Nations engagement will depend to a significant extent on effective coordination between individual United Nations entities based on a clear understanding of key priorities. The strategic option should articulate the coordination implications of the United Nations response, keeping in mind that planning processes and instruments developed by humanitarian, development and other entities of the United Nations system cover priorities specific to their individual mandates.
- (c) *Proposals for the form and structure of United Nations engagement:* The strategic options should provide preliminary indications on the required form of United Nations engagement, which refers to how the United Nations, as a system, could organize its country presence and capacities to implement its overall peace consolidation approach in an integrated and coherent manner. This should be driven by the analysis and the resulting overall approach of the United Nations, and should consider the potential risks and benefits for other country-specific United Nations priorities including any humanitarian response. Examples of organizational configurations include, but are not limited to, a UNCT configuration, a Special Political Mission (SPM), a structurally integrated peacekeeping operation, the deployment of a human rights presence, and the reduction or withdrawal of the United Nations presence. Different options and models for structural integration are found in the toolbox at the end of this section.

### 1.3 Integrated Technical Assessments

For the purpose of the IAP Policy and this Handbook, a technical assessment is defined as a Headquarters and field-based analytical exercise focusing on United Nations programmes and operations (staffing, budgets, funding, systems, etc.) for one entity and/or one sector. By nature, technical assessments will vary greatly in scope, duration, purpose, composition, etc. They include technical assessment missions (TAMs), usually conducted by Secretariat entities in support of a field mission (peacekeeping or political), and sector-specific programming reviews carried out by individual agencies (for example, a review or support mission for an agency's rule of law or child protection activities).

Technical assessments should be conducted in an integrated manner, as per the IAP Policy's requirements on integrated assessments, if and when their purpose and their outputs have operational implications that extend to more than one entity.

Hence, while all Strategic Assessments must be conducted in an integrated manner, the composition of a technical assessment – and the extent to which it should in-

clude several United Nations entities – will depend on its purpose, scope and operational implications.

The process for conducting technical assessments contains elements and tools that are similar to those employed for a Strategic Assessment, including the definition of the scope and the development of TOR, and the integration of risk analysis. This section focuses on issues that are specific to technical assessments.

#### 1.3.1 Timing

While Strategic Assessments take place when an integrated presence is being considered and/or at critical moments in the life-cycle of an integrated United Nations presence, integrated technical assessments may be undertaken at any point in time. They are undertaken in order to review, strengthen or amend existing interventions and programmes, even when the overall positioning and strategic objectives of the integrated United Nations presence (or any particular United Nations entity) remain unchanged.

#### 1.3.2 Composition and Leadership

The TOR of a technical assessment – and especially the scope of the assessment – dictate its composition. Assessments of a technical nature should only include representatives of the entities concerned by the scope of the assessment as defined in the TOR.

As a general rule, the composition of a TAM, in cases where a field visit is required, should be small (and smaller than a Strategic Assessment), in order to avoid overburdening stakeholders on the ground. Where integrated presences have already been deployed, existing expertise and capacities on the ground should be leveraged as much as possible. Participants from Headquarters and the field should be at a sufficiently senior level to ensure that they have authority to take decisions on behalf of their parent office on a broad spectrum of issues.

TAMs are generally led at the Director level and may be co-led in certain circumstances. Consultants may also be engaged to provide expertise or to assist in drafting the final report.

#### 1.3.3 Finalization and Authority

Whereas the Strategic Assessment is a collective, United Nations system-wide product, reviewed and endorsed by the ITF, an integrated technical assessment may not always require such a level of consensus. For example, if a mission decides to undertake, with Headquarters support, a review aimed at strengthening its child protection and gender interventions, such an assessment may have implications for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Women and/or the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and should therefore engage them in the process. However, the conclusions and recommendations, while including input from each of the agencies concerned, may not require agreement before finalization and mission en-



dorsement. Likewise, technical assessments from UNFPA and UN Women should be conducted in an integrated manner with the mission’s relevant components but the decisions emerging from the exercise may be at the sole discretion of the particular agency’s leadership.

Where mandated agencies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) undertake technical assessments relevant to their legal mandates, it is suggested that they communicate the resulting information as appropriate (with due respect for confidentiality).

In any case, it is always important to ensure that ITFs are informed about technical missions, even if they do not need to be conducted in an integrated manner.

## 1.4 Risk Analysis

The Strategic Assessment and/or other integrated technical assessments should always include a risk analysis. Beyond the assessment, risk analysis should be conducted as part of every step of the integrated assessment and planning process, including when analysing the context, defining priorities, assessing the right mode of integration, and planning for contingencies, such as crisis management.

At this time, however, there is no agreed United Nations system-wide methodology for comprehensively assessing risks to the United Nations in post-conflict and conflict settings. What is common to all risk assessment methodologies developed by different parts of the United Nations system, is that risks fall under several categories: political/reputational, legal, operational (including staff safety), programmatic and fiduciary (which results in the loss of assets/resources). These risks can be mutually reinforcing, for example risks to staff or loss of resources would lead to reputational risks.

### What the IAP Policy says:

24. Integrated assessment and planning processes must include an analysis of the risks and benefits that integration arrangements may result in, particularly for humanitarian activities. Integrated assessment and planning processes should provide a forum to assess these risks and benefits and decide on ways to manage them in a manner satisfactory to all UN entities involved.

The analysis of risks and benefits required by the IAP Policy should start with the identification of priorities and an agreement on the nature and depth of integration in each relevant area, followed by an assessment of contextual, institutional and programmatic risk factors. It is important to emphasize that such an analysis is not just about the risks of “structural integration”. First, not all integration arrangements are primarily structural in character and the visibility of association between political and other diverse mandates of United Nations entities may carry risks irrespective of structure. Second, while decisions regarding structures do carry specific risks, United Nations engagement in conflict and post-conflict contexts entails a number of risks,

regardless of, and above and beyond, structural considerations. As mentioned above, in the absence of system-wide agreed methodologies for risk assessment, several entities (Department of Field Support (DFS), agencies, etc.) have developed and use specific approaches that share some common attributes but remain fairly specific to their institutional mandates, priorities and operational requirements.

For each area of agreed integration, the proposed integration arrangements should include agreement on risk mitigation measures, which can range from agreed communication/messages to physical separation (or co-location) to tactical and operational decisions.

## 1.4.1 Considerations for Risk Analysis

This guidance proposes a series of questions to consider:

- What is the perception of the various parts of the United Nations in the country (including before the arrival of a Security Council-mandated mission)?
- Is armed conflict highly likely or on-going? In particular, do non-State armed actors exercise de facto control and/or have a significant extended presence and/or influence in part of the territory? How much territory is not under government control?
- Is the United Nations perceived as closely associated with a government or any other party whose credibility is significantly challenged, or which holds power through an election process that is not generally perceived as legitimate, or which is committing or complicit in human rights violations or widespread violence against civilians?
- In the event that a peace process is underway, or recently concluded, are there significant constituencies remaining outside the process or who challenge its legitimacy?
- Has the reputation of any United Nations entity on the ground been adversely affected (through, for example, significant civilian casualties, association with a flawed electoral process or unpopular peace agreements, association with national armed forces with a poor human rights record, or through corruption), resulting in knock-on reputational risks for other United Nations entities, and for the United Nations as a whole?
- Which of the United Nations mandates and activities are being or likely to be challenged by State and non-State parties to the conflict and other armed actors on the ground?
- Are local and/or regional non-State armed actors linked to internationally motivated armed groups who have taken an anti-Western stance?
- In a mission context, is the mission engaged in, or does it support entities (such as the national army, regional peace enforcement mission) that are engaged in, military operations against armed groups, which could jeopardize the effectiveness, acceptance, access and safety of its personnel and of other United Nations actors?

While such questions apply to any United Nations configuration in sensitive environments, the analysis they generate should be of particular relevance when a multidimensional United Nations mission is approved or under consideration and as part of a regular review process in existing integrated presences. This will help to ensure that the form and modalities of the mission–UNCT partnership are appropriate to the context, in the case of a new mission, or are sufficiently agile to respond to shifts in the operating environment where an integrated presence is already in place. This will also offer an opportunity to incorporate mitigation measures to address any potential risks.

## 1.4.2 Humanitarian Considerations

In addition to these United Nations system-wide considerations, the assessment and planning process also carries implications that are specific to the conduct of humanitarian operations. In this regard, integration policy states that “integration arrangements should take full account of humanitarian principles, protect humanitarian space and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors”.<sup>13</sup> The following provides a sample of key questions that should be considered when assessing the potential impact of modes of United Nations structural integration on humanitarian operations, including opportunities and risks. These should be addressed on the basis of relevant existing policy, including the IAP Policy, and the approaches of different United Nations agencies, funds and programmes related to integration.

The analysis should engage the Humanitarian Coordinator, the humanitarian country team and the broader humanitarian community, and should help to identify any adverse consequences (or potential benefits) to the United Nations and NGO humanitarian coordination and response, including possible mitigation measures. The result of this analysis should be reflected in United Nations decision-making processes, including through corrective action where necessary.

This guidance proposes a series of questions to consider:

- If the government does not control the whole country’s territory, how many humanitarian programmes are being conducted in areas which are not under the control of the government, or are under the control of armed groups hostile to the government or peace process? How many people are they supporting? Are there populations and/or areas that face particular risks?
- What implications (positive and negative) would United Nations integration have for humanitarian engagement with State authorities and non-State actors?
- Is there a risk that the profile and public messaging of humanitarian actors could be affected by a broader United Nations political and/or security agenda or the association thereto?

<sup>13</sup> Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008).

- What are the views of implementing partners of United Nations agencies and local/international NGOs on the potential mission roles and configuration?
- Are there indications that government, local populations and/or armed groups can and do make a distinction between United Nations humanitarian agencies, non-UN international humanitarian actors and political/peacekeeping actors?
- Are there situations in which humanitarian operations and access would benefit from using mission assets in accordance with relevant humanitarian civil–military coordination guidance<sup>14</sup> and how would the use of mission assets by United Nations humanitarian actors affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population, and by donors) of the humanitarian community? What are the consequences for the beneficiaries and humanitarian operations in the medium to long term (including possible dependency on mission assets)?
- Are there country-specific civil–military coordination guidelines that already describe relations between United Nations and NGO humanitarian actors and the military in-country, and provide an indication on coordination arrangements and the appropriate use of mission assets? Are these guidelines implemented and respected in practice?

This checklist should also include the following two questions specific to structural arrangements:

- To the extent that this can be determined, how would structural integration (for example DSRSG/RC/HC<sup>15</sup> and/or visible association between the mission and humanitarian actors) affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population and by donors) of the humanitarian community?
- Overall, and to the extent that this can be determined, how would other dimensions of integration (for example co-location, shared assets, military escorts, joint communication) affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population and by donors) of the humanitarian community?

## 1.5 Options and Models for Structural Integration

The IAP Policy specifies that the depth and form of integration between United Nations missions and agencies at the programmatic and operational level will vary and should follow a differentiated, needs-based approach and presents a set of standard parameters for the form that structural arrangements, or “structural integration”, should take. In short, the policy is predicated on the principle that “form follows function”.

Decisions on structural integration derive from the joint analysis, including the joint risk assessments conducted during a Strategic Assessment. Options on whether, how

<sup>14</sup> For example, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* (“MCDA Guidelines”) (2006) and *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* (“Oslo Guidelines”) (2007).

<sup>15</sup> DSRSG/RC/HC: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator.

and to what extent the mission and the UNCT should be structurally linked can be influenced by a combination of factors, including the needs on the ground, the political and security context (stage/inclusiveness of the peace process, active combat, post-conflict, likelihood of United Nations engaging in combat operations, presence of significant spoilers, linkage with ideologically driven armed groups, existence or likelihood of United Nations support to a party to conflict in a context that continues to be insecure), presence and influence of non-State armed actors, the humanitarian situation and access, perceptions (local population, non-State actors), the reputation of the United Nations, the type of mandate of the United Nations mission (e.g. Chapter VII, engagement in combat operations, etc.), resources, the international configuration (including presence of other international military missions), and the degree of overlap between the mission mandate and agency programmes.

Reference should also be made to any existing country-specific civil–military coordination guidelines, as these would provide useful reflections on issues such as collocation, use of United Nations logos and mission assets, which are salient to possible integration levels and structures.

What is called “structural integration” generally refers to the leadership structure of the mission. However, in discussions over structural integration, planners should keep four important ideas in mind:

1. There are multiple models and options (see below).
2. Structural integration can shift over time, especially at the time of mandate renewal and/or mission transformation (for example from a peacekeeping operation to an SPM) but, in some models, changes can be implemented at any other point, as needed, within existing mandates, lines of authority and budgets.
3. The form of structural integration influences, but does not fully determine, the depth of integration more broadly. For example, the absence of structural integration at the leadership level does not mean that IAP structures should not be established (remember, the IAP applies to integrated presences, regardless of whether they are structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC) and it does not preclude the possibility of joint structures, units or teams in select sectors or joint assessments and integrated planning between a mission and a UNCT.
4. More broadly, the IAP requirements apply to integrated United Nations presences regardless of the structural arrangements. So even in contexts where the mission and the UNCT are not structurally linked, integrated assessment and planning should be undertaken, and integrated coordination mechanisms established.

### Structural Integration in Burundi

On 1 January 2008, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), a peacekeeping mission, was transformed into the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), as an integrated DPKO-led mission.

BINUB shifted from a standard Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/RC) model to an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (ERSG/RC/HC) structure (initially launched in Sierra Leone). This was supported by a range of mission sections, including three integrated structures to implement joint mission and UNCT programmes in the areas of security sector reform (SSR), governance and justice.

The three integrated structures included staff from mission and staff from select UN agencies. The SSR and justice structures were both headed by a BINUB staff member, while the governance structure came under the responsibility of a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) staff member.

Each of the three integrated structures implemented their respective joint programmes, developed under the framework of the UNDG Joint Programming framework, combining mission-assessed budget resources with agency resources, later complemented by allocations from the Peacebuilding Fund (using agency project management capacities and mission technical advisory capacities).

The BINUB staffing table presented to the Advisory Committee on the Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) included the agency staff planned for the integrated structures, which allowed their inclusion in the calculations for mission support capacity and assets.

This experience of structural integration lies at the root of the UN’s commitment to integrated approaches in Burundi, which over time has also been translated into merged planning frameworks (with the UNDAF serving as the strategic document for both the mission and the UNCT) and common monitoring and evaluation (by harmonizing Security Council reporting on benchmarks, Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) performance measures, and UNDAF outcome and output indicators).

Examples of models of structural integration include:<sup>16</sup>

- *No structural integration*: Formal integrated structures at the leadership level have not been established and the RC/HC does not have any mission-related functions.

<sup>16</sup> While all of the following examples assume a combined RC/HC, there is not an HC designation in all contexts, in which case only the DSRSG and RC functions would be under consideration. In addition, in recent years, and in specific contexts, a regional Humanitarian Coordinator has been appointed. This would factor into consideration of integration arrangements.

Integrated assessment and planning and coordination mechanisms should nonetheless be in place, as required by the IAP Policy.

- *The DSRSG and RC function are brought together but the HC function remains separate*, for example in cases where conditions require complete independence of – and separate physical offices for – the HC function.
- *The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together but the offices remain separate*: The RC and OCHA offices (supporting the RC and HC functions, respectively) are either co-located with the DSRSG office or physically separated, depending on a range of factors including security and perception issues (OCHA offices are located separately in most current missions with DSRSG/RC/HCs).
- *The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together, supported by an integrated DSRSG/RC office* established to support the DSRSG and RC functions, with an OCHA supporting the HC function.
- *The SRSR, RC and HC functions are brought together*, under the title of ERSG (Executive Representative of the Secretary General): This option has been used so far for the integrated peacebuilding offices, usually following the withdrawal of a DPKO-led mission in settings where the peacebuilding and recovery process was fairly advanced, and where concerns over humanitarian space had been attenuated but where comprehensive support, including political, was still required. Where humanitarian concerns may be higher, this option can include a separate OCHA office.
- In addition to, or independent of the decisions on the ERSG, DSRSG, RC and HC functions, the mission and the UNCT form *integrated structures*, e.g. *joint units*, around particular thematic or geographical issues (elections, DDR, justice, etc.). Each staff in the integrated structure remains under the administrative framework of his/her respective entity (mission or United Nations agency) but shares the same programmatic reporting line to the integrated structure leadership. In these instances, administrative arrangements can ensure the sharing of assets (vehicles, computers, etc.). These function-driven structures can also be developed to support integrated analysis, planning and/or monitoring and evaluation, where capacities from both the mission and the UNCT are brought together under one roof (albeit with separate reporting lines).
- Finally, structural arrangements can also involve *staff secondment*, for example of United Nations agency staff in a mission section. Similarly, mission staff can be temporarily co-located in an agency.

### “Word from the Field”

Fidele Sarassoro, DSRSG/RC/HC

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

7 February 2010–30 September 2012

“The Integrated Office (IO) has been at the forefront of leading integration efforts: the Integrated Office was established in December 2005. It operates under the leadership of the DSRSG/RC/HC/UNDP RR (Resident Representative) and aims to strengthen joint strategy-building between MONUSCO and the UN agencies and among the UN agencies. In line with the Secretary-General Directives on Integration,<sup>17</sup> the office has worked with UN agencies and MONUSCO sections to identify concrete objectives that can better be achieved through joint actions. In the past years, the office has focused on maintaining these objectives while adding greater focus on transitional activities and supporting the planning mechanisms leading to the transfer of strategic activities linked to the future and eventual withdrawal of the DPKO-led mission.”

These different models are not mutually exclusive. Combinations and shifts are possible. In certain settings, the United Nations presence includes an ERSG/RC/HC, with an integrated support office, a number of integrated structures (with mission and agency staff working together under a mission or agency Director), and agency secondments into other mission-specific sections.

A final and critical consideration in selecting and designing the context-appropriate model of structural integration relates to budgetary implications. Some models are more straightforward than others when it comes to sources of funding. In most cases, functions and structures can be integrated but the underlying sources of funding remain separate, especially for salaries and benefits. Specific rules regulate certain aspects, for example how the DSRSG, RC and HC functions are financially accounted for when they are brought together. One important issue to keep in mind is that when integrated structures are developed under a mission framework, and/or agency staff are seconded to a mission, it is critical to account for their presence in the mission staffing tables that are presented to the ACABQ. Aside from demonstrating unity of effort, their inclusion in the staffing table, even if they are paid for by agencies (and not the assessed budget) is necessary to secure their access to the necessary support capacity and assets.

<sup>17</sup> Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008).

### Structural Integration in UNSMIL–Libya

In Libya, the goal from the start was to ensure that strategic analysis and planning should be a shared product of the whole UN system, both the mission (United Nations Support Mission in Libya/UNSMIL) and the UNCT. The process in Libya is driven by a small planning cell composed of the mission Chief of Staff, the Head of the RC Office, as well as UNSMIL and UNCT Strategic Planners that support United Nations managers to come together to identify peace consolidation targets and deliverables, as well as to monitor the Organization's success in achieving those goals. In areas where joint planning and coordination of activities are essential, fully integrated UNSMIL–UNCT structures have been created. The United Nations Electoral Support Team is an integrated team comprising UNSMIL, UNDP and UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) electoral officers under the leadership of UNSMIL's Director of Electoral Affairs. The Security Sector Advisory and Coordination Division of UNSMIL, incorporating the Arms Proliferation Team, also comprises staff from UNSMIL, UNMAS (Mine Action Service), UNDP and UNICEF to streamline all United Nations support in this area. DDR is a joint effort involving several UNSMIL sections, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, UN Women, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank, among others, each of which has its own Libyan counterpart.

## Toolbox: Integrated Assessments

### A. Template Terms of Reference for a Strategic Assessment

1. A Strategic Assessment TOR should have the following:
  - (a) *Background*: Explain why the Strategic Assessment is being done at that time, and which United Nations body requested it.
  - (b) *What*: The objectives of the Strategic Assessment. This should include: (i) a brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents for a changed United Nations strategy; and (ii) the identification of specific areas of concern.
  - (c) *Who*: List the participating entities, noting the lead department for the exercise and articulating the role of the field. It is useful to specify that the exercise should be conducted at the senior level.
  - (d) *How*: The process selected for the conduct of the Strategic Assessment. Any major deviation from the policy and guidelines should be noted here.
  - (e) *When*: Provide a timeline and an indicative report submission date or a strict deadline for the Strategic Assessment report. The latter will be necessary if the Strategic Assessment is bound by an external deadline, such as finalization of a Report of the Secretary-General or a mediation process etc.
2. While the preference is for the Strategic Assessment TOR to be concise, they may provide guidance on additional issues, and may also explicitly refer to:
  - (a) A more detailed summary of the situation, and an outline of the United Nations institutional setting;
  - (b) The methodology to be used for the required conflict analysis, and the existing United Nations or non-United Nations assessments to be used;
  - (c) The scope of United Nations priorities to consider, as included in existing official UN documents (for example in UNDAFs, CAPs, reports of specialized mandates, Reports of the Secretary-General, and General Assembly or Security Council statements or resolutions).

### B. Template for a Strategic Assessment Report

In general, a Strategic Assessment report should include the following sections:

#### Executive Summary

1. Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment

2. Key conflict factors and dynamics. This section could include, for example, a problem tree diagram
3. Priority objectives. This section could include a diagram of the priority objectives, as well as SWOT tables
4. Existing capacities
5. Strategic options including an analysis of the benefits and risks of each
  - (a) Option 1
  - (b) Option 2
  - (c) Option 3
6. Recommended option and recommendations on United Nations configuration. This section must include possible disagreements or differences of opinion on the options and configuration.

Annexes:

- List of people interviewed
- List of references (with hyperlinks)
- Current United Nations Organizational structure at the country level
- Tables and diagrams on analysis, United Nations priorities and strategic options (if not in the body of the report)

### C. Methodologies and Tools for Conflict Analysis and Priority Objectives

#### *Conflict Analysis*

The following summarizes the main features of three methodologies used for undertaking conflict analysis.

*UN Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition* (2004)

<http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=1252>

- It distinguishes between root causes, proximate causes, immediate causes (triggers), and consequences/symptoms.
- The analysis is organized around thematic dimensions: security (state to personal), political/governance, economic and social (including cultural and religious factors).
- It identifies and organizes (in matrix format) the spoilers and capacities for peace with an analysis of motivations and interests.
- The differentiation between root and proximate causes is not always easy but it is important, as different levels of causes require different responses (with different timeframes, capacities, etc.).
- The analysis can be conducted at international, regional, national, subnational and community/local levels.

#### *Power Analysis*

Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, *Manual for Conflict Analysis* (2006)

<http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/publications/manual-conflict-analysis>

- The tool maps the informal political landscape, including its rules and structures.
- It seeks to understand links between the political landscape and Member States/donors:
  - Who sets the policy agenda, with whose ideas and values?
  - Who gets what, when and how?
  - Who knows whom, why and how?
- The methodology is a useful corrective to approaches that focus on formal political rules and institutions.
- It provides qualitative information for comparison over time in a single country but it needs to be **complemented by other approaches**.
- The findings can inform actions at both the macro/national and micro/local level.

#### *Country at Risk of Instability*

UK Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, *Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors of and Dynamics of Instability* (2005)

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=2950>

- The methodology focuses on internal and external risks of instability.
- The analysis aims at assessing the country's capacity and resilience.
- It also includes an analysis of external stabilizing factors, with shocks and triggers.
- It can be used at the national and local/community levels.
- The tool brings in (but at times overstates) the role of the international community.
- The macro-level findings that are generated are often complemented by sector analysis with specific focus (e.g. governance).


Additional tools and resources can be found at the following links:

- UN System Staff College, Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool (2009): <http://www.unssc.org/home/themes/peace-and-security/e-learning-0>
- UNDP, Conflict-related Development Analysis (currently being revised)
- Saferworld, conflict analysis chapter in Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (2004): [http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter\\_2\\_\\_266.pdf](http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter_2__266.pdf)

- USAID, Conflict Assessment and Analysis (2012): <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>
- UNDG and the World Bank, Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning using Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks (2007): <https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Joint%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Integrated%20Recovery%20Planning.pdf>

**Problem Tree**

Many of these tools use a variant of the causal analysis approach, which can be summarized through a problem tree. The problem tree (see Figure 5) aims at identifying the various conflict factors, organizing them along different levels and clarifying the causal patterns.



**Figure 5: Problem Tree**

**Priority Objectives**

**SWOT Analysis**

Once the conflict analysis is finalized, the translation of the priority objectives for the country (to respond to the various conflict factors) into a coherent United Nations strategy can be guided by a SWOT analysis. This is a method to assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for an organization in a given context, in order to identify its comparative advantages. For each priority objective, the Strategic Assessment could list the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for

the United Nations. The stakeholder mapping exercise as part of the desk review described earlier should be taken into account when conducting the SWOT analysis.

For each priority objective, a SWOT analysis will allow the team to assess *whether the United Nations should be involved, what type of role (lead versus support) it should take and which key actors it should engage with*, in order to maximize the likelihood of achieving the priority objective. In some cases, it may result in a recommendation to support another, better-positioned actor rather than taking the lead for a given priority objective.

If helpful, the team could include tables for priority objectives. The following is a basic example.

Priority objective: Build local security capability	
Strengths of the United Nations	Opportunities for United Nations and non-United Nations actors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some operational capacity in UNCT and field mission</li> <li>• Expertise and experience of departments, agencies or funds</li> <li>• Standards, values and instruments, including on human rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional organization with readily available expertise, experience and funding</li> <li>• Capacities and mandates of government authorities and bilateral actors (e.g. on-going capacity-building programme jointly organized by donors, regional organization and government)</li> </ul>
Weaknesses of the United Nations	Threats to the priority objective
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of funding for programmes</li> <li>• Duration of necessary implementation</li> <li>• Lack of fit with mandates of departments, agencies or funds</li> <li>• Lack of available human resources, institutions, budgets</li> <li>• Likelihood of success low</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rebel group outside of peace agreement</li> <li>• Shift in power relations</li> <li>• Other priorities of donors and beneficiaries</li> </ul>

Based on this table, the United Nations should probably assume a support role in this priority objective area (i.e. building local security capability) and work closely with lead actors such as the regional organization, donors and national government.

## D. Template Terms of Reference for a Technical Assessment Mission

### 1. Background

The TOR should outline the United Nations policy documents (decisions of the Security Council, Secretary-General, Policy Committee, reports of the Secretary-General, Strategic Assessments), decisions or statements of regional organizations, or consultations that triggered a decision to undertake the TAM. It will also describe national and regional political developments.

### 2. Objectives

This section describes the strategic objectives of the mission, linking (as necessary) back to specific requests made by Secretariat leadership or governing bodies. It also identifies the key outputs related to the objectives. These outputs often include technical and analytical assessments or recommendations regarding the field environment, such as substantive and logistical resource needs and availability, political will and local capacity, security situation/threat assessment, the peace process, and political and technical feasibility analysis.

### 3. Methodology

Here, the TOR should identify the pre-mission, mission and post-mission tasks (for example, from initial desk review to final draft), describe the respective roles of Headquarters and field staff, including staff from United Nations partners (if involved), describe the schedule for the mission and identify key interlocutors, data to be collected based on a desk gap analysis, and outputs for each target group to be consulted.

### 4. Timelines and Results

This section identifies the schedule for debriefings at the field level and Headquarters, and the schedule for drafting the final report (including the individual responsible for this), as well as the vehicle for presentation of the findings (for example Report of the Secretary-General, internal Note to the Secretary-General, etc.). It lists the key components of the final report. Where relevant, it may also refer to the role of the report in the wider political negotiations leading to the fielding of the reconfigured or new United Nations presence.

### 5. Composition

The TOR should identify the leader or co-leader of the TAM and the entities represented, including both Headquarters and field staff. (Some members of the TAM may not go on the mission, but are part of the pre-mission and post-mission workplan and may be identified as such.) The list of participants is generally a list of offices and components within offices, but may include actual staff names.

#### Additional Elements

The TOR may also include details on the logistical arrangements, a draft programme for the visit, cost estimates for travel/consultants, and/or an annex of specific tasks/questions for the TAM.



The UN flag flies at half-mast in remembrance of the late Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa.  
06 December 2013  
United Nations, New York



# SECTION II

## Integrated Mechanisms



Staff members of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) play against a local team from Agboville in a "football match for peace", organized as part of the mission's "UNOCI Days" outreach campaign. 17 November 2011

**What the IAP Policy says:**

57. At Headquarters, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) are the main forum for joint assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consultations and decision-making support. Integrated Task Forces should consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated settings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have implications for other entities. [...]

58. At field level, integrated United Nations presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate. The configuration of these structures should be tailored to each context, but in all cases they should include:

- a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. [...]
- b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. [...]

## II.1 Headquarters Structures: Establishing and Managing Integrated Task Forces

The Integrated Task Force (ITF; formerly IMTF or Integrated Mission Task Force for DPKO-led<sup>18</sup> task forces) is the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to United Nations presences, and to coordinate Headquarters participation in integrated assessment and planning processes before and throughout the deployment of integrated United Nations presences.

As such, ITFs provide an important link between Headquarters and the field, aiming to provide coordinated guidance and support to the leadership of the field mission, UN Secretariat departments and the UN country team (UNCT).

The role of the ITFs varies in intensity throughout the mission life-cycle, so the guidelines below delineate the key planning roles and products according to the following phases: at mission start-up, during implementation, and at drawdown and withdrawal.

### II.1.1 Main Roles

The ITF is the formal Headquarters-based body responsible for implementing the Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) for a specific country or context. It is composed of representatives of United Nations departments and agencies from the field and Headquarters.

<sup>18</sup> DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Specific tasks will shift throughout the life-cycle of the integrated United Nations presence but an ITF generally has three overarching roles:

1. The ITF coordinates and validates, at Headquarters level, integrated assessment and planning processes and products.
2. The ITF ensures consistent information-sharing between the field and Headquarters, and between entities at Headquarters.
3. The ITF provides advice regarding modalities for ensuring adequate, timely and complementary resource allocation, in line with the respective mandates of missions and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

### II.1.2 Establishment of an ITF

A new ITF may be triggered in a variety of ways. As soon as an integrated presence is being considered, or when a decision is made by the Security Council or the Secretary-General to begin planning for a new field mission, when there is a shift in lead department (for example from DPA<sup>19</sup> to DPKO or vice versa), the designated lead department(s) must establish a new ITF.

ITFs can also be established for countries without a mission. In these cases, the elements of this Handbook, especially the management, composition and template terms of reference, can be used to guide the lead department and participants.

### II.1.3 Management and Composition

The ITF should be chaired or co-chaired by a senior representative, usually a Director or Team Leader, from the lead department. The Chair or Co-Chairs should ensure that:

- Meetings are called regularly with a focused agenda distributed well in advance of the meeting;
- Levels of representation of the lead department and other participating entities are appropriate;
- Field mission and UNCT leadership or representatives are included in the discussions;
- Processes are inclusive and collaborative;
- Discussions are focused and decisions are taken; and
- Meeting notes are distributed in a timely manner.

The ITF should include representatives from all relevant United Nations entities, including DPKO, DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, OCHA, DOCO and UNDSS, as well as UNDG

<sup>19</sup> DPA: Department of Political Affairs.

and ECHA<sup>20</sup> members based on the “2+4” formula.<sup>21</sup> Mission and UNCT leadership, including planning staff, should be included in ITF meetings through video teleconferencing (VTC) or teleconferencing facilities. Even if senior mission and UNCT leadership cannot participate directly in each meeting, it is important that ITFs consistently include representation from both the field mission and the UNCT.

ITF members at the senior officer level (for example senior desk officers, team leaders, functional specialists) should participate in all meetings and be empowered to speak on behalf of their entity. In general, ITF members should nominate officers who have country-specific knowledge and expertise. ITF membership should be adjusted as necessary, based on changes to on-going objectives and functions, in order to better respond to mission planning needs and developments on the ground. For example, ITFs are encouraged to draw upon specialized actors in the United Nations system when relevant thematic discussions are held.

ITFs should also consider inviting the World Bank and non-UN system organizations, including relevant regional organizations, and/or NGOs to their meetings on an ad hoc basis. Regional organizations and NGOs with in-country field operations may be particularly well positioned to contribute.

#### Managing ITFs: 10 Best Practices to Make them Effective

- Ensure consistent scheduling (same day and time), with consideration for field colleague constraints.
- Manage time scrupulously: start and finish on time.
- Circulate the agenda for input beforehand, allowing sufficient time for coordination with colleagues in the field.
- At the beginning, provide a brief summary of previous decision points and update on follow-up.
- At the end, provide a brief summary of decisions reached and present a forward agenda.
- Ask for concise situation updates with focus on issues of relevance to the entire ITF, using previous updates as a starting point.
- Maintain discussions focused on inter-departmental and inter-agency matters, where decisions are required and/or with United Nations system-wide implications.

20 DFS: Department of Field Support; PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office; OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; DOCO: Development Operations Coordination Office; UNDSS: United Nations Department of Safety and Security; UNDG: United Nations Development Group; ECHA: Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs.

21 For details of this formula, see footnote 6 above.

- Ensure appropriate representation from ITF members, who should know the file, their mandate and their role.
- Consider bringing in outside experts, on occasion, for sharing knowledge that is relevant to the entire ITF membership.
- Where relevant, use the ITF meeting to provide updates or generate discussions on relevant policy developments, especially if the ITF country/context provides a compelling illustration of the issues related to the policy.

#### II.1.4 Objectives of the ITF

All ITFs should have active terms of reference (TOR) outlining their primary responsibilities. Template TOR are provided for reference in the toolbox at the end of this section. While the role of an ITF will evolve over time, the following lists some of an ITF’s typical functions and activities that remain consistent throughout its life-cycle:

- Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for United Nations inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support, information exchange and monitoring.
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy and planning processes, including, at drawdown, aspects linked to the implementation of the *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal*.<sup>22</sup>
- Coordinate Headquarters participation in United Nations integrated assessments, including Strategic Assessments and technical assessments.<sup>23</sup>
- Coordinate Headquarters inputs into various planning products outlined in the IAP Policy, including foundational planning documents such as the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), the Report of the Secretary-General and Directives to the SRSG, RC and HC.<sup>24</sup>
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies (for example Secretary-General reports, Policy Committee papers).<sup>25</sup>
- Identify resource gaps and overlaps to promote the strategic alignment of resources.

22 *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal* (2013).

23 Normally, a DPA-led ITF leads a Strategic Assessment if there is no political or peacekeeping mission on the ground. Once a mission is up and running, an ITF can call for a Strategic Assessment, especially if there are drastic changes in the situation and/or if there is a joint recognition that the UN’s strategic vision in a given country needs to be reformulated.

24 SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General; RC: Resident Coordinator; HC: Humanitarian Coordinator.

25 This is not to duplicate any field-level coordination in preparation for these documents.

- Maintain a dialogue with field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams (or similar field-based working groups) and provide support to them as required.
- Support coordination with non-UN actors.

### II.1.5 Roles Across Mission Life-Cycles

#### *Role of the ITF at Mission Start-Up*

The ITF coordinates Headquarters participation in the conduct of the Strategic Assessment and in the development of the key integrated planning products including the Directive to the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG or ERSG), RC and HC, and the ISF.

Some of the key tasks of the ITF at this stage are:

- Coordinate the conduct of Strategic Assessments to identify strategic objectives for support within an existing or potential mission context, and, based on the decisions of the Secretary-General and the mandate from the Security Council, consolidate guidance to the field in the Directive to the SRSG, RC and HC.
- Discuss and agree on practical modalities to maximize the coherence of the UN's security, political, humanitarian, human rights, and relevant humanitarian and development interventions.
- Map existing United Nations capacities to ensure an optimal division of roles and responsibilities between the mission and the UNCT and ensure coherent guidance from Headquarters to field-based colleagues, based on an analysis of comparative advantages (see Section III.5). This can be articulated in the form of an "early" ISF, to be further developed and finalized in the field once the mission is deployed alongside the UNCT.
- Coordinate Headquarters communication with Member States, donors and other multilateral and bilateral actors on peace consolidation priorities.
- Identify other financial, logistics and administrative requirements necessary to support the overall strategy for an integrated presence, including complementary programmatic resources needed to achieve the UN's peace consolidation or peacebuilding mandate.

#### **Dedicated Planning Staff: the Darfur Planning Team**

Large peacekeeping missions or Special Political Missions (SPMs) often require a dedicated planning staff with a dedicated Team Leader for mission start-up. In these cases the ITF, rather than serving as a working group that meets occasionally, would benefit from a dedicated team of technical planning experts working under the leadership and coordination of the lead department. The experience of the Darfur Planning Team in 2006 found that a dedicated inter-departmental and inter-agency team (including representatives of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) promoted the effective integration of civilian and

military planning objectives, including protection of civilians and support of humanitarian aims. Moreover, the practice of transferring field staff to Headquarters to serve on the team greatly facilitated the creation of detailed operational plans based on up-to-date information. Regular use of videoteleconferencing (VTC) also ensured that field-based staff were included and could provide essential information that would otherwise be difficult to collect. Finally, having dedicated and tailored information management tools (such as a common workspace with an online document repository) also facilitated the work of the Darfur Planning Team. A similar arrangement was established to coordinate planning for an integrated United Nations presence in Libya in 2011.

#### *Role of the ITF During the Implementation of Mandates*

The ITF remains active throughout the life-cycle of an integrated presence, but it may meet more frequently during mission start-up and drawdown or withdrawal. Once a field mission is operational, the majority of planning efforts shift to the field, with the Headquarters-based ITF providing support and guidance to those efforts and linking its activities to the field-based integrated structures.

Some typical responsibilities of the ITF during this phase are:

- In consultation/collaboration with the field, review progress on the implementation of the ISF, and monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field.
- Contribute to resolution of policy differences between United Nations entities.
- Coordinate Headquarters participation in Strategic Assessments and technical assessment missions (TAMs).
- Maintain a dialogue with field-based integrated mechanisms and support them as required.
- Regularly share and review information.
- Consult thematic entities as needed, and support coordination and dialogue with key non-UN actors.
- Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work in cases where the country is on the agenda of the PBC.
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions of the Secretary-General (Secretary-General reports, Policy Committee papers, etc.).

#### *Role of the ITF During Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal*

An ITF usually becomes more active again as missions plan for or undergo drawdown and withdrawal. During these adjustment periods, planning between the field and the Headquarters should be closely coordinated through the ITF. Typical tasks for the ITF during such phases may include:

- In line with the *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal*,<sup>26</sup> coordinate Headquarters inputs as well as Headquarters participation in possible field missions, for the planning of the transformation of the United Nations presence on the ground and handover of residual tasks (timeline, benchmarks, roles, resources, communication, etc.).
- Maintain a dialogue with the mission and UNCT on the timely scaling up of peacebuilding activities carried out by the UNCT, key international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, and bilateral donors.
- Coordinate Headquarters support to ensure the smooth handover of responsibilities, leadership continuity, and joint resource mobilization strategies. This is particularly relevant in transitions from a peacekeeping operation to a follow-on peacebuilding or integrated office because it implies a shift in the lead department (for example from DPKO to DPA). Such transitions require a comprehensive planning process similar to the mission start-up phase.

## II.2 Field Structures: Establishing and Managing Joint Structures for Decision-Making, Planning, Programming and Operations

Each United Nations field presence should have standing coordination bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction, planning oversight, information-sharing, analysis, coordination and monitoring in support of the UN's peace consolidation efforts. The field-based integrated field coordination structures also serve as partners to Headquarters-based integrated structures, in particular the ITFs.

In keeping with the principle of “form follows function”, the number, configuration and composition of integrated field coordination structures will vary from country to country based on the scale of the United Nations operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required.

As such, existing mechanisms should be used where possible and the “form” of these structures should be tailored to each context. However, based on experience across a range of contexts, the IAP Policy<sup>27</sup> stipulates that in all cases they should include:

- a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. This forum should include the key in-country decision-makers such as the S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission components and Heads of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes. [At a minimum, it should include representation from the various elements of the United Nations integrated presence, e.g. depending on the context, political, security, development and humanitarian.] External partners should be invited to participate when appropriate.

<sup>26</sup> *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal* (2013).

<sup>27</sup> Para. 58.

- b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. All entities that are part of the integrated presence should either be represented in or seek to otherwise contribute to the joint analytical and planning capacity.

### II.2.1 The Senior Leadership Forum

A senior leadership forum must be in place to ensure high-level coordination and decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. The core functions of this body include:

- Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the United Nations system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantages of the UN system (as such this forum leads the development or revision of the ISF).
- Review progress in the implementation of the ISF and provide direction to United Nations components/agencies on implementation challenges.
- Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with the ITF and other Headquarters-based bodies as required, in order to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (for example transition and drawdown).
- Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities.
- Delineate roles and responsibilities among the United Nations actors, ensuring complementarities between mission and UNCT, and minimizing overlap.
- Guide and review the work of thematic working groups.
- Promote synergies and minimize overlap by identifying and commissioning the development of United Nations system-wide sector or thematic strategies or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs; for example on protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, early warning).

While the IAP Policy does not specify how often the senior leadership forum should meet or when, it does reflect the need for the forum (regardless of its specifics, including name and numbers) to provide a genuine space for in-depth joint analysis and decision-making, for identifying and addressing critical issues and for managing potential tensions. This means, in particular, that participation should not be delegated below the senior management level, that the forum should be actively led and regularly convened, and that discussions should be adequately prepared.

#### “Word from the Field”

Ellen Margrethe Løj, SRSR  
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  
January 2008–January 2012

“One of the more useful tools has been the meetings of the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), which includes all heads of agency and a number of UNMIL section

chiefs. In addition to being a venue where thematic issues and common issues of concern are discussed, the group is a venue for chairs of UN outcome groups to report on progress or concern regarding their respective groups or their corresponding government pillar under the Poverty Reduction Strategy.

I believe that both Senior Management Team and Strategic Policy Group meetings have been useful to create a better sense of what it means to be an integrated mission, including ensuring that we think like an integrated mission.”

### II.2.2 Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity

The functions of this body may vary, but should include, among others:

- Consolidate, organize and present United Nations system-wide analytical inputs required for the development of shared strategies, plans and related monitoring reports.
- Compile inputs and draft shared strategies, plans and related monitoring reports, including coordinating the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes such as ISFs.
- Establish effective information-sharing mechanisms and ensure joint analysis between all United Nations entities.
- Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages between United Nations internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors.
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for Headquarters and facilitate linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the Headquarters-based ITFs.
- Provide Secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (including the senior leadership forum), which would include preparation of agendas, background papers and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans and monitoring frameworks.

This capacity takes the form of dedicated strategic planning resources in both missions and UNCTs. Strategic planners are often provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), which funds some strategic planners and coordination officers in the Offices of Resident Coordinators (RCOs) in conflict-affected countries. On the mission side, planning capacity is funded through the mission’s Results-Based Budgeting. In addition, in situations with a significant humanitarian presence, humanitarian representatives should be included in the joint analytical and planning capacity.

The actual structure of a joint planning capacity may vary according to the field requirements, but there should be, at a minimum, at least one permanent planner representing the mission and one for the UNCT and, where required, one representing

the humanitarian country team (HCT).<sup>28</sup> Multidimensional peacekeeping environments usually have an expanded team of three to five planners with at least one planner on the UNCT side. Table 1 provides an example of staffing allocations for mission and UNCT planning capacities in Sierra Leone, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a TOR. All members of the shared analytical and planning capacity should have some or all of these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals. Finally, where possible, it is also advisable to have planners located in the same building to ease communication and help to build personal relationships. If not possible, and depending on workload, consideration should be given to co-location for a pre-determined period of time on a regular basis, for example one afternoon a week.

In most peacekeeping missions, the analytical and planning capacities are designed as separate work units. However, as strategic planning processes require both analytical and planning capacities, the contribution from the mission to the “shared analytical and planning capacity” will typically extend beyond the planning unit and reflect contributions from several mission components (for example the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), political affairs, civil affairs). Key inputs from these other mission components (for example conflict analysis for an ISF), as well as means/responsibility for securing them, should be reflected in the TOR of the joint analytical and planning capacity.

**Table 1: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DRC, Somalia (2009)**

	Sierra Leone	Sudan	DRC	Somalia
Mission	Joint UNIPSIL/ UNCT Strategic Planning Unit	1 P5, 1 P4, 2 UNVs (UNMIS)	1 P5, 2 P3s	1 P4, 1 P3
UNCT	1 P4 (Strategic Planning) 1 P4 (Peace-building Coord) 1 P3 (Coordination) 3 NPO	1 P5, 1 P4	1 P4 (Integrated Office DSRC/SG/RC/HC)	1P5, 1P4

<sup>28</sup> Smaller integrated peacebuilding offices may have one planner in the integrated office of the ERS/RC/HC, covering both the mission and UNCT.

**Thematic Working Groups**

The mission and the UNCT may also decide to develop and/or monitor implementation of joint strategies through thematic working groups. In establishing thematic groups, care should be taken to leverage existing groups (for example humanitarian clusters or UNDAF<sup>29</sup> outcome groups or Results Groups in countries following the *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach*<sup>30</sup>), as appropriate. United Nations field presences are encouraged to involve non-UN actors (for example NGOs) in thematic working groups on a case-by-case basis. For instance, an existing intra-mission working group on rule of law could be expanded to include UNCT and HCT representatives. Likewise, partners could decide that UNDAF outcome groups or humanitarian clusters could be expanded with mission representatives to constitute a thematic working group.

Mission and UNCT leadership should provide strategic direction to these groups and regularly review progress against their commitments, as reflected in the ISF, to promote mutual accountability.

**II.2.3 Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures**

Before new structures are constituted, a mapping of existing structures should be undertaken to identify structures that could be leveraged or adjusted, either permanently or periodically, to fulfil the functions outlined above. For instance, the senior leadership forum can be formed by expanding the Mission Leadership Team (MLT)<sup>31</sup> periodically and according to an agreed schedule to include the RC/HC (for non-structurally integrated missions) and members of the UNCT. Likewise, meetings of the UNCT could be expanded periodically to include mission representatives, while humanitarian clusters could be expanded to comprise integrated thematic working groups.<sup>32</sup>

**Models**

These guidelines provide two possible models building on current field practice. These configurations and titles are not required, but rather provide examples for ful-

29 UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework.  
 30 UNDG High Level Group, *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach* (2013). Further to the adoption of these SOPs in February 2013, the UNDG is developing specific technical guidance to support the implementation.  
 31 According to the DPKO/DFS, *Guidelines: Mission Start-Up Field Guide* (2010), the Mission Leadership Team generally includes: SRSG/head of mission, DSRSGs, head of the police component, head of the military component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the Chief of Staff. The MLT’s key tasks include providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to mission components and approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.  
 32 Leveraging humanitarian clusters should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Any decision to leverage humanitarian clusters into an integrated field coordination structure should be taken after consultation with humanitarian partners and cluster leads through the HCT in the cluster under consideration, as well as with relevant authorities if involved in the cluster as a co-chair or member.




Figure 6: Example of Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT

filling the minimum requirements described herein. The first, as depicted in Figure 6, could be applied to smaller United Nations field presences with integrated peacebuilding offices. It has a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group, which is supported by the shared analytical and planning capacity and thematic working groups.

The second model, shown in Figure 7, may be appropriate for United Nations field presences with large multidimensional peacekeeping operations (including military and police components). It has three layers: a Strategic Policy Group at the Principals level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT) at the senior officer level, and




Figure 7: Example of Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT

thematic working groups. The Strategic Policy Group provides the strategic direction; the ISPT translates that strategic direction into concrete deliverables and coordinates implementation. Thematic working groups (standing or ad hoc) are also recommended and should be formed (if they do not exist in some other form) based on the key peace consolidation objectives of the United Nations presence.

## Toolbox: Integrated Mechanisms

### A. Template Terms of Reference for ITFs

The TOR for each Integrated Task Force (ITF) should be tailored to the distinct needs of the situation/country/integrated presence. The task force should revise its TOR when the situation changes or the integrated presence enters a new phase (for example making a transition at the end of the mandate).

While each task force will have distinct TOR, the following components should always be included:

#### 1. *Background*

The TOR should start by describing the legislative basis for the peace operation and the group, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also describe the purpose of the task force, using language from key decisions. It may also refer to any Strategic Assessment or any other type of assessment undertaken. The section could also include the rationale for an ITF, particularly in cases where there are no integrated field presences.

#### 2. *Purpose and Principal Functions*

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the task force. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase of field presence. Each task force should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of a task force:

- Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for United Nations inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support and information exchange.
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy and planning processes.
- Coordinate a Strategic Assessment that conducts joint analysis, identifies United Nations priorities and recommends strategic options for the UN.
- Undertake the coordination of various planning activities outlined in the IAP Policy.
- Coordinate technical assessment missions (TAMs), where these are integrated.
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies (for example Secretary-General reports, Policy Committee papers).



- Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work, in cases where the country is under consideration in the PBC.
- Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field (the list of sectors will vary from case to case).
- Maintain a dialogue with field-based integrated structures and provide support to them as required.
- Regularly share and review information.
- Coordinate with non-UN actors at Headquarters level.

### 3. *Organization of Work*

This section should describe the working modalities of the task force. It should define who chairs meetings and how frequently the task force meets and at what level. Some task forces may decide to have two tiers by meeting more frequently at the working level and less frequently at the Director level. Information about the development of a workplan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section.

This section should also describe how the work of the task force is linked to similar field-level groups. It should describe the modalities for the exchange of information between these groups (including dedicated online document repositories) and note that the task force provides support to field-based working groups as required.

## B. **Template Terms of Reference for Integrated Analytical and Planning Capacity**

Note: The TOR for this capacity should be tailored to the distinct needs of the country and United Nations presence. This capacity should revise its TOR when the situation changes or when the United Nations presence enters a new phase (for example moves from conflict to peacebuilding).

### 1. *Purpose*

*Suggested generic text for the TOR:* This integrated analytical and planning capacity aims to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. This capacity responds to the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration<sup>33</sup> for UN country-level arrangements that promote the development and implementation of a strategic partnership for peace consolidation. It also aims to ensure that all components of the UN mission and the members of the UNCT operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner and in close cooperation with other national and international partners. The integrated analytical and planning capacity receives direction from and reports to the Strategic Policy Group and is the field-level counterpart to the [country] Integrated Task Force chaired by [lead department].

<sup>33</sup> Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008).

### 2. *Background*

This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the mission and the UNCT's activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments, TAMs, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies or any other type of joint assessment undertaken by the mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a tailored configuration, as well as the working methods of the integrated analytical and planning capacity. This is particularly important for missions and UNCTs that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

### 3. *Principal functions*

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the integrated analytical and planning capacity. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase. Integrated analytical and planning capacity should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of an integrated analytical and planning capacity:

- Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes including ISFs.
- Guide and review the work of thematic working groups.
- Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with ITFs and other Headquarters-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (for example transition and drawdown).
- Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by developing United Nations system-wide thematic strategies (for example on protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, early warning).

### 4. *Composition*

This section should define the composition of the integrated analytical and planning capacity. The capacity should comprise representative members of the United Nations presence, including peacekeeping/political, support, humanitarian, human rights and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSF and RC/HC may decide to identify a representative group of mission and United Nations agencies for inclusion in the integrated analytical and planning capacity based on their respective contributions to the agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework or similar) and to limit staff time in meetings. If this is the case, the RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the United Nations agency representatives. Team members should participate in meetings at the senior officer level in order to maintain strategic focus and be empowered to represent their entities.

### 5. *Organization of Work*

This section should describe the working modalities of the integrated analytical and planning capacity. It should define how frequently the team meets. Informa-

tion about the development of a workplan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section. This section should also describe how the work of the integrated analytical and planning capacity is linked to other integrated coordination structures in the field (Strategic Policy Group, thematic working groups, provincial/regional teams) and United Nations Headquarters (ITFs). It may also describe how the integrated analytical and planning capacity interacts with national coordination structures and/or coordination structures involving the World Bank and non-UN actors (for example donors, NGOs).



The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Commission of South Sudan and the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) handed over so-called DDR “reinsertion projects” to the Government of Eastern Equatoria State in Tirrangore. Close-up of a performer during the hand-over ceremony. 28 October 2013. Tirrangore, South Sudan

# SECTION III

## Integrated Planning

This section relates to the second requirement of the IAP Policy: “Articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and responsibilities in support of peace consolidation, including relationship, if any, to national plans and priorities”. The IAP Policy stipulates that the following planning documents are mandatory for United Nations integrated presences: (i) Directive to the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), to be issued by Headquarters, and (ii) an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). Both derive from an integrated assessment process.

The following section provides templates and guidance on the process for the development of the Directive and the ISF. It also includes tips on how to realign an ISF with national plans and other international plans related to peace consolidation, as appropriate.

The IAP Policy also states that modalities for working together in integrated settings may include joint programmes and/or the use of external capacities (for example non-UN expertise), depending on circumstances, specific requirements and mandates. The second half of this section includes examples on joint planning and issues to consider, such as expected impact, transaction costs and assessment of risks, as well as guidelines on joint resource mobilization and information strategy.

Brazilian Peacekeepers stationed with the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) distribute health and hygiene packs during a day of sport, cultural and educational activities for over 300 schoolchildren from the volatile slum of Cite Soleil in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The event was put on by MINUSTAH's Community Violence Reduction section and the non-government organization Timoun Bouke (Children in Danger). 01 September 2012

## III.1 Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC

### What the IAP Policy says:

40. Based on the mandate from the Security Council, the Strategic Assessment and decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is drafted by Integrated Task Forces as part of the integrated assessment and planning process.

41. The Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC signifies the transfer of responsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence.

42. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is issued and updated by the Secretary-General upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force at Principal level. Updates will usually result from a significant change in the environment or mandate, supported as required by an updated Strategic Assessment.

### III.1.1 Purpose and scope

The purpose of the Directive is to give to the S/ERSG, RC and HC the United Nations system-wide strategic direction, priorities and responsibilities, an outline of coordination arrangements (which may include structural set-ups), and basic planning parameters. This is in order to manage the integrated United Nations presence in the specific country/area.

### III.1.2 Process

The Directive is issued by the Secretary-General, following a Strategic Assessment, decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee to propose the establishment or reconfiguration of an integrated United Nations presence and the adoption or change of a mandate by the Security Council.

Directives are issued or updated at key moments in the life-cycle of integrated United Nations presences (not just at start-up), when the mandate and/or other major planning parameters change.

Directives are drafted by the Integrated Task Force (ITF). The ITF adopts the Directive, which serves as integrated guidance from Headquarters to the field-based UN-wide integrated planning.

## III.1.3 Structure of the Directive

A template Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is found in the toolbox at the end of this section. In general, all Directives should contain the following elements:

- (a) *Situation and context*, drawing on the Strategic Assessment, comparative advantages of the United Nations vis-à-vis partners, threats and opportunities and United Nations mandate(s).
- (b) *Strategic objectives and priorities for peace consolidation*, including intent for the United Nations system and overall approach to peace consolidation.
- (c) *Configuration of integrated presence and roles and responsibilities*, including reporting lines, management of diverse mandates in structurally integrated presences and risk mitigation measures.
- (d) *Planning parameters*, including instructions for the development or review of an ISF and monitoring and reporting arrangements.

Headquarters of each entity may issue, as annexes to the Directive, strategic guidelines to their field representatives on the basis of and in alignment with the Directive. For example, the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a template for instructions to the military components of peacekeeping missions (see the toolbox at the end of this section). Other sectors that require concept of operations may follow this example.

## III.2 Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)

### What the IAP Policy says:

43. On the basis of mandates, integrated assessments and the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC the vision, shared objectives and means through which the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated through an inclusive analytical and planning process whose conclusions are reflected in an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) document.

44. The content of the ISF document must include:

- a. The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, UN role and comparative advantages;
- b. A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity development and institution-building;
- c. An articulation of all programmatic, functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration;
- d. Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities and other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms;
- e. A common monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of progress.

45. Other UN planning frameworks (such as a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)) may serve as Integrated Strategic Frameworks if their content meets the standards outlined in paragraph 44. The decision to use such frameworks as the Integrated Strategic Framework or have a separate document is made by the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC in consultation with other senior managers and Headquarters, and on the basis of a gap analysis of existing planning processes and products. The opportunity for combining planning frameworks and harmonizing planning processes should be regularly assessed, with due consideration for respective programming and budgetary cycles.

46. The title, timing for development, timeframe, structure, content and ownership of the process and its product are determined by S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC, in consultation with other senior managers. These parameters vary with context, with particular consideration given to national milestones and UN agency planning requirements and timelines.

47. The decision to develop an Integrated Strategic Framework jointly with national authorities and other partners rests with the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC following consultation with Integrated Task Forces.

48. Once developed and endorsed, the ISF document serves as a regular reference for an on-going field-based process of joint analysis and review of the UN-wide strategies and arrangements for peace consolidation. As such, its nature and content may shift over time and may combine elements of strategic, programmatic, communication and operational integration. It should also include measures to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitarian operations.

49. The shared analysis should build on, where relevant, other assessments including Strategic Assessments, humanitarian needs assessments, risk analysis or those led by other national, regional and international institutions such as Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and Fragility Assessments. National authorities, civil society, other local representatives, affected populations and key international partners should be consulted as part of the process to ensure that, at a minimum, local perspectives are taken into account in the analysis and identification of UN priorities.

50. The Integrated Strategic Framework must include a monitoring and reporting framework to track adherence to responsibilities and progress towards results with a view to promoting accountability, making adjustments to activities or revising plans.

51. Integrated Strategic Frameworks are developed, updated and endorsed in the field under the leadership of S/ERSGs, DSRSGs,<sup>34</sup> Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes. ISFs are also endorsed

34 DSRSG: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

at Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces at the Director-level and signed-off by the USG of the lead department.

52. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be reviewed as necessary, especially after any substantial change in the mandate, Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC or circumstances on the ground, or at least every two years. The review of Integrated Strategic Frameworks is carried out by integrated mechanisms in the field and in cooperation with HQ as stipulated in paragraph 58 of this policy.

### III.2.1 Policy Framework and Purpose

The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008/35 requires United Nations field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a United Nations country team (UNCT) to have an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). This requirement is reinforced in the IAP Policy.

The purpose of an ISF is therefore to bring together the mission and the UNCT's mandates around a set of *agreed priorities and measures to maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations system* on the country/context's peace consolidation needs.

As such, the ISF process is designed to ensure that (i) the mission and the UNCT have a common understanding of the crisis and the critical peace consolidation needs; (ii) the mission and the UNCT jointly define the areas in which increased collaboration is necessary to increase the individual and collective impact; and (iii) the mission and UNCT jointly agree on the modes of collaboration required in each area and have a means of monitoring progress towards agreed priority objectives.

In thinking about the purpose of an ISF, it is therefore important to keep in mind the following:

- The ISF *document* reflects the common peace consolidation priorities agreed by the mission and the UNCT. The ISF is not, however, an end in itself. As stated in the policy, it must become a living document, supported by a *process* of regular joint analysis of the situation and stock-taking of the ways in which the mission and the UNCT can increase their impact on peace consolidation priorities.
- The ways in which a mission and the UNCT can increase their impact will vary depending on a range of factors, including country context and needs, the United Nations configuration and the various mandates. While most ISFs focus on priorities of a programmatic nature (for example defining strategic priorities in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and agreeing on a division of labour and responsibilities between the mission and relevant United Nations

35 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008) established the requirement for an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), but gives scope and flexibility for different types of vehicles or tools to fulfil this requirement.

agencies), it may be necessary for the ISF to articulate joint strategies in the areas of communication, policy-making (for example common approaches to addressing root causes, capacity-building or gender-based issues), and/or operations (for example sharing of assets). In some instances, an ISF may be used to promote greater geographical collaboration (for example harmonizing and sequencing UNCT and mission activities in a particular city or region).

- The ISF may in fact combine priorities and agreements of a programmatic, policy and/or operational nature. As such, the “identity” of the ISF will vary: in the context of limited programmatic overlap between the UNCT and the mission (for example in a small Special Political Mission or SPM), the ISF may be construed as a “Constitution”, laying out the common policies and political messages. In settings where the UNCT and the mission share significant programmatic responsibilities (for example in a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation), the ISF may be designed more as a “Joint Plan”. The latter may benefit from the existence of a UNCT “One Programme” in countries implementing the “delivering as one” approach.<sup>36</sup>

**“Word from the Field”**

Robert D. Watkins

DSRSG/RC/HC, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative

22 February 2011


“The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) exercise has been successful in the mission insofar as it has helped bring UNAMA and the agencies together to find areas of common ground for an overarching agenda that contributes towards peace and stability in the country. Unfortunately it has started to become the victim of a lengthy consultative process before its formal adoption. The process has to be hastened in order to ensure that all stakeholders see it as the useful tool that it could be.”

**III.2.2 Scope of an ISF**

The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. Figure 8 below, for example, represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation or peacebuilding context. In that regard, a review of current ISFs reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection and the protection of civilians, return, relocation and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), human rights, and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from a number of United Nations actors and, thus, could benefit from


<sup>36</sup> See UNDG High Level Group, *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach* (2013).

inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and the clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.



**Figure 8: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Peace Consolidation or Peacebuilding Context**

The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (for example Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)). For example, Figure 9 demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the United Nations would be obliged to prioritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these environments. In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.



**Figure 9: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Volatile Context**

In this regard, principled humanitarian action remains an important element of the United Nations system's response. However, even though humanitarian response often supports peace consolidation, its primary aim is to respond to needs. Accordingly, many humanitarian activities (as reflected in a Common Humanitarian Action Plan or CHAP) are likely to remain outside the scope of an ISF. Key exceptions may be activities related to protection of civilians, some support for return and reintegration (coordinated with mandated agencies), and early recovery. In the case of the protection of civilians, other strategy documents are likely to exist, including mission-wide protection of civilian strategies where peacekeeping missions are present (called for under Security Council resolution 1894<sup>37</sup>), and protection cluster strategies covering the objectives and activities of United Nations and NGO actors. It is important to ensure complementarity across these tools.

It is also important to recall that certain subjects, including human rights, must be mainstreamed into the work of all United Nations bodies. For example, according to the Secretary-General's Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions,<sup>38</sup> "all United Nations entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected through and within their operations in the field". The *Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions*<sup>39</sup> provides detailed operational guidance on how the mission leadership and mission components are expected to comply with and integrate human rights into all aspects of their work. In addition, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 requests "all entities of the United Nations system should institute mechanisms for gender mainstreaming in their planning and programming for example, through participation of gender specialists in these processes".<sup>40</sup> Within the IAP process at the field level, the form and structure of integration – and how this is captured in the ISF – should enable the human rights and gender components to further mainstream human rights and gender across United Nations peace consolidation priorities.

37 Security Council resolution 1894 (2009; S/RES/1894).

38 Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (2005).

39 DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS, *Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions* (2011).

40 *Report of the Economic and Social Council for the year 1997 (A/52/3)*, Agreed Conclusions 1997/2.

### Diversity in ISF Scope

The ISF has been introduced to allow integrated UN presences to maximize individual and collective impact. In most cases, the means through which such impact is maximized are programmatic, and the ISF focuses on defining common priorities and the appropriate division of labour along sectoral areas: security sector reform, elections, rule of law, etc.

The ISF need not, however, be restricted to programmatic priorities. Many integrated UN presences have also used the ISF to identify other measures that are required to maximize impact. These include:

- Agreement on messaging and communication, including content and division of labour
- Development on common capacity-building approaches, even if interventions and programmes remain separate
- Clarity on policies and "rules of engagement" with specific non-UN actors
- Common operational measures, including sharing of assets

### "Early ISF" at Mission Start-Up

These guidelines may also be used to support the development of an "early ISF" or "early strategy and action plan" at mission start-up. An "early ISF" may require an abbreviated development process and would address a smaller number of immediate priorities, with clear roles and responsibilities. Thus, achieving an early ISF will require even more involvement of the senior leadership team, more direct support from Headquarters (including surge capacity), and be shorter in its duration (for example 6–9 months). The aim of an early ISF is to deliver an early peace dividend. The content of an early ISF may also prove useful for the development of resource mobilization plans for the programmatic elements of a peace consolidation or peacebuilding plan that are not funded by the assessed budget of a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office. This may be presented to the various multilateral sources of pre-positioned pooled funds, for example the UN Peacebuilding Fund, World Bank Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund, EU Stabilization Fund and UNDP/BCPR<sup>41</sup> Trust Fund.

### ISF as a Planning Tool for Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal

During mission drawdown and withdrawal, coordination between the mission, the UNCT, national government and civil society is particularly important. Both the mission and the UNCT have to ensure that the departure of the former does not undermine either the stability in the host country or the ability of the latter to work effectively in this changed context.

The inherent flexibility and integrated nature of the ISF lends itself as a useful instrument (as both a process and a tool) to coordinate activities between missions and the UNCT in the context of mission drawdown and withdrawal.

41 BCPR: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

However, since national ownership and buy-in from the host government are key conditions for successful transition planning processes, efforts need to be made to ensure adequate consultation and buy-in from national partners if the ISF is used as the main planning tool during United Nations transitions.

In some contexts, missions and UNCT partners may find it more useful to develop a separate transition plan. Where separate transition plans are introduced, these should be aligned with the ISF, or can also replace it. The following table outlines some considerations that might guide the decision about whether to anchor transition planning in the ISF or to develop a separate decision plan.

**Table 2: Considerations for Incorporating Transition Planning into Existing Frameworks**

Incorporating transition planning into an existing frameworks (UNDAF or ISF)	Developing a separate transition plan
+ Use of existing tools and processes	+ Increased visibility through separate plan
+ No additional reporting requirements	+ More flexibility
	+ More ownership by government

### III.2.3 The Process of Developing the ISF

The process of designing or revising an ISF can be undertaken on the basis of the following steps:

#### Preparation

- Agree on a definition of peace consolidation specific to the country/context and/or revisit previous definition (as developed during mission start-up).
- Determine the nature and scope of the ISF in the specific country/context, based on an analysis of what is preventing the United Nations from maximizing its individual and collective impact in support of peace consolidation.
- Map the United Nations planning landscape by reviewing existing national and UN frameworks (see separate guidance in the toolbox at the end of this section).
- Decide if another framework (for example an UNDAF) could serve as the ISF and, if so, which changes/edits are required and when, bearing in mind that changes to the UNDAF are to be agreed upon by the host government.

The development and finalization of the ISF happens in the field in consultation with the ITF based on developments in-country (for example mission start-up, peace agreement, elections/new government) and instructions in the Directive. Consultation with Headquarters should occur throughout development of the ISF, and in particular when the vision is endorsed, to ensure buy-in/endorsement at all levels. It is also strongly recommended that an ISF exercise be undertaken with a view to harmonizing and adding coherence to United Nations system planning cycles. For this

reason, an ISF should come before the annual development of a mission’s Results-Based Budgeting (RBB), UNDAF review (when it has been decided that the ISF and the UNDAF should be separate), or CHAP/CAP<sup>42</sup> review.

This diagnostics phase provides the key parameters for the ISF development process (which instrument to use, timeframe and timelines, actors, etc.). If capacity gaps for the preparation, design and development of an ISF are identified, the United Nations field presence may request an ISF Headquarters support mission be mobilized through the ITF.

#### Design

Designing an ISF (new or revised) involves the following steps:

- Establish a process for developing or revising the ISF (or using an existing framework), with timelines and responsibilities, based on a set of external and internal parameters. Close consultation with Headquarters in terms of timeline, output and responsibilities is recommended.
- Undertake or update a conflict analysis and a review of the UN’s operational environment (reference to existing analysis, if appropriate, is encouraged). The context should determine whether the ISF is an internal United Nations document or one that is aligned with, and endorsed by, the national government.
- Refine the scope of the ISF, which can focus on programmes, policies, operations, communications, or a combination thereof.
- Articulate common ISF strategic objectives, results to be achieved, roles and responsibilities, determination/identification of monitoring mechanisms including through the use of thematic working groups if necessary.
- Finalize the ISF document, which should be a short document (10–15 pages) at the strategic level, supported by more specific workplans if necessary.

To initiate the design phase, a retreat for the senior leadership forum or structure may also be held<sup>43</sup> to (i) discuss the need for the ISF and the value it will add, based on the preparatory analysis, in order to secure buy-in for its design as well as for its implementation; (ii) agree on or validate the ISF design process or roadmap; (iii) identify, on the basis of a discussion of the context and the collective mandates of the United Nations, three or four strategic priorities for peace consolidation that are achievable in the envisaged timeframe (for example 1–2 years); and (iv) establish clear leads and/or co-leads for further developing the content of the strategic priorities.

Field teams should maintain a dialogue with the ITF throughout the ISF development process to ensure consensus around the analysis and the key peace consolidation priorities (strategic objectives) before elaborating the full strategy. For example, a schedule of ITF meetings could be elaborated as part of the ISF development road map.

<sup>42</sup> CHAP: Common Humanitarian Action Plan; CAP: Consolidated Appeal Process.

<sup>43</sup> The senior leadership coordination structure may require expansion in order for the retreat to ensure appropriate representation and buy-in across the United Nations system.



### Tips on the ISF Development Process

1. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the clarity – and effectiveness – of the design process, the clarity of the purpose of the ISF and the usefulness and ownership of the ISF itself. Recent experiences confirm that the more confusion there is about what the ISF is for and how it adds value, the more reluctant people are to engage. It is important to invest well at the very beginning in explaining what the ISF is, how it will function and why it is required.
2. The level of engagement in the development process is very much a function of (i) leadership support, (ii) a shared understanding of the value of the ISF, and (iii) expectations of greater impact and/or access to resources (political, financial, logistical, etc.) through the ISF.
3. A balanced participation is critical: ISF design processes have often been either very mission heavy or very UNCT focused.
4. Overall, transaction costs can be reduced by drawing on existing analyses and using existing structures and indicators that are already being monitored. However, when the existing analyses are weak or outdated, or when the existing structures are dysfunctional, or when the indicators are not sufficiently aligned, there's a risk of settling for shortcuts in the name of efficiency, at the detriment of content and rigour.

### Consultation and Finalization

- Validate the ISF in-country, within the United Nations senior leadership structure.
- Secure government buy-in, where appropriate (and signature if/when the UNDAF is used as the ISF).
- Endorse the ISF with the ITF.

The most senior leadership coordination structure should receive regular updates on the development of the ISF and review drafts as they are finalized. Senior leadership validation of the ISF means that the mission and UNCT agree to pursue the results, timelines and responsibilities as described and they will be mutually accountable for achieving the results. This concept of mutual accountability takes into consideration that the contributors are also pursuing other mandated priorities outside the scope of the ISF. Following endorsement by the senior leadership forum used by the mission and the UNCT, the S/ERSG and UNCT (represented by the RC/HC) should present the document for discussion at a Director-level meeting of the Headquarters-based ITF. At this stage, ITFs may call upon the expertise of the IAP Working Group to assist with quality assurance in the ISF process and product. Following these discussions, the S/ERSG, RC/HC and ITF should formally endorse an ISF. The Under-Secretary-General of the lead department should also sign off on the ISF as a demonstration of support.

Where the ISF is to be the composite for other planning documents, such as the UNDAF and part of the CHAP, or where the ISF and the UNDAF are merged, this pro-

cess must be adjusted to ensure validation by all local partners before referring the tool to global Headquarters.

### Thematic Working Groups

Once basic decisions are taken about the strategic peace consolidation priorities (the strategic objectives) that will be addressed by the ISF, it may be useful to further develop the ISF content through thematic working groups. In most cases, this will involve senior working-level staff from mission components and members of the UNCT. In this context, it is important to involve those with a direct understanding of programming and budgetary allocations (for example cluster leads, outcome group leads, mission heads of components) to ensure that commitments in the ISF can be adequately resourced (through RBB, CPAPs,<sup>44</sup> etc.). These thematic working groups should regularly report to senior leadership and should benefit from the coordination and facilitation support of the strategic planners of the mission and RC Office. Thematic working groups should be engaged in the development of ISF content, including the political and operational strategy, risk analysis, sequencing of priority results, linkages to other elements of the ISF, and the partnerships strategy (with World Bank, bilaterals, etc.).

### Consulting Non-UN Actors

Unlike an UNDAF, an ISF (in case it is separate from the UNDAF) does not require the direct endorsement of national authorities. The ISF is, first and foremost, an internal United Nations document. If UN field presences would like to produce a version of the ISF as a public information tool or for consultation purposes, it may need to be adapted from the original internal document. In this context, it might be necessary to exclude sensitive annexes and/or conflict analysis in the public versions.

If and when the United Nations has decided to merge its ISF with the UNDAF, UNDAF procedures should therefore take precedence and the document should be prepared and finalized in consultation with the host government.

If and when the United Nations has decided to have a separate ISF and UNDAF and keep the ISF as an internal document, each contributor to an ISF is responsible for consulting the appropriate national authorities, non-UN actors (for example NGOs, bilateral donors, other multilateral actors) throughout the ISF development process and should be able to articulate how the ISF's priorities contribute to national peace consolidation strategies (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Transitional Results Frameworks, National Recovery Strategies, etc.). Agencies are responsible for consulting with their respective Headquarters.

The nature of consultations with national actors will vary depending on the context. For instance, consultations on an ISF being developed in a peacebuilding context may be extensive and an ISF may be explicitly linked to existing national peacebuilding and development strategies. However, consultations with national authorities for

<sup>44</sup> CPAP: Country Programme Action Plan.

ISFs in conflict situations will require more care, and may involve non-State actors and civil society.

***Example: Elaboration of the 2013–2016 Integrated Strategic Framework in Haiti***

The ISF in Haiti, which includes MINUSTAH<sup>45</sup> and 18 agencies, funds and programmes, replaces the UNDAF and constitutes the strategic umbrella under which MINUSTAH undertakes its consolidation plan and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes elaborate their respective country programme documents.

As with the previous ISF in Haiti, the 2013–2016 ISF is fully aligned with the National Development Strategic Plan along its four pillars (institutional, territorial, social and economic rebuilding).

The document was elaborated over an eight-month period in close consultation with the government and is signed by the SRSB and the Minister of Plan and External Cooperation. In addition, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have aligned their new country programmes with the ISF results, while some MINUSTAH sections (such as rule of law) have used the ISF results as the basis for their annual workplans. The 2013–2016 ISF is also taken as a reference for the development of the mission consolidation plan.

***Merged UNDAF–ISF and Links with Other United Nations Planning Processes***

The purpose of an ISF process is to achieve an overarching strategy for the role of the United Nations in peace consolidation in a given country. Whereas existing United

Key Steps of the Elaboration Process	Key Outcomes
Existing joint planning team (SRSB Office’s planning officer and DRSB/RC/HC’s planning officer), who had worked on the previous ISF 2010–2011 and its 2012 extension	Joint vision on the objectives and process for the 2013–2016 ISF
Agreement within the UNCT and within the UNDG LAC <sup>46</sup> that the ISF is the only inter-agency strategic document and replaces the UNDAF	Increased buy-in and rationalization of the planning process in-country
Senior-level retreat with MINUSTAH and UNCT senior management and high-level participation of the government	Validation of the 10 principles guiding the elaboration of the document by technical teams

45 MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

46 UNDG LAC: United Nations Development Group for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Key Steps of the Elaboration Process	Key Outcomes
Creation of a group of focal points in the government to follow and guide the elaboration of the document. Two consultation meetings organized (hosted in the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation) and various drafts of the document circulated for comments	Buy-in from relevant ministries and government entities, especially the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation as the lead for development planning and aid coordination
Creation of four groups, one for each pillar of the ISF, to elaborate each of the four result matrixes. A lead and co-lead for each of the pillar was jointly agreed upon	Buy-in from mission and agency staff on the development of the document
Internal validation by MINUSTAH and UNCT senior management through the Integrated Strategic Planning Group	ISF document validated internally
Validation meeting with the government hosted in the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation	ISF document validated by the government. The document was then signed by both the Minister of Plan and the SRSG

Nations planning processes (for example UNDAF for development, CHAP/CAP for humanitarian action, RBB for the mission) are specific to development, humanitarian, or peace and security sectors, the ISF is unique in that its primary purpose is to reflect the collaborative objectives of the United Nations system for peace consolidation. In order to foster synergies and avoid duplications, whenever possible, a coherent process should be used for the different United Nations planning tools and instruments.

If the ISF follows other planning processes and instruments it should draw upon existing analysis, while allowing senior managers to step back and have a strategic discussion about current peace consolidation priorities. The ISF process is likely to reveal gaps and suggestions regarding how current plans could be revised in order to contribute more effectively to peace consolidation. Different processes will have different scopes and a different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them.

When examining the linkages between the ISF and existing United Nations system planning tools, some United Nations field presences may consider whether an existing in-country tool could be adapted to fulfil the minimum standards for ISFs described herein. This is often the case with the UNDAF, which has been used as the UN's ISF in countries such as Burundi, Liberia and Haiti (and in these places, the UNDAF is at times referred to internally as "UNDAF+" to indicate that it serves as the ISF, following, usually, slight revisions to meet the ISF minimum requirements).

If the mission and the UNCT decide to use another planning framework currently in use, in lieu of a separate ISF, the framework should be reviewed against these guidelines.

However, in certain situations adapting an existing tool may not be sufficient. For instance, complex United Nations architectures with multiple mandated presences would benefit from developing an ISF (as described in these guidelines) that effectively brings together the United Nations presence around a set of agreed priorities. Likewise, multidimensional operations (for example those that include police and/or military components) would require an ISF so as to adequately reflect the scale of mission resources and/or allow for a short-term planning horizon suited to these typically volatile environments.

Once developed or revised, the ISF needs to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF's objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within other United Nations system planning tools (such as UNDAF and country programme documents, CHAP/CAP and RBB).

### III.3 Transition Planning in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal

#### “Word from the Field”

Ameerah Haq, SRSG and Head of United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

January 2010–June 2012

“Together with the government, we decided on seven focus areas for the transition, reflecting UNMIT's key areas of work, and the cross-cutting concern of building capacity for Timorese staff in UNMIT and national institutions. The government and the UN family appointed overall transition focal points – the Deputy Prime Minister and the mission's Chief of Staff – as well as focal points for each area, who set about drafting a Joint Transition Plan (JTP). The JTP, which turned out to be the first of its kind by a peacekeeping mission, sets out UNMIT's activities in each focus area, and identifies when the activity will either be completed, or when and how it will be handed over to a national institution or a bilateral or multilateral partner. The plan listed a total of 129 activities, one third of which will be completed by December 2012, and two thirds of which will be handed over.

Progress on UNMIT's transition activities is monitored by the transition focal points, supported by the UNMIT transition team, and reported every quarter in a dashboard report, which tracks completion levels, activity status and handover progress, and thereby enables the High-Level Committee (HLC) to identify gaps, focus on priorities and effectively steer UNMIT's transition. The systematic moni-

toring of activities, their scoring and use in dashboards for senior managers are central elements of decision-making in UNMIT. It will be important to continue this monitoring through to the end of the mandate, to ensure that we deliver on what is set out in the plan, and that activities are effectively concluded or handed over.

*Lesson learnt: A seamless transition to a new form of United Nations engagement is only possible if UN Headquarters, both the Secretariat and agencies, funds and programmes, commit to planning early for the shape and scope of the post-peace-keeping presence. ITFs can provide useful forums for such planning, and ensure inclusiveness, but a smaller group of the most concerned stakeholders needs to take responsibility for moving the process forward.*

By aligning our own planning with the New Deal, as we have done with the UNCT's transition portfolio, the United Nations has an opportunity both to provide credibility to Timor-Leste's leadership of this initiative and thereby strengthen our relations with the government, and to ensure that the UN is well-positioned as this major policy initiative in post-conflict countries becomes increasingly operational.

*Lesson learnt: Having a national 'champion' who understands the importance of early transition planning – in our case President Ramos-Horta – helps to secure national engagement at the early stages of the process.”*

In addition to guidance provided in the IAP Policy and Guidelines, the *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal*<sup>47</sup> provides strategic guidance to United Nations Headquarters offices and field presences specifically on how to plan and manage the transition of UN operations triggered by the significant drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission or SPM.

The IAP Policy clarifies the roles and responsibilities of United Nations actors at Headquarters and in the field, illustrates links between transitions and other related policy stream, and establishes the following key principles that apply across all UN mission transition processes:

- (a) *Early planning:* Planning for United Nations transitions needs to begin early, take into account different potential scenarios, and remain flexible throughout.
- (b) *United Nations integration:* United Nations transitions involve the reconfiguration of the overall UN presence and objectives, not only the drawdown and withdrawal of a mission. As such they must be planned, coordinated and managed jointly by all UN actors present in the country from the outset, at both the field and Headquarters level.

<sup>47</sup> *Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal* (2013).

- (c) *National ownership*: The success of United Nations transitions hinges on national ownership, leadership and political will in the host country, which should be secured through high-level political engagement, as well as support from a broad and representative range of national stakeholders.
- (d) *National capacity development*: The existence and development of relevant national capacities is critical to ensure an effective and sustainable handover of mission responsibilities to national partners.
- (e) *Communication*: United Nations transitions can cause anxieties and diverging expectations among national and international stakeholders, including mission staff and UNCT members. UN leadership in the field and at Headquarters needs to manage expectations carefully through clear and consistent messaging, among other things.

#### **Key Dos (and Don'ts)**

- Plan jointly for the transition with the host government and the UNCT. This is a time-intensive process but it is essential.
- Establish dedicated capacity internally, chaired jointly by mission and RC/UNCT, to oversee transition planning. Adequate and consistent participation by operational, administrative and security officers from the mission and the United Nations agencies should be ensured.
- Identify benchmarks and indicators from the outset to monitor progress in the overall peacebuilding effort, in dialogue with national and international partners. Regular assessments of progress towards benchmarks should inform the gradual adjustment of a mission's presence over time, taking into account the changing situation on the ground as well as the evolving capacities, resources and comparative advantages of national and international partners.
- In addition to benchmarks, introduce a transition timeline when mission drawdown is anticipated, in order to keep the plan on track and sustain momentum with national and international partners throughout the transition process.
- Take the opportunity of the transition to (re)assess whether new or other peacebuilding needs not included in the mandate of the mission have arisen and should be the focus of United Nations support after mission withdrawal.
- Develop criteria for handover, to decide, among other things, which entity (UNCT, national or international partner) will take on selected tasks. Such criteria should be agreed in conjunction with the host government, after consultation with other national actors, and be informed by recent policy developments on international assistance, including the New Deal where/when relevant.
- Based on the above criteria, carry out a joint mapping exercise to determine (i) which tasks the mission has carried out; (ii) which of these tasks should be continued beyond the end of the mission and which should be concluded or discontinued; and (iii) who will take over those tasks. The analysis should include capacity

and resource assessments for each task to be handed over, as a reality check (can the "recipient" entity actually take it on?) and to inform resource mobilization efforts (what does the "recipient" entity need to take it on?). This common understanding of the challenges will form the backbone of the transition process and inform and be informed by strategic-level assessments undertaken to determine the nature of the reconfigured follow-on United Nations presence.

- Take time to assess the pros and cons of reflecting transition plans and agreements (which tasks? to whom? when and how?) in existing United Nations plans (UNDAF+ or separate ISF) versus developing a separate transition plan and the impact of either option on national ownership as well as planning and monitoring costs.
- Include updates on handover in regular United Nations reports (internal and external), including capacity status of recipient entity, timing of handover, and residual handover tasks.
- Prioritize and dedicate sufficient resources, time and senior-level involvement to communication with both internal and external actors, as many constituencies will have various concerns regarding the transition (for example employment for mission staff, loss of support for external actors). A range of communication tools may be used simultaneously (web pages, radio messages, town hall meetings).
- Design joint resource mobilization strategies between the mission and UNCT with the full support of United Nations Headquarters offices to ensure that the latter will have additional means to address some of the gaps that are being created by the mission's departure.
- Factor in externalities associated with the mission drawdown and withdrawal, including local economic impact (and ways to mitigate).

#### **Lessons: Transition from UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL**

In 2008, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was handed over to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and renamed the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). This transition highlighted areas that required further work at Headquarters, including through the use of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs).

Some key lessons included the importance of transition planning processes, the timely appointment of senior leadership, effective linkages between departments, support for integration, and arrangements to ensure continuity of key staff in the field. At the mission level, the importance of risk assessment and the development of strategies to mitigate risk were also underscored. Finally, the transition from UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL also highlighted the important role that leadership and vision play in such situations and provided a best practice for knowledge transfer that should be emulated by other missions.

## III.4 Aligning with National and International Planning Processes

### What the IAP Policy says:

21. **National ownership:** National ownership is an essential condition for the sustainability of peace. Where and when clear national peace consolidation priorities have been developed on the basis of broad-based consensus, integrated assessment and planning processes should aim to specify how the UN will support a diverse range of stakeholders in the implementation of these priorities.

53. A shared understanding of other existing planning processes, including content, timeframes, budgetary implications and degree of national ownership, must inform the development or revision of Integrated Strategic Frameworks.

54. Whenever possible and appropriate, the ISF must take into account and reflect existing national and international planning frameworks and articulate to which national peace consolidation priorities the United Nations will collectively contribute. To the extent possible and appropriate, planning timelines should be aligned and ISF monitoring systems should seek to use and strengthen national monitoring indicators.

### III.4.1 Improving Linkages with National Planning Processes

National planning processes refer to instruments developed under national leadership to define the needs, priorities and strategies of the country/context in the crisis or post-conflict period. They may be national in their thematic and geographical scope, or focused on specific issues or regions. They may be political in nature (for example a vision), policy-oriented (for example a PRSP), programmatically driven (for example recovery plans or sector plans), or analytical (for example Post-Conflict Needs Assessment). They may also include, in some instances, specific roles for international actors.

To ensure that the ISF (or equivalent) coheres with national planning processes, where relevant, the following practices are suggested:

- Align, where possible, the parameters of the ISF and other joint planning processes with national parameters, especially timeframes (start date and end date of the plan/framework).<sup>48</sup>
- Sequence the design of United Nations plans flexibly and, to avoid “competition” with national planning processes, ensure that relevant national actors will have the capacity (including time) to input into the ISF and other joint UN planning

<sup>48</sup> The level of alignment of an ISF with national plans is based on the contextual analysis, in particular stage/inclusivity/stability of the peace process.

processes. Use the substance (analysis, selection of priorities, etc.) of the national planning process as a reference for the UN planning processes.

- Use existing national sources of data and analysis to support joint United Nations planning processes (even if, in some instances, the UN may need to carry additional analysis to cover gaps or address sensitive issues). This is particularly important when Post-Conflict Needs Assessments have been undertaken, since these are nationally led and owned but benefit from structured international support.
- Where relevant, explicitly identify the national priorities, as articulated in national plans or compacts with the international community, that the ISF and other joint United Nations plans will either contribute to (at the outcome level) or directly execute on behalf of national partners (at output level). This is especially relevant for national priorities that have the buy-in from a wide range of actors and that have been developed on the basis of a genuinely inclusive consultative process.
- Likewise, where possible, especially when the United Nations plans designate specific national priorities as areas of UN support, the UN plans should use the same monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches, including the indicators and targets, and seek to support national actors in collecting the relevant data (instead of creating parallel structures/efforts).
- However, when aligning United Nations M&E processes with national planning processes, the UN should clearly distinguish measures of *United Nations performance* from indicators of *country performance*.
- In certain settings (of increased stability and sufficient government legitimacy), consider merging the United Nations planning process (for example an UNDAF+) with a national planning process, whereby one analytical process, led by national actors with international support, will yield national priorities and plans. There should be an agreed presentation of how the United Nations (and other international actors) will contribute to such priorities and plans.
- In an unstable context, where there is more than one party to the conflict, including the authorities, caution should be exercised in merging the ISF with national plans and seeking government endorsement, as this could jeopardize perceptions of the impartial role of the United Nations within the country. There are other mechanisms that are jointly coordinated with national authorities; this is not a requirement for the ISF.
- When, for various reasons, the planning processes need to remain distinct, joint United Nations planning processes should nonetheless, at the outset, articulate the various principles and concrete ways in which the UN will seek to align (over time) with national planning processes and support national planning/implementation capacity. Integrated planning processes (such as ISFs or joint sector plans) present particularly important opportunities for such thinking, as they allow for UN consolidation of various resources and capacities (political, programmatic and operational) in support of national capacity development.

- See also the guidance on mapping existing plans and frameworks in the toolbox at the end of this section.

**In practice, the level of alignment between an ISF and national plans will vary from one context to the other, and can take on one or a combination of the following options:**

- Fully aligned:* The timeframe is the same, and all ISF strategic objectives (excluding any internal objective) express a United Nations contribution to national results.
- Partially aligned:* For example, because national governments do not fully share core United Nations values and standards, or because participatory process has not been fully inclusive – the ISF may therefore contain contributions to several national objectives as well as additional objectives.
- Time-dependent:* For example, aligned either up to an election or after an election.
- Additional process:* ISF is not aligned with national planning, either because there is no national plan to which the ISF can be linked or because the nature of the ISF is purely internal.

### Alignment with National Plans in South Sudan

The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 was prepared in the lead-up to South Sudan’s independence through a government-led process in which the UNCT and other multilateral and bilateral partners actively participated. The development plan structures the government’s development objectives and priority programmes under four pillars: (i) governance, (ii) economic development, (iii) human and social development and (iv) conflict prevention and security. The development plan was formally adopted by the new Government of the Republic of South Sudan following the country’s independence in July 2011.

Both the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UNCT have aligned their key strategic frameworks with the South Sudan Development Plan, including the UNDAF, the benchmarks for measuring the mission’s progress, and the UN’s integrated framework for support for peace consolidation: the United Nations South Sudan Peace-Building Support Plan. Both the benchmarks and the Peace-Building Support Plan have been prepared in accordance with Security Council resolution 1996.<sup>49</sup>

With the advent of the new nation, the United Nations and other development partners in South Sudan have had a unique opportunity to align their planning frameworks with those of the government. The simultaneous development of the UN’s first set of national planning frameworks for South Sudan also provided an opportunity to ensure that there were close linkages between them. In particular, the Peace-Building Support Plan is harmonized with both the UNDAF

<sup>49</sup> Security Council resolution 1996 (2011; S/RES/1996).

and the Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) of the mission. It is also aligned with the peacebuilding and state-building goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which South Sudan has self-nominated to pilot. The alignment of planning frameworks allows for streamlined monitoring and reporting mechanisms and improved coherence during their implementation.

**Finally, the alignment with national plans is not merely a process issue. The ISF provides the opportunity for the United Nations system to analyse local and national capacities and develop common approaches to enhancing such capacities.** The toolbox at the end of this section provides a list of recent United Nations policies and guidance notes developed for such a purpose.

### III.4.2 Improving Linkages with International Planning Processes

International planning processes refer to instruments developed by the international community to define its engagement in a particular country. They include bilateral frameworks of assistance (donor strategies, etc.) and collective frameworks (such as compacts). Coordination between international actors is particularly important in instances where national ownership is weak and capacity to coordinate international support and implement plans is deficient.

The following recommendations have emerged from recent experiences:

- Align, where possible, the parameters of the ISF and other joint United Nations planning processes with international planning processes, especially timeframes (start date and end date of the plan/framework), and encourage international alignment behind national plans and parameters where appropriate.
- Where possible, the United Nations should lead other international partners in collaboration on the analytical phase (needs assessments, conflict analysis), on the selection of priorities (to bring clarity to the division of labour) and in the monitoring phase (to reduce transaction costs) by undertaking joint field missions/reviews, and sharing data collection efforts/capacities.
- In certain settings (where there is limited United Nations leverage and/or donor fragmentation), consider merging the United Nations planning process (for example an UNDAF+) with other donor planning processes, whereby a set of international actors (including the United Nations) presents one vision, one approach and one, agreed, division of labour to support the country/context. This option was used in the DRC (with the Country Assistance Framework or CAF) to maximize the impact of the international community, reduce transaction costs and increase leverage on the government.

When the planning processes need to remain distinct, joint UN plans should nonetheless be based on an accurate knowledge of what other international actors are doing, and where the United Nations adds real value above and beyond these other

actors. This is as relevant for missions as it is for UN agencies; even in mandate areas, there is scope for the United Nations to further define its unique contribution, devise effective ways of coordinating and collaborating with other actors, and, as a result, reduce the costs of engagement for all national partners.

#### “Word from the Field”

Lise Grande, DSRSG/RC/HC and UNDP Resident Representative in India  
End of Assignment Report  
July 2012

“Uncoordinated, parallel planning and financing result in competing objectives, contradictory priorities and strategic incoherence, which impede the transition to recovery and development. International actors need to agree on a strategic framework that is driven by national strategies and based on harmonized needs assessment and planning.”

### III.5 Comparative Advantage and Integrated Planning

#### What the IAP Policy says:

19. Comparative advantages: Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best equipped to carry them out and resources requested accordingly.

22. Clear UN role in relation to other peace consolidation actors: While integrated assessments and planning are internal UN processes, they have to define the strategic positioning and role of the UN vis-à-vis national and international actors on the basis of UN comparative advantages and the activities being carried out by these actors.

#### III.5.1 Assessing Comparative Advantage

Leveraging comparative advantages to maximize impact and reduce overlaps constitutes one of the core principles of the IAP Policy. Designing the UN’s peace consolidation responses based on the individual comparative advantage of each United Nations entity yields complementarities and increases the efficiency and impact of the United Nations.

The definition of priorities for the United Nations and the related allocation of responsibilities must be based on carefully identified and agreed comparative advantages, both within the United Nations and between the United Nations and other actors. Once United Nations priorities have been agreed, tasks should be allocated to

the United Nations entity best equipped to carry them out and resources mobilized accordingly.

It is important for participants in the assessment and planning process to have a shared definition of what constitutes a comparative advantage, and a shared understanding of how and when to assess comparative advantage within the process.

#### Definition

A comparative advantage combines three basic elements:

1. *A legal mandate; and*
2. *A demonstrated capacity; and*
3. *A unique contribution in the selected areas of intervention.*

Comparative advantage must always be context specific. A verifiable comparative advantage in another country does not directly translate into a similar comparative advantage in the country under consideration. They are also intervention specific – a comparative advantage is not in a sector, but rather a specific and concrete type of intervention in that particular sector.

A comparative advantage is, by definition, relative. One’s recognized strength in a specific type of intervention does not necessarily result in a comparative advantage; another entity may be able to respond more effectively and more efficiently to the demands of this particular task in this specific country context.

#### Defining Capacity

Capacity should be assessed as the combination of the following elements:

- (a) *Adequate resources*: Does the organization have access to all financial, human and other resources required for delivery of tasks and/or can they mobilize the funds needed?
- (b) *Leverage and acceptance*: Does the organization have the support of other external actors, and/or the access (political, physical) to decision-makers and beneficiaries to secure support, address constraints and/or develop partnerships for more effective implementation?
- (c) *Effective and efficient programme delivery approaches*: Are the interventions designed and implemented in accordance with project management and sector best practice, and tailored to context-specific factors? Do they minimize resource use?
- (d) *Accountability for results*: Does the organization have the monitoring and evaluation systems to assess and communicate its performance transparently, and translate findings into corrective measures?
- (e) *Back office support*: Does the organization have the administrative, logistical and legal systems (procurement, contracts, etc.) required to quickly implement activities, including the ability to enter into partnerships with a range of actors (private companies, NGOs, etc.)?



- (f) *Capacity of implementing partners:* Does the organization's network of implementing partners (where relevant) have the required capacity to perform effectively?

### Timing: When to Assess Comparative Advantage

Comparative advantage should be an on-going consideration for planners, but it is especially important to consider it at two moments:

1. *At the early stage of integrated planning, when a Strategic Assessment is carried out and the ISF developed. This is the moment when priorities, responsibilities and programmatic and other functions requiring an integrated approach are defined, and it is a critical stage at which to consider who is best equipped to carry out which peace consolidation tasks, taking all sources of funding into account.*
2. *In the mission-specific assessments and the formulation of the Mission Concept and resulting concepts of operation, structure and RBB. This phase relates to how the mission can best deliver on mandated tasks, deploying the resources that would be proposed for the mission. It is important to consider comparative advantage within the mission planning and budgeting cycle, not off-cycle, because the mission budget proposal to the General Assembly is the main vehicle for setting out the resources, structures and implementation arrangements required to carry out the mandate (see below).*

## III.5.2 Transfer of Mandated Tasks

A comparative advantage exercise, undertaken within the framework of an integrated assessment and planning process, may reveal that an agency, fund or programme may be best placed to carry out a mandated task. In such instances, mission leadership and planners in particular should keep in mind the following considerations:

- Implementation of mandated tasks by United Nations partners on behalf of a mission may be considered when it can be demonstrated to be a more cost-effective way of carrying out the mandate than direct mission implementation, within the framework of the ISF.
- Mission planning and organizational design should reflect tasking to other entities, so as to avoid duplication of structures for the implementation of the related body of work.
- It is necessary to consider whether certain tasks are of a specific political or monitoring character, such that only the mission itself, with its reporting line to the Security Council, can appropriately carry them out.
- Provision for accountability for the resources provided needs to be clear and specific.

### Examples

As the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) began to draw down in 2012, it made arrangements with UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women to carry out a small set of mandated capacity-building work, primarily in relation to support for the national police and the rule of law.

### Info Box: CAPMATCH

CAPMATCH is an online platform that matches up providers and requesters of civilian expertise. It can be used by planners as part of a comparative advantage analysis focusing on matching expertise with tasks, at various stages of the integrated presence's life-cycle.

#### Uses of CAPMATCH

CAPMATCH can help planners and missions provide stronger support to national institution-building, as follows:

- To support national authorities in producing clear priorities and plans in critical institution-building areas, use CAPMATCH to request advice/input/expertise from reformers from other countries which have faced comparable challenges.
- To find the right people to advise national authorities or respond to their requests, use CAPMATCH to:
  - identify a stronger pool of potential candidates for approved mission posts (government-provided personnel, mission-specific vacancies);
  - identify expertise for country team programme needs
  - request expertise directly – governments can register on CAPMATCH too.
- To provide national institutions with technical and financial support beyond the advice the mission can provide, register needs on CAPMATCH.

#### Key Features of CAPMATCH

- Government entities, regional organizations, UN missions and country teams, NGOs and civil society can participate.
- Focuses on the five areas most commonly identified as the critical capacity gaps for countries emerging from conflict or crisis: safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality and economic revitalization.
- Aimed at governments and organizations, not individuals. Participants may register as a requester of capacities/exchange of experience, a provider of capacities, or both.
- Designed to foster greater cooperation among government and non-government entities with direct experience of institutional reform for

post-conflict peacebuilding or conflict prevention. A mechanism for identifying new sources of experience and expertise, particularly from the global south.

- Not a roster, nor a site for UN recruitment. Once CAPMATCH has suggested potential matches, it is up to the participants to make contact and go forward, using the usual processes of selection and deployment. UN procedures for recruitment, selection and vetting remain unchanged.

#### How to Register

- Visit <https://capmatch.dfs.un.org>
- Submit a registration request which is vetted by the UN team that manages CAPMATCH. Once approved, you can make a posting to request and/or provide civilian capacities.

## III.6 Joint Sectoral Planning

### What the IAP Policy says:

18. **Form follows function:** The structural configuration of the UN integrated presence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates and can therefore take different forms. Under the same principle, decisions on modalities for working together in integrated settings, which may include integrated or joint structures, joint programmes and/or the use of external capacities (e.g. non-UN expertise), should be based on criteria of expected impact, transaction costs and assessment of risks.

Joint planning at the strategic level may also be supported, where relevant, by joint sector planning and programming between a mission and one or more United Nations agencies. Such joint sector planning is often used to coordinate United Nations support in areas such as security sector reform, DDR, rule of law,<sup>50</sup> elections, protection of civilians, institution-building and/or constitution-making.

<sup>50</sup> Joint programmatic responses in the area of rule of law constitute one of the main purposes of the Global Focal Point arrangement between DPKO/OROLSI (Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions) and UNDP. One of the most recent examples of joint rule of law programmes can be found in Somalia, where UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and UNDP have developed a joint programme, implemented by an integrated team, with resources for UNDP staff provided by the mission budget.

In addition to ensuring coherence of support, joint sectoral plans are also useful resource mobilization instruments, in line with “delivering as one”<sup>51</sup> expectations from many donors.

### III.6.1 Outline of Joint Planning Process and Document

The following list provides suggested outlines for both the process of developing a joint sectoral plan and the plan itself.

- (a) Analysis
  - *Clarity of purpose:* Why this intervention, and coherence between mission and United Nations agency plans?
  - *Value of common approach:* What is gained from developing a common strategy in this particular sector?
- (b) Results
  - Results to be achieved, timelines and sequence
  - Conflict sensitivity
- (c) Resource requirements and gaps
- (d) Implementation arrangements
  - Structural arrangements (for example integrated teams) and roles and responsibilities within the United Nations
  - Internal coordination mechanisms (where relevant)
- (e) Approach to the joint endeavour: how to work with partners (including a common capacity-building approach where relevant) and shared messaging/communication and M&E
  - Indicators, baselines and targets
  - Data collection plan: responsibilities, frequency, format
  - Resources required
  - Corrective measures: decision-making process

### III.6.2 United Nations Integrated Support for Government Sectoral Planning

In certain circumstances, the mission and country team are mandated or requested to support governments in developing their own sector planning. The box below contains a resource note, to help missions and country teams in undertaking such exercises.

<sup>51</sup> See UNDG High Level Group, *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach* (2013).

### Examples: Sector Planning for Police, Justice and Corrections

#### Liberia

Liberia's Justice and Security Joint Programme (JSJP) is a sector-wide programme developed in May 2011 by the Government of Liberia in partnership with the international community. The JSJP is designed to respond to the rule of law and security sector reform needs identified by the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan that was developed by the government with the United Nations family, national and international partners, including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The three-year programme is led by the Government of Liberia and supported by the international community, including DPKO, UNDP, the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) working in concert. In anticipation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) transition and the need for a subnational presence of justice and security actors, the JSJP has four main areas of focus: (i) establishment of five regional "Justice and Security Hubs" for decentralized service delivery; (ii) capacity-building of justice and security personnel; (iii) local community-responsive service provision; and (iv) enabling legal and policy frameworks in place. To more effectively deliver in these areas, the JSJP captures the financial contributions made by the United Nations, bilateral donors and international entities, as well as those non-financial/in-kind contributions made by the Government of Liberia and United Nations entities, in a single results and resources framework within the JSJP document. This framework is considered an overarching document for the justice and security sector in Liberia, providing coherence and coordination to sectoral engagement for better results in a nationally owned process.

#### Afghanistan

In 2008, the National Justice Sector Strategy and National Justice Programme (NJP) was finalized in Afghanistan, identifying six main components of work in the justice sector: accountability, infrastructure, training, law reform, institutional cooperation and public awareness. The Programme Unit (PU) had responsibility for overseeing the NJP, and included the Programme Oversight Committee (POC) and the Programme Support Unit (PSU). The POC consists of the three justice institutions (police, justice and corrections), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and is responsible for overall policy direction and guidance, interacting with donors at a high level, and overseeing implementation of justice sector activities. To assist the POC in its efforts to coordinate donor activities, donors established the Board of Donors, chaired by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with a rotating co-chair to allow for quarterly interaction between international donors and the justice institutions. This structure provided an opportunity to address rule of law assistance in a positive and proactive way, consolidating a core, high-level mechanism for coordination and monitoring in this sector.

### For Further Reading: Sector Planning for Police, Justice and Corrections

The Resource Note on Sector Planning for Police, Justice and Corrections in Post-Crisis and Transition Situations (under development; by the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections in the Rule of Law, supported by the Civilian Capacities Initiative) is intended as a resource for national decision-makers engaged in building and reforming security and justice systems in the aftermath of conflict or during democratic transitions.

The note describes how the security and justice sector is often overlooked and underfunded in national reconstruction and development plans. It sets out the need to recognize that police, justice and corrections are closely linked and, as such, require an inter-agency approach. Success in this regard will require not only addressing capacity issues and improving conditions of service, but may also extend to addressing the legacies of corruption and human rights abuses. The note describes how this goes far beyond training to involve a comprehensive institution-building approach, including legal and organizational reform, incentives, professionalization and community relations.

The note considers lessons on how to prioritize action, such as:

- Linking police, justice and corrections and ensuring that the right resources are secured;
- Getting the right balance between quick wins and long-term approaches;
- Involving the public in consulting on needs, priorities and implementation.

The note includes resources on the process that national governments can use to develop a sector plan:

- Short-term or emergency planning for immediate quick wins and confidence-building measures;
- Establishing a sector coordination mechanism;
- Gathering and using the data needed for longer-term planning;
- Assessing the evidence;
- Drafting the national strategy and plan for police, justice and corrections;
- Developing the budget;
- Monitoring implementation of the plan.

## III.7 Integrated Support Planning

United Nations entities working in the same geographical locations have long recognized that their respective activities may include areas of common interest. In these areas, they understand that closer cooperation and collaboration with re-

gard to support services could increase their efficiency in fulfilling their mandates, and maximize the collective impact and capacity of the United Nations at country level.

Integrated support planning, rather than the actual integration of support services, is regulated by binding frameworks or mechanisms. The impetus to provide timely, sound and comprehensive integrated support planning, therefore, is on the desk officers assigned to the mission in question. The key guiding document in this regard is the Framework Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Collaboration in Respect of Support Services.

Planning for integrated support should happen as early as possible in the integrated planning process to allow for maximum consideration of integrated support before support elements of individual United Nations entities are locked into place.

**Liberia: Fully Integrated Services**

*A joint effort from UNMIL and the UNCT to integrate the Internet networks of 11 UN agencies and field offices in 20 locations in Liberia resulted in some of the fastest, most reliable and cost-effective Internet services in West Africa.*

**Access to System Contracts**

*A Security Trauma Bag, jointly developed by the United Nations Department of Safety & Security (UNDSS) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), is available in the Equipment Systems Contract catalogue for ordering by any UN entity.*

### III.7.1 Common Services

#### Which Areas of Goods and Services?

There are many goods and services that could, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the specific situation, be integrated. A list of support areas that could possibly be integrated is found in the toolbox at the end of this section. Irrespective of the final determination, all of these should be considered in order to maximize system-wide efficiencies and use of limited resources.

#### Integration to What Extent?

- (a) In case of common services:

The greatest level of integration of support is the establishment of common services, for example office premises, accessible by all participating United Nations entities and usually paid for and/or staffed pro rata, based on staffing size or projected use (“cost sharing”).

Key considerations with regard to common services are appropriateness to the context, for example potential programmatic impact, the organization of the service (e.g. will there be a lead executing or managing entity?) and funding/staffing modalities. Pro-rata costs need to be included in participating entities’ budgets.

- (b) In case of provision of services by one entity to others:

Short of common services, services and goods can be provided by one entity and used by others to limit duplication and maximize economies of scale. Examples are bulk procurement (e.g. of fuel), use of aircraft, or access to a medical clinic. Such use of goods and services are usually paid for on a fee-for-service (“cost recovery”) basis.

These types of arrangements, including the use of World Food Programme (WFP) trucks to move mission equipment, should be reviewed and approved by the humanitarian country team to ensure that no adverse effects on humanitarian actors results from the service. Humanitarian vehicles should not carry military equipment or personnel.

**Sudan: Asset Sharing**

*WFP trucks were used for movement of equipment from the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).*

Key considerations with regard to this level of integration of goods and services are (i) the need for the providing entity to plan for a larger client base than if it were providing these goods and services only to its own organization, and increase its capacity accordingly; and (ii) the need for the receiving entity to estimate its use and budget accordingly.

### III.7.2 Limitations

The United Nations financial and procurement rules and regulations limit the possibilities for the integration of support arrangements across the UN system. One outstanding question continues to be the level of programme support costs that can or should be charged when providing goods or services to United Nations entities working in the same geographical area. Guidance on this issue is awaited from the Department of Management.

Notwithstanding the desirability of integrated support planning, care has to be taken to maintain the autonomy of individual entities with respect to, including but not limited to, staffing structures and levels and Results-Based Budgeting.

### III.8 Joint Resource Mobilization

While United Nations missions (peacekeeping operations or SPM) and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have different funding structures, recent reforms have increased opportunities for funding inter-operability (for example using assessed contributions for delivery by agencies, or missions accessing UNDG trust funds).

Even when the sources of funding are separate, unity of effort is critical to increase individual and collective fundraising opportunities. Especially in times of financial constraints, donors expect sound resource stewardship and coherence in resource allocation. Joint resource mobilization approaches increase the chance of donor support (even if the resource allocation is “individual”, i.e. specifically for the mission or one UN agency, fund or programme). In addition, integrated plans (ISF or sectoral

plans) may often benefit from joint resource mobilization approaches to ensure consistent implementation,<sup>52</sup> in parallel with or to complement bilateral funding streams.

Joint resource mobilization strategies can vary in scope and depth, but the following elements should be considered:

- Costing each strategic objective articulated in the ISF and other sectoral plans, and consolidating the different sources of funding being mobilized (assessed budget, agency core funding, extra-budgetary/non-core funding) to identify gaps and the most appropriate source of potential funding. Donors now expect to see a comprehensive picture of United Nations funding needs, and how the various sources are being brought together and leveraged to minimize costs and increase impact.
- In this regard, the United Nations may consider developing a Common Budgetary Framework, which has been used by UNCTs in “delivering as one” approaches. The “delivering as one” Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) document<sup>53</sup> describes the Common Budgetary Framework as “an agreed, joint source of financial information on available resources and expected funding and as a basis for joint resource mobilization and allocation of resources from the One Fund (if applicable)”. It states: “The Common Budgetary Framework will include (a) estimated agency contributions, with disaggregation by core and non-core resources; (b) the government contributions; and (c) the funding gap. When other UN actors (Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund or UN mission) are present, the Common Budgetary Framework should, as relevant, reflect these other resources. [...] In countries where the principle of integration applies, the Common Budgetary Framework captures the contributions made by the UN mission to the areas covered. In transition countries where humanitarian activities are on-going, the Common Budgetary Framework should be coordinated with the applicable humanitarian processes and instruments in order to ensure continuity and coherence between humanitarian and development assistance.” Furthermore: “In transition countries, the One Fund should take into account and be coordinated with the resources channelled through the UN mission, Peacebuilding Fund and humanitarian funding mechanisms. This will strengthen the transparency of resources managed and implemented by the UN in the country.”
- For missions, presenting the overall United Nations budgetary picture in submissions to the Advisory Committee on the Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)/5th Committee. Member States increasingly request information on the budgets of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and capacities before approving mission budgets. For complex integrated peacekeeping operations, General Assembly resolution 61/276<sup>54</sup> requests the Secretary-General to provide “a clear description of the role and responsibility of missions vis-à-vis

<sup>52</sup> Tailored approaches are required when an ISF is an internal UN document.

<sup>53</sup> UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach (2013).

<sup>54</sup> General Assembly resolution 61/276 (2007; A/RES/61/276).

integrated mission partners as well as the strategies of the missions for enhancing coordination and collaboration with United Nations country teams in order to achieve better results”. Integrated assessment and planning structures should therefore regularly monitor the “whole of United Nations” resources and capacities, to be able to quickly update Member States and/or launch joint resource mobilization strategies that address these concerns/questions.

- Aligning resource mobilization messages with ISF and other common plans. For example, it is important, even in “individual” fundraising efforts, to describe how an agency project contributes to the result/objective of an ISF or UNDAF+.
- Conducting joint donor stewardship exercises. For example, in many contexts, donors have indicated strong appreciation for regular SRSG and DSRSG/RC presentations on UN strategies and funding needs, and how the United Nations as a system is addressing these priorities (and looking to maximize existing mission and agency resources). Such briefings can include thematic presentations from select heads of agencies.
- Using pooled funds to promote coordinated resource allocation (across strategies and programmes, or within strategies and programmes when implemented jointly by mission and agencies). The pooled funds can be strategy specific (e.g. Trust Fund for elections in country X, or Trust Fund for National Dialogue in Yemen) or United Nations system wide. The use of pooled funds to implement joint resource mobilization strategies is increasingly valuable now that missions are directly eligible to receive funds from the Peacebuilding Fund and UNDG Trust Funds as administered by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund office.

These elements dovetail with other elements of the UNDG SOPs on “delivering as one”, which focus on the need to “agree on a coherent approach to joint resource mobilization”.<sup>55</sup> The SOPs highlight the following considerations, which can be extended to a joint approach with the mission, with appropriate modifications:

- “The mapping of donor priorities and approaches to financing is undertaken in order to facilitate a clear delineation of resource-mobilization opportunities at the country level, including opportunities for One Fund utilization.
- If so decided by the UN Country Team and based on the principles agreed during medium-term planning, a joint resource-mobilization strategy is developed. The UN is currently operating in an environment with increasing challenges to mobilizing the required resources at the country level. Joint resource-mobilization strategies must be country specific, flexible and pragmatic and take into account innovative sources of funding and partnerships.
- The strategy will ensure that the Resident Coordinator-led joint mobilization of resources to cover the identified funding gap is supplemented by individual agency resource-mobilization efforts, thus ensuring transparent, effective inter-agency coordination of resource-mobilization efforts. [...]

<sup>55</sup> UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach (2013).

- Information on new resources mobilized or any changes in expected resources must be shared on a timely basis with the Resident Coordinator/Resident Coordinator's Office for realistic monitoring and updating of the Common Budgetary Framework."

### Joint Resource Mobilization Example: the Sierra Leone MDTF 2009–2012

The Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was set up to fund the Joint Vision, the Integrated Strategic Framework for 2009–2012. In keeping with the international aid effectiveness agenda, emphasizing national ownership, alignment and harmonization, the Trust Fund was designed to improve coherence and efficiency in the funding of the UN's contribution to Sierra Leone's national priorities. Allocation decisions were made, following consultations within the UNCT (comprising agencies, funds and programmes as well as mission representatives) and with its national counterparts, by the Development Partners Committee, co-chaired by the Minister of Finance, the World Bank Country Manager and the ERSG in his capacity as Resident Coordinator.

Launched at a session of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Sierra Leone MDTF enabled the UNCT/RC and the government to oversee the transparent channelling of funds towards the Joint Vision. With its harmonized reporting procedure and encouragement of non-earmarked funding, the MDTF was promoted as the preferred funding mechanism, even over bilateral funding, in line with agreed United Nations reform.

In practice, however, donors did not reroute their bilateral support through the MDTF to the extent hoped for. About 15 per cent of the \$30 million (approximately) that was deposited in the fund between 2010 and 2012 came from resident and non-resident donors, all of whom earmarked the contributions for specific UN agencies and/or Joint Vision programmes.

Nearly 85 per cent of the funds deposited in the MDTF were non-earmarked contributions from the Expanded Delivering as One Funding Window for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Because a joint fund was among the requirements to be considered under that funding window, the MDTF necessitated collaboration between UNCT members both in applying and in allocating the funds: the UNCT had to jointly agree with the government which funding gaps to prioritize. Although this procedure at times could have been smoother, it provided an excellent opportunity for the UNCT with support from its Joint Strategic Planning Unit, to oversee, if not all, at least some of the funding of the ISF. UNIPSIL at the time could not receive these funds directly, but it provided technical and management support in one of the projects funded by the MDTF, as it also did in several PBF-funded projects.

## Toolbox: Integrated Planning

### A. Template for Directive to SRSG, RC and HC

#### 1. Context

- Summary of findings of the Strategic Assessment
- Assessment of key threats and opportunities, and role and comparative advantage of the United Nations vis-à-vis national, regional and other international or multilateral partners
- Summary of applicable United Nations mandates (mission and UNCT)

#### 2. Strategic Objectives, Priorities and Approach

- Strategic intent and end state that the United Nations system will pursue for peace consolidation
- Outline of approach for the United Nations system in the country/area
- Specific common objectives and priorities for the United Nations system as identified in the mandate from the Security Council and through the process of the Strategic Assessment
- Key partnerships

#### 3. Configuration of Integrated Presence and Roles and Responsibilities

- Structural or other arrangements between the mission and UNCT, as applicable
- Roles and responsibilities of the mission and UNCT leadership (including TOR of DSRSs, where missions are structurally integrated) including delegated authority and internal reporting lines
- Reporting lines to Headquarters
- Guidance on the management of diverse mandates in structurally integrated entities (for example implications of robust mission mandates for the United Nations presence)
- Summary of risk assessment and mitigation measures (including humanitarian consequences)
- Relations with the media and information strategy

#### 4. Planning Parameters

- Instructions for the development or review of an Integrated Strategic Framework (timeline, prioritization, sequencing, synchronization of activities between the mission and UNCT in support of the objectives identified above, and links with other national and international planning processes)

- Monitoring and reporting on implementation of United Nations-wide priorities through respective reporting lines (for example reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UNDAFs)
  - Areas of operation and priority locations
    - ◊ Mission and UNCT deployment priorities
    - ◊ Hot spots
5. *Specific Instructions*
- Mainstreaming of various policy issues
  - Conduct and discipline
6. *Monitoring of Implementation*
- How implementation of the Directive will be monitored
  - Schedule of update

***Annex to the Directive (e.g. Component-level Directive), if required***

Headquarters of each entity may issue strategic guidelines to their field representatives on the basis of and in alignment with the Directive. For example, the Office of Military Affairs in DPKO is developing the template that follows for instructions to the military components of peacekeeping missions (see below). Other sections that require concepts of operation may follow this example.

**B. Template for Military Directive to the United Nations Force Commander for the Military Operations in [Name of Mission]**

**REFERENCE**

This is a list of pertinent documents that provide a foundation for the Military Strategic Directive. References will be made in descending chronological order according to the IAP and Mission Planning Process (MPP).

- A. (peace agreements)
- B. (Strategic Assessment)
- C. (Decision on Strategic Option)
- D. (Planning Directive)
- E. (Technical Assessment Mission Report or equivalent)
- F. (Military Capability Study)
- G. (Secretary-General's reports and/or recommendations)
- H. (Security Council resolutions)
- I. (Directive to SRSG, RC and HC)
- J. (Information Strategy)
- K. (UN Police Directive)
- L. (UN Logistic Directive)

- M. (Strategic Framework and Results-Based Budgeting)
- N. (Rules of Engagement)
- O. (SOMA/SOFA)<sup>56</sup>
- P. (Command and Control Policy)
- Q. (Troop Contributing Country Guidelines)
- R. (any other relevant documents)

*Example: A. Security Council resolution 1923 (S/RES/1923/2010), dated 25 May 2010.*

**SITUATION**

1. **General:** Brief summary. Background to the conflict, regional situation and other aspects as well as the current situation. (Full details in Annex A.) This part should include the relation to the strategic lines of operation and could include information about the political, security, information, humanitarian and socio-economic situation.
  - a. Political situation
  - b. Security situation
  - c. ....
2. **Threat(s)/risk assessment:** Provide a concise summary of major threats to the mission. (Complete assessment in Annex B.)
3. **Own forces**
4. **Friendly forces** (may include host nation, bilateral presence and regional organizations)

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Text taken directly from the Directive to SRSG. (Annex C)

5. **Political objectives**
6. **Military objectives**

**STRATEGIC END STATE**

(Annex C)

7. **Overall end state:** Text taken directly from the Directive to SRSG.
8. **Military strategic end state:** This is a description of the mission's end state which defines the environment that would indicate successful completion of the military aspects.

<sup>56</sup> SOMA: status-of-mission agreement; SOFA: status-of-forces agreement.

**PLANNING PARAMETERS**

9. **Assumptions:** Used in place of unknown facts and to be plausible, necessary and realistic. These should be assumptions without which planning cannot proceed.
10. **Constraints and restraints:** Political and military constraints (things that must be done) and restraints (things that must not be done).
11. **Theatre of operations:** Clearly identify the Area of Operation (AOO) and Area of Responsibility (AOR). (Full details in Annex D.)
12. **Information strategy:** This should follow the overall Information Strategy as expressed in the Directive to SRSG.

**MILITARY MISSION**

13. **The output of the mission analysis:** who, what, where, when and why. The statement should be concise and end with a unifying purpose.

**AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND FORCE COMPOSITION**

14. **Strength** (As per Security Council resolution)
15. **Composition** (Annex I)

**DIRECTION**

16. **Planning tasks:** OPLAN, SOP, IMC, LI/LL,<sup>57</sup> gender, training, environment
17. **Military tasks**
18. **Supporting tasks:** Tasks in support of other components in the mission
19. **Use of force:** Military and legal aspects
20. **Civil–military interaction:** Multidimensional setting requirement, interaction with elements within the United Nations mission as well as outside actors
21. **Military–Police joint operations**
22. **Public information and relations to media**

**SUPPORT**

(Annex E)

23. **Logistic concept**
24. **Movement**
25. **Medical**
26. **Host nation support**

<sup>57</sup> OPLAN: Operations Plan; SOP: Standard Operating Procedure; IMC: inter-mission cooperation; LI/LL: Lesson Identified/Lesson Learned.

**BUDGET**

27. **Operational budget**

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

(C2 and liaison architecture in Annex F)

28. **Authority**
29. **Transfer of authority**
30. **Task organization and command relationships**
31. **Documentation, records and reports** (Annex G)
32. **Liaison and coordination**
33. **Communication** (communication infrastructure in Annex H)
34. **Conduct and discipline** (Annex J)

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Military Adviser  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
(date)

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Under-Secretary General for  
Peacekeeping Operations  
(date)

**Annexes:**

The following annexes, and others as required, may be included:

- Annex A – General situation
- Annex B – Threat/risk assessment
- Annex C – Strategic design
- Annex D – Area of Operation and Area of Responsibility
- Annex E – Support
- Annex F – Command and Control and liaison architecture
- Annex G – Reporting
- Annex H – Communication infrastructure
- Annex I – Statement of force requirements
- Annex J – Conduct and discipline



### C. Key Questions in Preparation for Developing an ISF

In light of recent experiences with ISFs in several countries/contexts, the preparation for initiating or revising an ISF must begin with the foundational question that is at the core of the integration agenda: *What is preventing the United Nations in a given country/context from maximizing its individual and collective impact on the country/context's peace consolidation goals?*

On the basis of this initial question, the preparation for developing or revising an ISF should then aim at addressing the following key questions:

#### **Purpose and Content**

- What is the definition of peace consolidation in your context? What value is added by a framework that brings together the efforts of the mission and the UNCT? For the mission? For the UNCT?
- What kind of ISF is needed? Of what scope, nature and duration? Based on the context, should it be an internal or external document?
- Is there a mapping of existing United Nations strategies and frameworks in-country? If not, could one be undertaken?
- Can other plans or frameworks be used? Can the ISF be merged with the UNDAF or other existing plans? (Here, the United Nations needs to consider if it is an internal or external document before deciding on merging with the UNDAF.)
- How will the various planning tools of the United Nations system be linked/inform each other and relate to the national planning processes? Will the ISF form the basis for the peace consolidation aspects of an UNDAF review? CHAP/CAP review? Next RBB?

#### **Process Design**

- When should the process be initiated? Should the ISF be delayed – or speeded up – to take account of internal or external factors (other United Nations planning requirements, government planning cycles, elections, etc.)?
- On this basis, can a phased approach to the ISF be planned (initially a short-term ISF followed by a longer-term ISF after a major internal/external milestone)?
- If another strategic planning exercise is already underway, can it be used to develop an ISF?
- Can a process be designed that meets the requirements of multiple planning processes simultaneously?
- Is conflict analysis required or does it exist already? If not, is there dedicated capacity to complete it?
- Who should participate (internal and external actors)? How can the transaction costs be lowered for all involved?

### **Willingness and Capacities**

- Do all actors understand the role and significance of an ISF? Is training/sensitization required? Also consider this for external partners.
- Are all actors ready to participate? Should national authorities, NGOs, major international and bilateral donors take part? Do those non-UN actors have the necessary capacity to participate in an ISF?
- How much staff time (including senior management) will be needed? From whom (for example senior leaders, strategic planners, mission/UNCT analysts)?
- Are there integrated field coordination structures at senior and working levels? If not, can other mission/UNCT coordination mechanisms be adapted for this purpose? Is the requisite planning expertise in place?
- Is assistance required from Headquarters for the process, technical or substantive? Are there regular meetings of the Headquarters-based IMTF/ITF that can be used to liaise with Headquarters on the ISF development?

### D. Sample Outline for ISF Document

The following components and sample outline for an ISF account for the differences in the scope and nature that ISFs may present, depending on country requirements.

1. *Situation Analysis*
  - Summary of conflict analysis and current conflict triggers identified in the preparatory phase (or most recent Strategic Assessment), including divergent trends within the country, risks and assumptions
  - Operational environment in which the United Nations is expected to fulfil its mandates
  - Description of the UN's combined mandates and partnerships in-country and expectations regarding its future strategy
2. *Vision and Role of ISF*
  - End state that the United Nations seeks to achieve or contribute to over the ISF timeframe
  - Scope and nature of ISF, and value the ISF will add in relation to the end state
  - Link between ISF and other United Nations strategic frameworks/plans, national plans (as relevant)
3. *Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities*
  - Scope of ISF strategic objectives, reasons for the prioritization. The strategic objectives may relate to programmatic goals, and/or matters of operations, communication, positioning, common policy, etc.
  - Narrative strategy for each strategic objective: Each strategic objective has a unique narrative explaining what is to be achieved, why it is a priority, how it will be done, and who is/are the responsible leads/co-leads, as well as the risks to achievement

- Results: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (for example using a similar methodology as an UNDAF “outcome” or RBB “expected accomplishment” for programmatic objectives); special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented
  - Timelines: Explanation of how the strategic objectives and related results will be phased to take into consideration the synergies in the plan (may split results into phases, use critical path methodology, etc.)
  - Summary results framework: A summary of the ISF results framework may also be presented graphically as part of the ISF document
4. *Coordination and Implementation Arrangements*
    - Brief description of coordination arrangements (such as a visual graphic) and any integrated approaches to be employed in implementation of the ISF
    - Expectations for implementation (for example revision of RBB, UNDAF, Country Programme Document if relevant; development of workplans, joint sector strategies, etc.)
  5. *Monitoring*
    - Frequency of reporting
    - Actual reporting format
    - Roles and responsibilities in data collection, analysis, information-sharing and decision-making
  6. *Description of the ISF Development and Endorsement Process*

## E. Mapping of Planning Frameworks and Tools

When initiating a process of in-country joint United Nations planning, such as the ISF, a mapping of existing analyses, planning frameworks and strategies provides a useful first step towards building *consensus and clarity on the added value of the ISF* and reducing the transaction costs of the ensuing ISF process.

As such, a mapping of existing planning frameworks serves the following purposes:

- Identify the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place both at the national level and within the international community, including the United Nations family.
- Provide an overview on how the various frameworks complement and build upon each other (or not).
- Assist in identifying any inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps among the existing planning processes and the results articulated therein.
- Assist in identifying areas where other actors are already engaged, where the United Nations might not have a comparative advantage, and where UN involvement might be reduced or not required.

This then allows the United Nations to answer foundational questions including:

- Is an additional framework needed or can an existing framework meet the needs of the context or be adapted to do so?
- If not, what will be the added value of the ISF?
- What is the most appropriate start date for the ISF? Its duration?
- What will the relationship of the ISF to the other frameworks be? Will it complement and align with national planning processes – which are dynamic, not static – in terms of objectives, content, timing? If not, what is the justification for not doing so?

### Mapping Exercise

When mapping existing plans and strategies, it is important to take into account the distinction between (i) overall national/multi-stakeholders’ plans (such as a plan emerging from peace negotiations, or developed by the government for the implementation of the peace agreement; (ii) thematic planning processes (such as a reintegration action plan and/or policy); (iii) plans which represent the response of the United Nations (and/or other parts of the international community) to national priorities; and (iv) United Nations internal planning processes. This helps to identify which other plans can be replaced by the ISF and which cannot (based on their mandatory nature and/or the purpose they serve).

Moreover, it is important to consider all foundational processes or documents (such as peace agreements, Security Council mandates) for inclusion in the mapping, as they are a key part of the planning parameters.

Examples: National plans, such as PRSP, peace agreements; international/United Nations plans, such as UNDAF, mission mandate and planning frameworks (Mission Implementation Plan, RBB etc.), CHAPs (humanitarian plans), or national/international cross-cutting sectoral strategies, and frameworks that have geographical focus.

### What To Look For

Different planning processes will have different scopes, durations and constituencies, and a different hierarchy of results. As such, all of them will provide a set of parameters that inform the process for developing an ISF, as well as its content.

Those parameters include:

- Purpose, including constituencies (who is this plan for? why? national or United Nations?)
- Thematic and geographical coverage
- Timeframe (when it starts/ends)
- Level (strategic, programmatic, operational)
- Implications/links (is the United Nations bound to this plan?)
- Level of implementation and follow-up (is the plan being used?)
- Lessons learned, where relevant (in its design, implementation, etc.)

- Are there data and/or indicators that are already being tracked that can be used in the ISF?

### Process

The process of mapping will depend on the specific context and the number of analytical and planning processes and documents that need to be considered. However, in general, such a process would entail:

- Listing and review of existing frameworks
- Determination of planning coverage (national, United Nations, geographical, thematic, strategic, programmatic, operational, etc.) and linkages between frameworks
- Identification of gaps (at what level: strategic, operational, thematic, geographical, etc.)
- Positioning of ISF in this planning universe and the nature of the links between the ISF and other planning frameworks, including justification of areas where ISFs are not aligned with national planning processes

## F. United Nations Guidance on National Capacity-Building and Institution-Building

Planners may find useful tools and approaches developed within the Civilian Capacities Initiative (CivCap) for better supporting post-conflict institution-building:

- Means to enable United Nations peacekeeping or political mission management to support national ownership and respond to evolving national needs (see ISF M&E Report UNSMIL Sample, page 138).
- United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts (2013, <http://bit.ly/11RXgK>): Designed to guide capacity development programming and inform dialogue and planning exercises with national actors and other partners. The Guidance Note lays out 10 system-wide principles, with advice and resources, to ensure that United Nations support is based on national ownership and priorities, while acknowledging its mandates and norms.
- Resource Note on Sector Planning for Justice, Police and Corrections (under development, <http://civcapreview.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3769&language=en-US>): A resource for national decision-makers engaged in building and reforming security and justice systems in the aftermath of conflict or during democratic transitions (see page 98).
- Support on financing for institution-building programmes and donor coordination approaches, provided through (i) tailored support on designing financing mechanisms and coordination with donors, based on requests from the field, and (ii) options for innovative engagement modalities to support south-south and triangular cooperation in institution-building and reform (work under development).

- CAPMATCH (<https://capmatch.dfs.un.org/Capmatch/>): Online platform to match up suppliers and requesters of civilian expertise in the five key gap areas (safety and security, inclusive political processes, justice, core government functionality and economic revitalization) (see page 94 for more information).

## G. Support Services and Goods to be Considered for Integration

### 1. Miscellaneous Services

- Procurement of goods and services
- Access to global/systems contracts or blanket purchase order agreements
- Lease of premises/facilities and land, parking, provision of living and office accommodations
- Provision of petroleum, oil & lubricants, fuel & fuel stations, cooking gas; access to fuel supplies and use of common fuel contracts
- Provision of water (bottled and bulk), sharing of water resources, well drilling, bottling plants
- Cafeteria and post exchange services
- Provision of power services, sharing of electricity generation capacities, generators and maintenance
- Implementation of environmentally sustainable practices
  - Asset management
  - Customs clearance, tax exemption
- Sharing of equipment (generators, light- and heavy-duty vehicles and machinery)
  - Non-staff recruitment (interns, consultants, labour contracts, stand-by arrangements, etc.)
- Training, including country induction

### 2. Aviation Services

- Passenger seats on aircraft
- Aircraft chartering and ground handling services
- Passenger aircraft chartering (including VIP charters) and handling services
- Airfield support services: terminal management, fire trucks, cargo handling, security, etc.
- Emergency evacuations and search & rescue services
- Flight following
- Management of air traffic control and aircraft tracking systems
- Meteorological assistance, flight briefing, integrated threat and security assessment

**3. Movement Services**

- a. Consignment movements on door-to-door basis
- b. Overland transport (inland freight)
- c. Storage and warehousing, including inventory management and tracking services
- d. Container and handling services
- e. Chartering of ships and boats
- f. Strategic analysis of movements in theatre of operations
- g. Money and payments

**4. Road Transport**

- a. Light vehicle fleet or staff ground transportation services (dispatch, shuttle bus, local staff transport)
- b. Maintenance, repair and recovery of light vehicles
- c. Body shop
- d. Armoured vehicles related services
- e. Car washing
- f. Driver testing, licensing
- g. Maintenance/repair and recovery of ground transportation equipment
- h. Strategic analysis of repair and recovery plan
- i. Vehicle registration
- j. Airport pick-up
- k. Vehicle lending with/without driver

**5. Engineering Services**

- a. Project planning and design services
- b. Management of construction project
- c. Airfield maintenance and construction
- d. Common and shared premises
- e. Living and office accommodations
  - i. Warehousing
  - ii. Engineering services
  - iii. Sanitation and drainage

**6. Medical Services**

- a. Medical services: Sharing/use of medical facilities and services
- b. Medical evacuation: Sharing resources for CASEVAC/MEDEVAC<sup>58</sup>
- c. Mass evacuation/casualties management under catastrophic conditions

<sup>58</sup> CASEVAC: casualty evacuation; MEDEVAC: medical evacuation.

- d. Ambulance
- e. Staff counselling
- f. Testing
- g. Vaccines and cold chain
- h. Medications
- i. Blood
- j. Oxygen
- k. Medical services contracts with clinics, laboratories, Level IV hospitals, etc.

**7. ICT (Information and Communications Technology)**

- a. Sharing of ICT resources (hardware, software and services) for voice, data, Internet such as, but not limited to, VSAT,<sup>59</sup> microwave, WiFi, WiMAX,<sup>60</sup> terrestrial, GSM<sup>61</sup> and communications systems (HF, VHF<sup>62</sup>) supporting safety and security
- b. Sharing of data centre and/or server room facilities and services
- c. Sharing of communications centre (COMCEN) facilities and services
- d. Video teleconferencing (VTC) services
- e. Help desk
- f. Internet and BlackBerry connectivity
- g. CITS<sup>63</sup> peripherals – cartridges, memory storage, cables
- h. Telephone billing
- i. United Nations Directory

**8. GIS (Geographic Information Service)**

- a. Data
  - i. Vector GIS data (Vmap-1, Vmap-2 and MGCP<sup>64</sup> format)
  - ii. Satellite imagery
  - iii. Gazetteer
  - iv. Scanned and geo-referenced maps
- b. GIS systems contract (or blank purchase agreement) for supplying satellite imagery, GIS software and GIS hardware
- c. GIS and map production service
- d. GIS and terrain analysis service (hosting GIS servers)

<sup>59</sup> VSAT: very small aperture terminal.

<sup>60</sup> WiMAX: Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.

<sup>61</sup> GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications.

<sup>62</sup> HF: high frequency; VHF: very high frequency.


<sup>63</sup> CITS: complete information technology solutions.

<sup>64</sup> MGCP: Media Gateway Control Protocol.

- e. GIS training
- f. GIS joint projects
- 9. **Security Services**
  - a. Security guard services
  - b. Radio room with staff tracking
  - c. ID cards
  - d. Operations and crisis centre (situational awareness, crisis response, executive communications, rapid reaction force)
  - e. Blast film
  - f. Body armour
  - g. X-ray and metal screening devices and maintenance contracts
  - h. Fire-fighting equipment and servicing
  - i. MOSS and MORSS related services<sup>65</sup>
  - j. Close protection (visiting VIPs, immediate threat)
  - k. Security risk assessment
  - l. Security trainings (staff, guards, fire, emergency medical, security officers, VIP drivers, communications, weapons, non-lethal weapons)
  - m. Security investigations
  - n. Travel clearances
  - o. Key control
  - p. DSS asset sharing
- 10. **General Services**
  - a. Camp management
  - b. Printing
  - c. Reproductions
  - d. Office machinery rental (photocopiers, scanners, shredders, faxes)
  - e. Office furniture
  - f. Pouch/overnight/provincial mail
  - g. Travel services, ticketing, visas (transit/arrival), hotels
  - h. Protocol, VIP airport, inbound visas
  - i. Office supplies
  - j. Cleaning supplies
  - k. Waste (liquid, solid, construction, recycling) services
  - l. Grounds maintenance

<sup>65</sup> MOSS: Minimum Operating Security Standards; MORSS: Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards.

- m. Cleaning services
- n. Vector control
- o. Maintenance services (carpentry, masonry, electrical, plumbing, painting, heat/air)
- p. Conference/workshop services
- q. Welfare – crèche, gym, classes



# SECTION IV

## Integrated Monitoring and Reporting

Children inside a classroom at Za'atri refugee camp, host to tens of thousands of Syrians displaced by conflict, near Mafraq, Jordan.  
07 December 2012  
Mafraq, Jordan

**What the IAP Policy says:**

60. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must include from the start a monitoring and reporting mechanism, including measurable and meaningful benchmarks and risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support decision-making. Other existing monitoring and reporting frameworks may be used where relevant.

61. The joint analytical and planning capacity tracks progress and reports to the senior UN leadership forum and, through this forum, to Headquarters on progress towards common objectives agreed to and articulated in the Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Frameworks. When appropriate, it provides recommendations for changes in strategy or objectives based on this analysis.

62. Additionally, progress against the UN priorities outlined in integrated plans must be reflected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the implementation of these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mechanisms.

## IV.1 Monitoring and Reporting on Integrated Plans

Each Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) must contain a monitoring and reporting framework when it is presented for endorsement.

Whatever its shape or form, a monitoring and reporting framework should therefore seek to answer the following questions:

- Are the joint strategic objectives being realized?
- What is preventing progress towards the joint strategic objectives?
- What corrective measures could be taken?
- Are the entities participating in the ISF abiding by the commitments/agreements?
- Is the underlying analysis (of the conflict, of the operational environment) still valid and are the strategic objectives still relevant (if the situation on the ground has changed)?

Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF monitoring tool should provide scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring tool is the senior leadership team, who should review the monitoring reports regularly and take appropriate actions to correct shortcomings or revise plans.

### IV.1.1 Frequency of Reporting

It is recommended good practice to include ISF status reports as a regular agenda item for joint senior leadership meetings at Headquarters and in the field, even if, on

some occasions, the reporting may be very short because there is little to flag up of any significance to senior leadership. Similarly, the ISF should be a regular agenda item for the Integrated Task Force (ITF), as a way of, among other things, systematizing Headquarters support for the implementation of the ISF.

In addition to regular reporting, for first-time ISFs the Integrated Steering Group<sup>66</sup> requires that integrated United Nations presences report on implementation within one year.

The content of the reporting can follow a differentiated approach: some elements of the ISF may require very frequent reporting (such as operational objectives, often those with military or police dimensions), while others may only necessitate reporting at longer intervals in order to adequately measure impact (for example, objectives related to institution-building). Others, such as communication objectives (for example, harmonizing key political messages, outreach to certain constituencies) may combine short-term and long-term reporting cycles.

Finally, the reporting processes should allow for the production of data and analysis prior to major external and internal milestones, including Secretary-General reports, mandate renewals, United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) reviews and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) developments. This is not to say that Secretary-General reports or the rest should report on the ISF per se, in particular if the ISF is an internal United Nations document, but that the information generated and agreed at the senior leadership level could inform the preparation of key products.

### IV.1.2 Format

The monitoring framework should use, if possible, existing data collection and monitoring formats, capacity and experience within the mission and UN country team (UNCT), for example UNCT monitoring and evaluation (M&E) working group, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) performance monitoring reports. There is no need to establish new monitoring systems if existing ones can be used effectively.

Potential tools include:

- Scorecards, as used, for example, for the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UN SSSS) for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The scorecard measures progress towards joint objectives according to a simple colour-coded methodology that allows for rapid review and decision-making for results deemed “yellow” (some progress but with obstacles) or “red” (progress stalled).

<sup>66</sup> Inter-agency and inter-departmental level mechanism chaired by the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), established to oversee integration-related matters, including policy development/revisions and field-level support.

- Web-based platforms, as used for example by the United Nations in Timor-Leste, allowing on-time and standardized reporting on key indicators, including policy commitments, and easy comparison/trend analysis over time.
- Standard M&E frameworks, derived from United Nations agency and/or mission reporting instruments, such as the UNDAF M&E plan, especially in those instances where the UNDAF and the ISF have been merged.

Regardless of the format used, a common feature of robust monitoring tools is the provision of concrete options for decision-making when and if progress on ISF objectives and commitments is stalled.

Examples of monitoring and reporting tools are found in the toolbox at the end of this section.

### IV.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities

To ensure momentum and commitment to regular and sound ISF reporting, it may be useful to include the following roles and responsibilities in the terms of reference (TOR) of each function, and for strategic planners in particular to regularly promote them.

#### ***Role of the Senior Leadership***

- Decide and agree on reporting mechanisms and frequency
- Demand reports as a tool to support decision-making
- Ensure United Nations system-wide participation in reporting and analytical efforts
- Review reports and make decisions on corrective measures

#### ***Role of Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity***

- Develop reporting templates/frameworks, using or building on existing systems where possible
- Support generation and consolidation of inputs
- Develop analysis and options for corrective action, in consultation with relevant thematic working groups, mission sections and agencies
- Present to senior leadership
- Follow up on decisions

#### ***Role of Thematic Working Groups, where established***

- Based on the United Nations strategic objectives, identify results
- Establish clear responsibilities for each participating United Nations entity with regard to results
- Identify risks and mitigating measures
- Formulate indicators of achievement

- Indicate how the results identified relate to the strategic objectives of other thematic pillars
- Where relevant, ensure the participation of the appropriate government counterpart(s) in the planning exercise and their endorsement of the results matrix for the respective thematic area
- Describe what other international partners are doing in this area
- Describe how cross-cutting themes will be addressed
- Establish a working-level coordination mechanism for its thematic pillar to monitor and evaluate progress towards the strategic objective and expected results. Thematic coordination mechanisms should include, at a minimum, all the relevant mission sectors and UN agencies, funds and programmes contributing to the objective. Where relevant, the mechanism will also include relevant government counterparts
- Monitor progress towards strategic objectives and prepare reports for the Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity

#### ***Role of Mission Components and Individual Agencies, Funds and Programmes***

- Provide inputs to ISF reporting framework
- Participate in and review analysis on progress made and options for corrective measures
- Follow up on decisions made by senior leadership

#### **From Monitoring to Action: Four Tips to Strengthen Links Between Results Monitoring and Decision-Making**

The purpose of monitoring and reporting systems is to inform and support senior decision-making with relevant data and analysis. A review of United Nations experience with results monitoring systems suggests that four practices can be helpful to maximize the impact of monitoring on decision-making:

1. Develop the approach to monitoring and reporting while developing integrated plans (*not after*), and ensure senior leadership buy-in for this approach.
2. Establish ISF monitoring as a regular agenda item for senior leadership consideration.
3. Pool monitoring and reporting capacity under the joint authority and chairmanship of the mission Chief of Staff and Head of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/RC), with TOR endorsed by United Nations senior leadership.
4. Develop simple monitoring and reporting templates with consolidated analysis and clear, concrete options for decision-making.



## IV.2 Benchmarking

As defined in the *United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking*,<sup>67</sup> a benchmark is a “point of reference against which change and progress can be measured [...] a target that has been defined by an existing standard, a minimum requirement for something to work, the performance of a leading actor in a field of competition (i.e. a best practice), etc.”

For example, US\$2/day/person is a standard benchmark for defining poverty levels, set as the “amount of money needed per capita in a particular area to purchase food containing the minimum requirements of energy (kilocalories) fulfilling the metabolic requirements of an adult human being to stay healthy”.

Under this definition, *benchmarking is the component of monitoring* whereby a value for measuring progress on a particular activity is set against an agreed reference.

### IV.2.1 Purpose

Benchmarking is used to avoid analysing performance in a vacuum. Through the use of set references, benchmarking supports more robust and credible monitoring and decision-making. Benchmarking is increasingly being used by the United Nations Security Council to inform decisions on mandate renewal and overall international strategies of assistance. Internally, it is also used to measure and monitor the performance and impact of a project, programme or activity.

In the context of mission transitions, for instance, benchmarks provide important “signposts” that need to be reached in order for the missions to draw down. Basing decisions on the pace of mission drawdown and withdrawal on established benchmarks increases objectivity and reduces the level of uncertainty.

### IV.2.2 Different Benchmarks for Different Uses

Broadly speaking, the United Nations uses benchmarks to measure progress on two different kinds of issues:

- Benchmarks developed to measure the *performance of the country/context*, which indicate the progress of a country/context towards a defined end state
- Benchmarks developed to measure the *performance of the United Nations* (the mission or the UNCT or both) in the country/context

While the two uses are related, they reflect distinct levels of accountability. In some instances, the United Nations may perform well in realizing its mandated tasks but the country/context itself may be facing severe constraints in progressing towards its goals due to a number of factors beyond the UN's control. Conversely, a country may achieve significant progress despite suboptimal United Nations performance.

<sup>67</sup> *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010).

The ISF, which is meant to increase the impact of the United Nations in-country, can serve as a link between these two levels by identifying how the UN's performance can better support the peace consolidation needs of the country/context.

Therefore, it is always useful to keep this distinction clear and introduce benchmarks at the two levels.

National benchmarks are often used in the development of national strategies and mutual accountability frameworks between the country and the international community (such as compacts). In such cases, the national government has the lead in selecting and reporting on the benchmarks. The United Nations plays a supporting role but may be asked, by the Security Council, to report as well on some of the benchmarks related to the mission mandates and/or provide technical assistance to national structures set up to coordinate the benchmarking process.

Given the diversity of scope and uses of benchmarks, accountability for meeting a benchmark must be clearly identified from the outset.

### IV.2.3 Benchmarking Steps

A practical tool is *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010), available from:

[http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring\\_peace\\_consolidation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf).

The guide provides detailed information on the various benchmarking steps:

- Preparation
- Selection of benchmarks
- Data collection system
- Attribution of indicators to the benchmarks
- Aggregation and data analysis
- Reporting system
- Evaluation and adjustments

#### Quick Tips on Selecting Benchmarks

A number of methodologies for selecting performance measures (indicators, benchmarks) are readily available, each with its specific set of criteria and respective acronyms (SMART, etc.). A consolidation of these various approaches suggests that the four most important aspects to consider when selecting benchmarks are:

1. *Clarity*: The benchmarks are easily understandable by all relevant actors, with a common understanding of what the benchmarks mean, how they will be measured, to whom they apply and in what timeframe.
2. *Realistic*: The benchmarks reflect a best-case scenario based on the actual context, not an ideal but impossible to reach situation.

3. *Accuracy:* The benchmarks effectively describe the change or end state being pursued, and associated indicators are a sound measure of this change.
4. *Measurability:* Data to track progress towards the benchmarks is easily accessible, interpretable and manageable with existing capacity (for example the data is already collected by someone, and/or the time to access/develop the data is manageable, and the responsibility to collect is clear and accepted).

### IV.3 Mainstreaming Integrated Plans into United Nations Reporting Mechanisms

Unlike many entity-specific planning documents (e.g. RBB or UNDAF), integrated plans do not have formal institutional governance frameworks. Accountability for, and visibility of, integrated plans need to be manufactured, encouraged and sustained as part of efforts to maximize the coherence of United Nations interventions.

The IAP Policy states: "UN priorities outlined in integrated plans must be reflected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the implementation of these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mechanisms." This is not to say that Secretary-General reports should include details on the ISF per se, in particular if the ISF is an internal United Nations document, but that the information generated and agreed within the United Nations presence should inform the preparation of key products.

#### IV.3.1 Purpose

The purpose of mainstreaming integrated plans into United Nations reporting mechanisms is threefold:

1. Maximizing the utility, and in some cases the visibility of integrated strategies and plans;
2. Ensuring consistency across plans and reports, and strengthening the analytical content of these reports through the use of integrated results reporting;
3. Streamlining reporting requirements.

#### IV.3.2 Best Practices

1. Where relevant and feasible, harmonize results and indicators between the integrated plans and the RBB, UNDAF, agency plans and other United Nations reporting mechanisms.
2. Align timing of integrated plans (ISF, joint sectoral plans) and their reporting schedules with standard United Nations reporting mechanisms (mission and agencies), including in particular:

- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council
  - RBB reporting
  - UNDAF reviews
  - Resident Coordinator annual reports
  - One UN country results report (in "delivering as one" countries)
  - National reporting (for example compacts)
3. Develop a simple dashboard consolidating the various results, indicators and reporting requirements of all the plans, and update as needed, to monitor gaps and redundancies and highlight inconsistencies.
  4. Pool monitoring and reporting capacity for improved consistency, harmonization of reports and lower transaction costs. This also allows for faster and more in-depth dissemination of information and analysis across the United Nations system.
  5. Joint Trust Funds, linked with the implementation of integrated plans, provide a real incentive for harmonized monitoring and reporting and the mainstreaming of integrated plans (and their commitments) into mission and agency reporting mechanisms. In addition, when established through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, these trust funds benefit from state-of-the-art reporting backstopping.

### Timor-Leste: Integration and Harmonized Reporting

Among the United Nations presence in Timor-Leste, plans and reporting mechanisms were established for every policy and situation. The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) itself was responsible for reporting against five planning frameworks, not including section, collaborative or thematic plans. A common complaint from management and leadership concerned the duplication of effort and quality of information. Technical advisors and staff responsible for liaising with national authorities were spending precious time copying and pasting narratives from one matrix to another. The resulting mish-mash required significant redrafting and editing for approvals and distribution, multiplying the effort/cost of reporting. Yet, valuable programmatic information was often not available when needed.

Introducing harmonized reporting aimed to (i) reduce duplication, (ii) simplify communications and reporting lines, and (iii) improve the quality and timeliness of information in reports. To this end, the UNCT and UNMIT agreed to synchronize the highest level of goals across the planning frameworks. Reporting officers, working group participants, managers and leadership were able to use a single online input-gathering structure to produce all necessary reports. The immediate accessibility of information permitted UNCT and UNMIT offices to engage in substantive discussions and align messaging. The reporting timeframe was reduced, so that instead of a single report being produced in 4–5 weeks, 4 reports were produced in 3 weeks, and some reports were produced in as little as 1 week. The quality, timeliness and participation in reporting for joint UNCT–UNMIT–government policy-level decision-making improved drastically.

## Toolbox: Integrated Monitoring and Reporting

### A. Example of Monitoring Scorecard (DRC)

DRAFT September 2008 Update

Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC

*Goma Process and Nairobi Communiqué:*

- The Goma process is seriously challenged since the resumption of military confrontations on 28 August. A unilateral CNDP<sup>68</sup> commitment to pull back to its original positions (pre-28 August) was followed by a Minister of Defense Communiqué also committing to a ceasefire for the FARDC.<sup>69</sup> Yet, throughout the month of September, CNDP and FARDC continued to confront each other along several axes and proximity points in North Kivu and along the fringes of South Kivu Province.
- Despite this phase of escalation, the GoDRC<sup>70</sup> remains committed to the Amani program, but CNDP now openly started rejecting Amani and insists on direct talks with the GoDRC.
- MONUC,<sup>71</sup> backed by the International Facilitation, imposed a Separation and Disengagement Plan for all signatories of the Actes d'Engagement. The SRSG<sup>72</sup> will approach the Security Council to ask for formal approval of this new approach, which is dubbed Amani Plus.
- Following the *Comite d'Pilote* for the Amani Program, fast-tracking DDR,<sup>73</sup> opening the strategic axes, deploying the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and extending state authority in South Kivu, in the Grand Nord and in Maniema have been prioritized in coordination with the PNDDR.<sup>74</sup>
- The fighting in North and South Kivu is a temporary setback for the Nairobi Communiqué and especially Operation Kimia, after the Integrated and Trained Battalions of the FARDC are drawn into the combat zone in North Kivu and are moved away from the Triangles. No new FARDC battalions have joined the training centers.

68 CNDP: National Congress for the Defence of the People.

69 FARDC: Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

70 GoDRC: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

71 MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

72 SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

73 DDR: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

74 PNDDR: National Programme of DDR.

- There is not much progress on the 70 *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR/RUD) combatants in the regroupment center in Kasiki although MONUC reaches an agreement in principle with the GoDRC representatives for the Kisan-gani Road Map on an incentive package for FDLR who repatriate/relocate under the Program.
- Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo did not improve during the month and mutual accusations are exchanged in media articles; President Kagame and President Kabila accuse one another through media channels as well.

*Security:*

- The security situation is far from stable as long as there is no ceasefire in North Kivu and Separation and Disengagement are not implemented. A flaring up of attacks by the FRPI<sup>75</sup> in Ituri against the FARDC forces MONUC to use its attack helicopters and puts more strains on the FARDC, after Ituri zone Operations Commander Kinkela left to North Kivu to reinforce the 8th Military Region.
- The LRA<sup>76</sup> are changing their modus operandi in DR Congo and stage a series of raids against soft targets in Dungu, west of the Garamba Park. The FARDC experiences serious delays in the deployment of FARDC to the Dungu. 2 Battalions of reinforcements arrive in Kisangani but their transportation to Dungu is hampered by financial constraints.
- Demonstrations and violent mob attacks against MONUC peacekeepers become routine and spread from Rutshuru to Goma and other parts of the Kivu Provinces. Country-wide, politicians campaign against MONUC and voice their disappointment with the slow pace of the Amani Process.

*State authority, return and recovery:*

- Activities for the rehabilitation of roads and infrastructure have had to be partially suspended in North Kivu due to the security situation along those areas. Meanwhile, focus is turning to South Kivu where road rehabilitation is expected to commence in the coming weeks. Efforts to link DDR activities in the province with the extension of state authority and community reintegration activities are being made.
- The police and border police components continue to make progress in the planning and preparedness for the deployment of the PNC, including the possibility of deployment in the non-militarized zones that will need to be created as part of the disengagement plan.
- The fourth component is being revised to extend conflict resolution and recovery activities along the axes. This re-conceptualization is intended to quickstart fourth component activities in a more synchronized, rather than sequential manner, with activities implemented in the other components and therefore accelerate peace dividends for the population living in those areas.

75 FRPI: Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri.  
76 LRA: Lord's Resistance Army.

Sub-component	Impact Indicators	September Developments	Status	Management Intervention
FARDC capability improves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of FARDC battalions in TTF Facility<sup>77</sup></li> <li>• Number of effective FARDC battalions in the Kivus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The courses planned at MONUC's two training facilities expected to take place in September had to be postponed until October due to the non-arrival of FARDC battalions to the training site.</li> <li>• The FARDC Command and control structure was tested by CNDP operations in North Kivu during the month of September with some set backs. However, ongoing operations are having the positive effect of permitting an identification of capable FARDC commanders and experience is being gained.</li> <li>• The lack of bi-lateral agreements to provide vehicles and radios for post-brassage and post Military Training Program (MTP) battalions remains a key limitation on capability improvement of the FARDC in the Kivus.</li> </ul>	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is required	<p>SRSG and FC<sup>78</sup> to persuade MoD and Chef de l'Etat Major to commit battalions to MONUC training and to site garrisons along the strategic axes.</p> <p>SRSG to seek support from the international community for bi-lateral equipment support to FARDC (vehicles and communication equipment).</p>

77 TTF: Troop Training Facility.  
78 FC: Force Commander.

Sub-component	Impact Indicators	September Developments	Status	Management Intervention
Armed groups are encouraged to negotiate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of FARDC battalions actively engaged in operations against armed groups in the Kivus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LRA: One FARDC battalion is currently in Dunga and patrolling further afield, which has sparked an increase in LRA violations. The remaining two GoDRC battalions are currently held in Kisangani for lack of transport means.</li> <li>ADF/NALU:<sup>79</sup> Operations against the ADF/NALU were delayed due to the transfer of FARDC commander and the battalion that had been allocated to the North being re-directed to other areas in North Kivu.</li> <li>FDLR: There were almost no operations carried out against the FDLR as three out of the eight FARDC battalions have been reassigned to operations against CNDP. The three additional battalions due to join the operations in September have not yet arrived.</li> </ul>	Yellow: Some progress has been made	
Armed militia enter brassage or DDR/DDRRR <sup>80</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of ex-combatants entering DDR or DRRR</li> <li>Number of ex-combatants awaiting brassage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since the implementation of the Nairobi Communiqué, 862 FDLR including dependents, have been repatriated to Rwanda by MONUC.</li> <li>1109 militia are assembled at Kitona, 2896 at Kamina and 1766 at Lukusa brassage centres awaiting training. Training is said not to be able to start until the number of candidates in the centers reaches 3000.</li> </ul>	Yellow: Some progress has been made	SRSRG and DSRSG to meet with the Chairman of the Amani Program and with the Head of the UE <sup>82</sup> /PNDDR to coordinate and align efforts on the resumption of DDR activities.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of children released from armed groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>932 FARDC are at Mura undergoing training by RSA<sup>81</sup> for the Rapid Reaction Force with postponed date of completion fixed on the 3 October 2008.</li> <li>The launching of PNDDR is expected to commence on the 3 October 2008. Intense discussions have been taking place to link the need of accelerating DDR activities with decisions being made in Amani Steering Committee. Focus is placed on prioritizing South Kivu and Maniema. A mapping of on-going reinsertion and recovery activities for non-eligible combatants is underway.</li> </ul>		
At-risk populations are protected, ceasefires monitored and checkpoints dismantled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of ceasefire violations</li> <li>Number of checkpoints dismantled</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continued, extensive ceasefire violations were registered throughout September as the FARDC and CNDP both seek tactical advantage and ignore the ceasefire. FDLR and PARECO<sup>83</sup> have also, but to a lesser extent, exploited the instability.</li> <li>Firm MONUC action has protected the main population centers and MONUC MOBs<sup>84</sup> have provided a haven for IDPs.<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless CNDP and FARDC actions have resulted in an increase in IDPs populations in the Petit Nord.</li> </ul>	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is required	

79 ADF: Allied Democratic Forces; NALU: National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.

80 DRRR: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement.

81 RSA: Republic of South Africa.

82 UE: Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion.

83 PARECO: Patriotes Résistants Congolais.

84 MOB: mobile operating base.

85 IDP: internally displaced person.

**B. Deliverable Scorecard Model (Libya)**

**1. Deliverable is on track:**

FULLY ON TRACK    PARTIALLY ON TRACK    WILL SOON BE ON TRACK    UNDER DISCUSSION    NOT ON TRACK

**2. Principal counterpart has been delivered:**

YES    NOT YET

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IDENTITY OF COUNTERPART:

**3. Cooperation has:**

STARTED    BEEN AGREED    IN DISCUSSION    PENDING

**4. Results have been:**

SIGNIFICANT    PARTIAL    LIMITED

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WHAT HAS BEEN DELIVERED:

**5. National capacity to implement is:**

STRONG    MEDIUM    LIMITED    ABSENT

**6. UN capacity to provide support is:**

STRONG    MEDIUM    LIMITED    ABSENT

**7. Access to identified counterparts(s) is:**

SUFFICIENT    OCCASIONAL    RARE    NEVER

**8. Counterpart feedback on UN support for deliverable is:**

VERY POSITIVE    POSITIVE    MIXED    NEGATIVE    UNAWARE

**Guidelines on Use of Scorecards**

*Question 1*

- FULLY ON TRACK** – all processes are under way and good progress is being made
- PARTIALLY ON TRACK** – all processes have been established and implementation has commenced
- WILL SOON BE ON TRACK** – process has been developed and is ready for implementation
- UNDER DISCUSSION** – process in development
- NOT ON TRACK** – no progress has been made or has been made in the wrong direction

*Question 2*

Principal counterpart should be at the level of a department, institution, agency or organization, e.g. Ministry of Information department of planning or Ministry of Social Affairs department of family development **not** “government”, “ministry x”, “civil society” or “Mr. X”

In those cases where more than one **principal** interlocutor is essential for success, e.g. for resolution of local conflicts, all interlocutors should be listed. Subsequent questions, e.g. access and counterparts, should then be targeted at the level of the most recalcitrant of identified counterparts.

*Question 3*

- STARTED** – activities are being implemented on the basis of a process that has been agreed with counterparts
- AGREED** – an agreement has been reached with the counterpart and a timeframe has been established for implementation
- IN DISCUSSION** – counterparts engaged in subject area and need for cooperation process agreed on both sides
- PENDING** – no action taken

*Question 4*

- SIGNIFICANT** – planned results have been broadly achieved
  - PARTIAL** – some aspects of planned results achieved
  - NOT YET** – results have not been achieved
- List activities and/or results achieved, e.g. workshop on transitional justice, training on strategic planning

*Question 5*

- STRONG** – human, structural and financial resources to assume full technical ownership and leadership
- MEDIUM** – human, structural and financial capacity gaps exist

**LIMITED** – limited human, structural and financial capacity in place

**ABSENT** – no human, structural and financial resources in place

*Question 6*

**STRONG** – human and financial resources to provide assistance in place

**MEDIUM** – human and financial gaps exist

**LIMITED** – limited human and financial capacity in place

**ABSENT** – no human and financial resources in place

*Question 7*

**SUFFICIENT** – adequate level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to necessary support

**OCCASIONAL** – limited level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to necessary support

**RARE** – insufficient level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to necessary support

**NEVER** – no access to engage counterpart on issues relating to necessary support

*Question 8*

**VERY POSITIVE** – counterpart considers UN engagement on this deliverable to be essential

**POSITIVE** – counterpart considers UN engagement on this deliverable to be useful

**MIXED** – counterpart has at different times stated both positive and negative views of UN engagement

**NEGATIVE** – counterpart considers that UN engagement could be rendered more appropriate

**UNAWARE** – prior to conversation on evaluation, counterpart was unaware of UN support

*Constraints Identified*

This is a narrative section in which the programme manager should identify what constraints have hindered implementation of the deliverable, the corrective measures to be implemented, as well as the strategic decisions required from senior leadership.

C. ISF M&E Report UNSMIL Sample<sup>86</sup> (March 2013)  
Deliverables

Lead	Deliverable	Code	On track	Counterpart	Cooperation	Results	National capacity	UN capacity	Access	Feedback	Progress score
PAD <sup>87</sup>	Provision of technical support to Constitutional Committee and relevant national authorities, including advice on procedures, contentious issues as well as additional assistance as requested by Committee	1A	5	0	3	0	3	7	0	0	26
UNDP	Facilitation of civil society participatory dialogue, inclusive of women, minorities and youth, on constitution and civic education programme	1B	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	97
UNEST <sup>88</sup>	Technical advice on establishment of legal framework for all electoral events	2A	5	10	3	0	7	10	3	5	55

<sup>86</sup> This sample is taken from the full ISF M&E Report UNSMIL for March 2013, which includes 20 deliverables. Available online at DPKO: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping>.

<sup>87</sup> PAD: Political Affairs Division.

<sup>88</sup> UNEST: United Nations Electoral Support Team.

**Delivery**

Deliverable	Principal counterpart	What has been delivered
1A	Not yet identified	The mission has delivered guidance notes and advisory support to preliminary counterparts (the GNC <sup>89</sup> Legal and Constitutional Committee, Constitutional Outreach Committee). Other deliverables are pending the formation of primary counterparts.
1B	Forum for Democratic Libya	Series of constitutional dialogues 50% completed. Forums have taken place in Tripoli and Sabha. Estimated completion of current round of dialogue is mid-March.
2A	GNC Electoral Committee	No significant delivery

**Constraints**

Deliverable	Key constraints, corrective measures, decisions to be taken
1A	Counterpart not yet officially formed. The UN has capacity to provide guidance and some advisory assistance, but requires additional resources to supply specialized technical experts.
1B	Unclear to what extent GNC/constitutional committee will be receptive to recommendations generated by dialogue
2A	Committee only established in recent weeks. Access to GNC has not always been easy

89 GNC: General National Congress.

**References**

List/links of related resources on integration

- *Civil Affairs Handbook* (2012); <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/policy/civilhandbook.asp>
- Civilian Capacities Initiative (CivCap): <http://www.civcapreview.org/>
- Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (2005)
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- DPA, *Special Political Missions Start-up Guide* (2012); [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SPMStartupGuide\\_UNDPA2012.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SPMStartupGuide_UNDPA2012.pdf)
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- DPKO/DFS, *Guidelines: Mission Start-Up Field Guide* (2010)
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- *Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)* (2006); [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/UN%20IMPP%20Guidelines%20\(2006\).pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/UN%20IMPP%20Guidelines%20(2006).pdf)
- *IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field* (2009) and *Role of Headquarters* (2010)
- Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS): <http://www.unddr.org>
- *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010); [http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring\\_peace\\_consolidation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf)
- *Secretary-General Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* (2006); [http://www.undg.org/docs/8483/8039-SG\\_s\\_Note\\_of\\_Guidance\\_on\\_Integrated\\_Missions\\_\\_Feb\\_\\_2006.pdf](http://www.undg.org/docs/8483/8039-SG_s_Note_of_Guidance_on_Integrated_Missions__Feb__2006.pdf)



- UNDG High Level Group, *Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach* (2013); <http://www.undg.org/docs/12968/Standard%20Operating%20Procedures.pdf>
- *UN Guidelines on Strategic Assessment* (2009); [http://www.undg.org/docs/12293/UN%20Strategic%20Assessment%20approved%20by%20SG\\_signed\\_.pdf](http://www.undg.org/docs/12293/UN%20Strategic%20Assessment%20approved%20by%20SG_signed_.pdf)
- *United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts* (2013); <http://bit.ly/11RXgK>

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
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**Digital version of the IAP handbook is available in English and French in the Resources/Policy section of the DPKO website (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/policy.shtml>)**

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# APPENDIX

## Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning



Young girls learning to sew at a Koranic school in Fayum, Egypt.

Approved by:

Secretary-General on 9 April 2013

Following endorsement by the Integration Steering Group<sup>1</sup> on 15 March 2013 and by the United Nations Development Group on 13 March

### A. Purpose and rationale

1. The purpose of this policy is to define the minimum and mandatory requirements for the integrated conduct of assessments and planning in conflict and post-conflict settings where an integrated UN presence is in place or is being considered, and to outline responsibilities of UN actors in this process.
2. Integrated assessment and planning processes are intended to maximise the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system. While there are important systemic constraints to integration within the UN, it is crucial that, at a minimum, the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities of the organization share a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses in conflict and post-conflict settings.
3. Integrated assessments and planning are essential to (i) improve the quality of the situational analysis, (ii) design interventions that are tailored to the requirements of each situation, (iii) support the effective management of integrated presences in line with mandates and the strategic vision of senior UN leadership, (iv) avoid gaps and overlaps between different UN activities, (v) identify opportunities for closer cooperation across different parts of the UN and (vi) make the UN a more coherent and consistent partner with host governments and other national, regional and international partners.

### B. Status and compliance

4. This policy supersedes the Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).<sup>2</sup> All other guidance materials on integration more generally remain valid.<sup>3</sup>
5. This policy is consistent with Decisions of the Secretary-General no. 2008/24 and 2011/10 on integration and no. 2012/1 on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings. It does not supersede and should be read in conjunction with related

<sup>1</sup> The Integration Steering Group is composed of DPKO, DFS, DPA, OCHA, PBSO, OHCHR, DOCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and the EOSG.

<sup>2</sup> Including the June 2006 Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), the May 2009 IMPP Guidelines on the Role of Headquarters and the January 2010 IMPP Guidelines on the Role of the Field.

<sup>3</sup> Including the 2006 SG Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions and the UN Guidelines on Strategic Assessments.

mandates and UN thematic policies.<sup>4</sup> This policy is complemented by a set of guidelines to facilitate implementation of each requirement.

6. Compliance with this policy is required by all UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes.

### C. Scope

7. The requirements set out in this policy apply in all cases where a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is deployed alongside a UN country team, or where such presence is being considered.
8. This policy focuses on the peace consolidation activities of the UN as defined in each particular context and in line with Security Council mandates and the relevant mandates of UN entities, agencies, funds and programmes. UN activities in response to critical needs in areas other than peace consolidation fall outside the scope of this policy.
9. While humanitarian action can support peace consolidation, its main purpose remains to address life-saving needs and alleviate suffering. Accordingly, most humanitarian interventions are likely to remain outside the scope of integration, which can, at times, challenge the ability of UN humanitarian actors to deliver according to humanitarian principles. Depending on the context, certain activities related to protection of civilians, return and reintegration and early recovery may be included in the UN's integrated strategic approach. Therefore, in all cases, shared analysis and coordination among humanitarian and peace consolidation actors should be supported in UN integration arrangements.
10. Integration occurs at several levels within the UN system, necessitating different levels of integrated planning. This policy relates primarily to requirements for integrated assessment and planning at the overall strategic level across missions and UN country teams.
11. During the integrated assessment and planning process, the level and depth of integration required between the different entities in specific areas shall be determined. While this policy does not govern entity-specific operational and budgetary planning processes, coordination on entity-specific operational and budgetary planning will be required for operational levels of integration within applicable rules and regulations.
12. Where there is no integrated UN presence and none is being considered but where a crisis demands closer coordination and a more comprehensive UN response, the UN Policy on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings provides the coordination and support arrangements required.

<sup>4</sup> For example, on issues such as electoral assistance, protection of civilians, human rights, gender or child protection.

## D. Definitions

For the purpose of this policy and related guidance:

13. An *integrated UN presence* is the configuration of the UN system in all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission/office, regardless of whether this presence is structurally integrated.
14. A *multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation* is a peacekeeping mission comprising a mix of military, police and substantive civilian components working together to implement a mandate from the Security Council.
15. A field-based Special Political Mission (SPM) is defined as an in-country political mission or office implementing a mandate from the Security Council or General Assembly. For the purpose of this policy, SPMs do not include non-resident envoys and advisers; panels, monitoring groups and similar expert bodies; or regional offices (SPMs with regional mandates covering multiple countries).
16. An integrated assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities. The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake integrated assessment at the UN system-wide level for the purpose defined in paragraph 28 of this policy. Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical assessment missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secretariat departments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system.

## E. Guiding principles for integrated assessment and planning

The following principles guide the conduct of integrated assessments and planning processes:

17. **Inclusivity:** Where an integrated UN presence is deployed, integrated assessment and planning must be undertaken with the full participation of the Mission and UN country team<sup>5</sup> and in consultation and coordination with Headquarters.
18. **Form follows function:** The structural configuration of the UN integrated presence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates and can therefore take different forms. Under the same principle, decisions on modalities for working together in integrated settings, which may include integrated or joint structures, joint programmes and/or the use of external capacities (e.g. non-UN expertise), should be based on criteria of expected impact, transaction costs and assessment of risks.

<sup>5</sup> The UN country team will engage with the humanitarian country team in the context of integrated assessment and planning.

19. **Comparative advantages:** Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best equipped to carry them out and resources requested accordingly.
20. **Flexibility to context:** While adhering to the minimum standards outlined in this policy, the design and implementation of assessment and planning exercises should be adapted to each situation.
21. **National ownership:** National ownership is an essential condition for the sustainability of peace. Where and when clear national peace consolidation priorities have been developed on the basis of broad based consensus, integrated assessment and planning processes should aim to specify how the UN will support a diverse range of stakeholders in the implementation of these priorities.
22. **Clear UN role in relation to other peace consolidation actors:** While integrated assessments and planning are internal UN processes, they have to define the strategic positioning and role of the UN vis-à-vis national and international actors on the basis of UN comparative advantages and the activities being carried out by these actors.
23. **Recognition of the diversity of UN mandates and principles:** Integrated assessment and planning processes must take into account all recognized principles of UN engagement across humanitarian, human rights, development, political and security areas.
24. **Upfront analysis of risks and benefits:** Integrated assessment and planning processes must include an analysis of the risks and benefits that integration arrangements may result in, particularly for humanitarian activities. Integrated assessment and planning processes should provide a forum to assess these risks and benefits and decide on ways to manage them in a manner satisfactory to all UN entities involved.
25. **Mainstreaming:** All integrated assessment and planning processes should take into account relevant UN policies, including on human rights, gender and child protection.

## F. Overview of minimum requirements

26. The minimum requirements set out in this policy apply throughout the life-cycle of integrated presences. Their application starts with the establishment of Integrated Task Forces as soon as an integrated presence is being considered. Their application concludes with the withdrawal of a Security Council or General Assembly authorized mission.<sup>6</sup>
27. All integrated assessment and planning processes must meet the following requirements, which are described in more detail in the sections below:
  - (1) The joint conduct of **Strategic Assessments** to ensure a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and

<sup>6</sup> See Policy on UN Transition in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal.

core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities;

- (2) The articulation of a **common UN vision, priorities and respective responsibilities** in support of peace consolidation, including relationship, if any, to national plans and priorities;
- (3) The establishment of **integrated mechanisms** for joint analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring and decision-making on joint strategic and operational matters at both field and Headquarters levels;
- (4) The conduct of **integrated monitoring and reporting** on the implementation of Integrated Strategic Frameworks.

### G. Requirement 1: Joint conduct of Strategic Assessments

28. The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Ahead of Mission start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences, the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re)configuration<sup>7</sup> of UN engagement for the consideration of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Council.
29. The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by:
  - a. The Secretary-General; or
  - b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security; or
  - c. An Integrated Task Force at Director level or above
30. Strategic Assessments can be proposed by a number of UN entities including:
  - a. A member of the Policy Committee
  - b. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security
  - c. A member of the Integrated Task Force
  - d. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission
  - e. The RC and/or HC, representing the UNCT
31. Strategic Assessments should complement, and draw on, any other analytical processes that components of the UN system may have undertaken on the ground.

<sup>7</sup> Including the specialised civilian capabilities that may be required and possible partnerships that should be established to meet such needs.

32. Relevant interlocutors should be consulted including, to the extent possible, national authorities, civil society and other local representatives, as well as relevant regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions and key member states.

#### *Settings where an integrated UN presence has not been established*

33. Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is being considered.
34. Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is undertaken by a Headquarters-based Integrated Task Force, which may already exist<sup>8</sup> or may need to be established. The Strategic Assessment is then undertaken in consultation with the UNCT.

#### *Settings where an integrated UN presence has already been established*

35. Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments should be carried out following a significant change in the situation or prior to a substantial change in a Mission's mandate. In these settings, Strategic Assessments can be initiated at field or HQ level.

#### *Follow up to Strategic Assessments*

36. Strategic Assessments result in a report and, where required, a recommendation to the Secretary-General through the Policy Committee. Strategic Assessments do not necessarily result in a recommendation to initiate planning for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission or changes to existing arrangements. In all cases, the chair of the Integrated Task Force has the obligation to reflect any disagreements over findings and/or proposed options when finalizing the report and recommendations to the Secretary-General and/or the Policy Committee.
37. The decision on the options proposed in a Strategic Assessment, including whether to initiate planning for the establishment of an integrated UN presence or to propose changes to an existing presence, strategy or mandate, lies with the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's decision is expressed in a statement of intent<sup>9</sup> containing a designation or reaffirmation of a lead entity at Headquarters for implementation. If a decision has been made to propose the establishment of a Mission, the recommendation is articulated in a report

<sup>8</sup> Such as Inter-Agency Task Forces established under the UN Policy on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings or other ad hoc inter-agency working groups. See Requirement 3 for further guidance on Integrated Task Forces.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Planning Directive, PC Decision or other document spelling out strategic objectives and essential modalities for implementation.

of the Secretary-General to the Security Council developed in accordance with paragraph 63 of this policy.

38. The Security Council, based on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, decides whether or not to authorize the establishment, reconfiguration or termination of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission and issues a mandate accordingly.
39. If the Security Council authorizes the establishment of a Mission or changes to an existing mandate, the mandate and Strategic Assessments should be used as a basis for the development or revision of the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Framework as detailed in paragraphs 40-52.

#### **H. Requirement 2: Articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and responsibilities in support of peace consolidation, including relationship, if any, to national plans and priorities**

##### *i. Directive to the S/ERSG,<sup>10</sup> RC and HC*

40. Based on the mandate from the Security Council, the Strategic Assessment and decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is drafted by Integrated Task Forces as part of the integrated assessment and planning process.
41. The Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC signifies the transfer of responsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence.
42. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is issued and updated by the Secretary-General upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force at Principal level. Updates will usually result from a significant change in the environment or mandate, supported as required by an updated Strategic Assessment.

##### *ii. Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)*

43. On the basis of mandates, integrated assessments and the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC the vision, shared objectives and means through which the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated through an inclusive analytical and planning process whose conclusions are reflected in an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) document.
44. The content of the ISF document must include:

<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of this policy, the term S/ERSG is used to refer to the head of a peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission and therefore also applies to Special Coordinators.

- a. The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, UN role and comparative advantages;
  - b. A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity development and institution-building;
  - c. An articulation of all programmatic, functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration;
  - d. Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities and other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms;
  - e. A common monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of progress.
45. Other UN planning frameworks (such as a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)) may serve as Integrated Strategic Frameworks if their content meets the standards outlined in paragraph 44. The decision to use such frameworks as the Integrated Strategic Framework or have a separate document is made by the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSs, RC and HC in consultation with other senior managers and Headquarters, and on the basis of a gap analysis of existing planning processes and products. The opportunity for combining planning frameworks and harmonizing planning processes should be regularly assessed, with due consideration for respective programming and budgetary cycles.
  46. The title, timing for development, timeframe, structure, content and ownership of the process and its product are determined by S/ERSG Deputy SRSs, RC and HC, in consultation with other senior managers. These parameters vary with context, with particular consideration given to national milestones and UN agency planning requirements and timelines.
  47. The decision to develop an Integrated Strategic Framework jointly with national authorities and other partners rests with the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSs, RC and HC following consultation with Integrated Task Forces.
  48. Once developed and endorsed, the ISF document serves as a regular reference for an on-going field-based process of joint analysis and review of the UN-wide strategies and arrangements for peace consolidation. As such, its nature and content may shift over time and may combine elements of strategic, programmatic, communication and operational integration. It should also include measures to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitarian operations.
  49. The shared analysis should build on, where relevant, other assessments including Strategic Assessments, humanitarian needs assessments, risk analysis or those led by other national, regional and international institutions such as Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and Fragility Assessments. National authorities, civil society, other local representatives, affected populations and key international partners should be consulted as part of the process to ensure that, at a minimum, local perspectives are taken into account in the analysis and identification of UN priorities.

50. The Integrated Strategic Framework must include a monitoring and reporting framework to track adherence to responsibilities and progress towards results with a view to promoting accountability, making adjustments to activities or revising plans.
51. Integrated Strategic Frameworks are developed, updated and endorsed in the field under the leadership of S/ERSGs, DSRSGs, Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes. ISFs are also endorsed at Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces at the Director-level and signed-off by the USG of the lead department.
52. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be reviewed as necessary, especially after any substantial change in the mandate, Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC or circumstances on the ground, or at least every two years. The review of Integrated Strategic Frameworks is carried out by integrated mechanisms in the field and in cooperation with HQ as stipulated in paragraph 58 of this policy.

*Linkages between Integrated Strategic Frameworks and other planning processes*

53. A shared understanding of other existing planning processes, including content, timeframes, budgetary implications and degree of national ownership, must inform the development or revision of Integrated Strategic Frameworks.
54. Whenever possible and appropriate, the ISF must take into account and reflect existing national and international planning frameworks and articulate to which national peace consolidation priorities the UN will collectively contribute. To the extent possible and appropriate, planning timelines should be aligned and ISF monitoring systems should seek to use and strengthen national monitoring indicators.
55. Agencies, funds and programmes must ensure consistency between the joint analysis, strategic priorities and responsibilities agreed to in the Integrated Strategic Framework and relevant parts of their various country programming frameworks including the UNDAF and the CAP, the country programme documents and the country programme action plan. Depending on the timing of its development and finalization, the ISF informs the development or the revision of agency frameworks and annual plans, with due consideration for the various governance and budgetary considerations regulating such internal processes.
56. Peacekeeping and field-based Special Political Missions must ensure consistency between the joint analysis, strategic priorities and responsibilities agreed to in the Integrated Strategic Framework and relevant parts of their strategies for mandate implementation, including the Mission Concept which articulates the main objectives and tasks of the Mission for each phase of its operations. These strategies guide other Mission-specific planning processes and products, including related technical assessments, component and support plans, concepts of operation, administrative plans and results-based budgets. The Mission Concept reflects the responsibilities agreed to in the ISF, and is revised when the ISF is revised.

### I. Requirement 3: Integrated mechanisms

57. At Headquarters, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) are the main forum for joint assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consultations and decision-making support. Integrated Task Forces should consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated settings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have implications for other entities. ITFs should be used to resolve policy differences between UN entities, ensure information-sharing between Missions and UNCTs, and consult thematic entities as needed. Integrated Task Forces are established and chaired by lead departments on behalf of the UN system and include representatives of all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DPA, DFS, PBSO, OHCHR and DSS as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the “2+4” formula adopted in 2006.<sup>11</sup> Field presences should also be represented. Task forces meet at the Director or Principal level as needed or as required by the present policy.
58. At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate. The configuration of these structures should be tailored to each context,<sup>12</sup> but in all cases they should include:
  - a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. This forum should include the key in-country decision-makers such as the S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission components and Heads of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes. External partners should be invited to participate where appropriate.
  - b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. All entities that are part of the integrated presence should either be represented in or seek to otherwise contribute to the joint analytical and planning capacity.
59. It is a responsibility of senior leadership in the field and at HQ to convene integrated mechanisms on a regular basis to discuss and make decisions on joint strategic and operational issues.

### J. Requirement 4: Integrated monitoring and reporting

60. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must include from the start a monitoring and reporting mechanism, including measurable and meaningful benchmarks<sup>13</sup> and

<sup>11</sup> Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, up to four representatives from the UN agencies, funds, and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question and capacity to engage.

<sup>12</sup> Examples of field-level mechanisms are included in the How-to Guidelines.

<sup>13</sup> Benchmarks should echo those used by the Security Council to monitor progress with peace consolidation.

risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support decision-making. Other existing monitoring and reporting frameworks may be used where relevant.

61. The joint analytical and planning capacity tracks progress and reports to the senior UN leadership forum and, through this forum, to Headquarters on progress towards common objectives agreed to and articulated in the Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Frameworks. When appropriate, it provides recommendations for changes in strategy or objectives based on this analysis.
62. Additionally, progress against the UN priorities outlined in integrated plans must be reflected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the implementation of these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mechanisms.

#### **K. Responsibilities, authority and accountability for integrated assessment and planning**

63. Under the guidance of the Secretary-General and in coordination with field leadership and Task Force partners, lead departments at HQ are responsible for:
  - a. Establishing, convening and chairing Integrated Task Forces where an integrated UN presence is in place or as soon as one is being considered;
  - b. Initiating, organising and conducting integrated assessment and planning processes in line with the present policy, including ensuring that consultations and information-sharing take place at all phases of the process, leading integrated assessment missions and coordinating the finalisation of Task Force-approved documents such as Directives to S/ERSGs, RC and HC;
  - c. Following consultations with relevant UN partners, drafting and finalising Strategic Assessment reports, submissions to the Policy Committee and reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. Lead departments must ensure that, where they occur, diverging points of view are reflected in a transparent manner in submissions to the Secretary-General or the Policy Committee.
64. Special and Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General, supported by Deputy SRSs, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners, Chiefs of Staff and other senior managers, are responsible for initiating, organising and leading integrated assessment and planning processes at field level, for the establishment of the required integrated mechanisms and for the conduct of field-level consultations on draft planning and reporting documents. S/ERSGs are responsible for ensuring that responsibilities assigned to a peacekeeping or field-based Special Political Mission in mandates, in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Framework are reflected in the Mission Concept and prioritised accordingly in the Results-based Budget and component workplans.

65. UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators are responsible, respectively, for ensuring, where relevant, consistency between the Integrated Strategic Framework and the UNDAF and the CHAP. They should promote, as appropriate, harmonization of the underlying analytical and planning processes.
66. Agencies, both at HQ and in the field, are responsible for participating in and contributing inputs to all phases of integrated assessment and planning, including integrated assessments and other joint analytical processes.
67. Heads of UN agencies, funds and programmes in the field are responsible for ensuring that responsibilities agreed to in Integrated Strategic Frameworks are reflected in agency plans for peace consolidation and prioritised accordingly in terms of resource mobilization and allocation.
68. The finalization, implementation, and regular review of Integrated Strategic Frameworks is a joint responsibility of S/ERSGs, Resident Coordinators, Humanitarian Coordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes, including through cooperation in mobilizing resources against peace consolidation priorities.
69. Delivery against priorities outlined in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HQ and Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be integrated into existing accountability mechanisms, including S/ERSG Compacts and existing performance systems for DSRSs, RC/HCs and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes.

#### **L. Implementation of this policy**

70. Each UN entity is responsible for ensuring the implementation of this policy.
71. Lead departments, Integrated Task Forces and the senior leadership forum in the field are responsible for monitoring the implementation of this policy in each particular situation.
72. Disagreements over the interpretation or implementation of this policy that cannot be resolved by Integrated Task Forces at the Director or Principal level shall be referred to the Integration Steering Group, or the Policy Committee.
73. The policy should be reviewed no later than 1 March 2015, on the basis of an evaluation to be commissioned by the Integration Steering Group.